Dauti v. Lighting Services, Inc. (Concurrence)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
****************************************************** The officially released date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the officially released date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the officially released date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ****************************************************** DAUTI v. LIGHTING SERVICES, INC. CONCURRENCE LAVINE, J., concurring. I concur in the majority s result, but I do not believe that General Statutes § 31294c (a) is clear and unambiguous.1 I again want to draw attention to the concerns expressed by our Supreme Court in Fredette v. Connecticut Air National Guard, 283 Conn. 813, 839, 930 A.2d 666 (2007) (urging legislature to address gaps and inconsistencies in statute). See Wikander v. Asbury Automotive Group/David McDavid Acura, 137 Conn. App. 665, 679, A.3d (2012) (Lavine, J., concurring). Although the worker in this case died on the date of the alleged work-related accident and no notice was filed by any party within one year from the date of the accident, the plaintiffs action is saved by the proviso portion of § 31-294c (a). I believe that the proviso portion of the statute is problematic as it melds the time in which a claim for benefits must be filed for both accidental and occupational disease cases. I respectfully suggest that the legislature may wish to clarify the statute by stating, in separate sentences or provisions, the limitation period or periods within which to file claims for an injury that causes a worker to die on the date of the accident, for deaths that occur as a result of the accident but not on the date of the accident and for deaths arising from occupational diseases. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 1 My concerns are set forth more fully in Wikander v. Asbury Automotive Group/David McDavid Acura, 137 Conn. App. 665, 679, A.3d (2012) (Lavine, J., concurring). Wikander also is a case in which the worker suffered an alleged work-related heart attack and died the same day. Id., 667.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
