Ark. Highway & Transp. Dep't v. O.J.’s Serv. Two, Inc. (Majority)

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Justia Opinion Summary

In 2014, the Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department issued a bid invitation for a janitorial and cleaning-services contract. O.J.’s Service Two, Inc. submitted a bid for the contract. The Highway Department, however, awarded the contract to another bidder, RazorClean. O.J.’s protested the contract award, contending that RazorClean’s bid did not conform to the specifications in the bid invitation. The Highway Department denied O.J.’s protest. Thereafter, O.J.’s filed suit against the Highway Department and other state defendants (collectively, “Defendants”) requesting a writ of mandamus compelling Defendants to follow the Arkansas procurement laws and regulations and requiring Defendants to declare the contract with RazorClean null and void and to award the contract to O.J.’s. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that O.J.’s claims were barred by sovereign immunity. The circuit court denied the motion. Defendants subsequently filed this interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot, holding that because the contract at issue in the lawsuit had been fully performed, the matter is now moot, and none of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply.

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2015 Ark. 388 a SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CV-15-27 ARKANSAS STATE HIGHWAY AND TRANSPORTATI ON DEPARTMENT; DIRECTOR SCOTT BENNETT; ARKANSAS STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION; CHAIRMAN JOHN ED REGENOLD; DICK TRAMMEL; TOM SCHUECK; ROBERT MOORE; JR.; AND FRANK SCOTT, JR. APPELLANTS ,S Opinion Delivered October 29,2015 APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT INO. 60CV- 1 4- 1,231,] HONORABLE ALICE S. GRAY, JUDGE APPEAL DISMISSED. SERVICE TWO, INC. APPELLEE COURTNEY HUDSON GOODSON, Associate Justice This is an interlocutory appeal fror.n thc Ptrlaski Counly Circuit Court's denial of a ntotion to disnriss on sovereiqn-inrnrurriry erounds filed Tmnsportatiolr 1)e by appellants, Arkansas Statc Hiehrvay and partnlclrt; its director Scott Bennett; Arkansas Statc Highrvay Conrnrission; its chairnran-fohn Ed l\cgcnold; and Dick Tranrnrcl, Tonr Schucck. Robert Moore,-fr., and Frank Scott, -f r. in their capacities as nrenrbers oFthc Arkansas Statc Hiehway Conrnrission ("thc State Dcfendants"). The undcrlyine lawstrit involvcs a contract fbr janitorial and clcaning scrvices bctween the Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Dcpartnrcr-rt ("thc Higliway I)cpartnrent") and a third part), IlazorClean. Becausc the contract at issue in the lalvsuit has bcen ftrlly perfornred, the nrattcr is now nloot. Accordingly, rvc disnriss thc appeal. The relcvant lacts in this appeal :lre as lollorvs. h-rJanuary 2014, the Highway l)epartnrcnt 2015 Ark. 388 issued a bid invitation for a janitorial and cleaning-services contract for February 19,2074, through February 18,201,5. Appellee, OJ." Service Two, Inc. ("OJ.'s"), submitted a bid for the contract, but the Highway Department ultimately awarded the contract to another bidder, RazorClean, on February 1.0,2074. OJ.'r filed a formal protest ofthe contract award, arguing that RazorClean's bid did not conform to the specifications in the bid invitation and should not have been accepted invalid. The Highway Department issued a letter denying OJ.'r protest, stating that there was no procedure for reevaluating the award of a because the references RazorClean provided were contract and that the Highway Department had followed its bid process by inquiring about the reGrences provided. On March 25, 2014, OJ.'r filed suit against the State Defendants requesting a writ of mandamus compelling the deGndants to follow the Arkansas procurement laws and regulations, as well as requiring the defendants to declare the contract with RazorClean null and void and to award the contract to OJ.'s. The State Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that OJ.'s claims were barred by sovereign ininiuniry. OJ." responded that sovereign immunity did not apply because the suit was one to enforce a purely nrinisterial dury, and because the Highway Departnrent had acted illegally in awarding the contract without properly following Arkansas procllrenrent laws. The circuit court der-ried the r-notion, and the State Defendants have f-iled this ir-rterlocutory appeal pllrsuant to Rule 2(a)(10) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure-Civi1. Before reaching the merits of thc appeal, we nlust first address the State Defendants' threshold argument that the case has become moot because the contract at issue has now expired, as it was for services fronr February 19,2014, through February 18,2015. As a general rule, the cv-t5-27 2015 Ark. 388 appellate courts of this state Serus., lnc.,201.2 will not review moot. City of Clinton u. S. Paramedic issues that are Ark.88,387 S.\V.3d137. To do so would be to render advisory opinions, which this court will not do. Id. We have generally held that a case becomes moot when any judgment rendered would have no practical legal effect upon a then-existing legal controversy. Id. In other words, a moot case presents no justiciable issue for determination by the cotrt. Cen. Pub. Co. u. Erxleben, 283 Ark. 136,671S.W.2d 1,82 (1984). We have recognrzed that when state contract has been is rendered 'We moot. fully performed, a a challenge to the grant of the contract to a particular parry Id. agree that this appeal is moot because the contract at issue in the litigation has been perfornred. Our decision rn Erxleben is instructive on this issue. In that case, the State ofArkansas invited bids for publication of certain volumes of the Arkansas Reports. The contract was awarded to United Services of Arkansas, and General Publishing Cor-npany cl'rallenged the award of the contract, arguing that at the tinrc the contract was awardcd, [Jnited Scrvices ofArkansas was not a propcr applicant. Thc circtrit court disnrissed the casc, rulins that no justiciable controversy cxisted becausc the contract had been lully pcrfornrcd. Or-r appcal, r,vc aflimred the ruling of the trial court and held that thc casc was nroot. Sir-nilarly. in Fris61, 17. .!rrorl3 Sr/rool District,282 Ark. 81, 666 S.W.2d 391 (1984), wc aflirnred thc trial corlrt's disnrissal of a case as nloot rvherc te rr achcr cl-rallcnged the nonrencwal of hcr tcachins contract. Becalrsc the contract year had er-rdcd, we held that the teacher's request lor for tltc ycar was rl nloot a writ olmandanrus to conrpel thc school board to hire her issrrc. In this case, the janitorial contract betwcen the Highway Dcpartr-nent an'd RazorClean covercd the period from February 19,2014, through Fcbruary 18,2015. Like the contracts in cv-15-27 2015 Ark. 388 Erxleben and Frisby, the contract in this case has expired. Accordingly, the case is moot because there is no reliefthat the court could give OJ.'s on its petition for a writ ofmandamus. Although the contract does provide for the possibility of renewal upon the mutual written agreement of both parties, OJ.'s has provided no evidence of any such renewal. Because the record does not demonstrate that the contract has been renewed, it fails to show that a justiciable controversy between the parties exists. The record contains only one contract, and that contract expired in February 201,5. Thus, because the instant contract forjanitorial services has been fully performed, there is no longer any justiciable controversy between the parties. 'We have recognized two exceptions to the mootness doctrine, but neither exception applies in this case. The first exception involves issues that are capable of repetition, yet evading review. City oJ Creentuood u. Shatlout Lake Ass'n, lnc.,2015 Ark. 143,459 S.W.3d 291. This exception does not apply here because the instant case trlrns on distinct facts that are unlikely to be rcpcatcd. /d. Specifically, this case involves an isolatcd contract forjanitorial services that has expircd and OJ.'s claitls that the Highway Departnrcnt awarded thc contract in violation of the procurcl])cnt lar,vs of Arkansas. Bccause there is no wlly for this corlrt to forecast rvhcther the Hiehrvay Departtnent rvill enter into :rnother contract fbr jar-ritorial scrvices, or rvhat thc ternrs of sttch a contract r,vould [rc, the first exception to the nrootness doctrir"rc is inapplicablc. The second cxccption to thc nlootl)ess doctrinc conccrlls issucs that raise considerations oisrtbstantial public interest which, if addressed, rvotrld prevent futtrrc litigation. Bd. ttf Dirs. of City Ltf Hot Springs u. Pritchett,2015 Ark. 17,454 S.W.3d 223. Thls exccption is also inapplicable in this case becattse "a deternrirration o[the issue presented arrd trnique facts presented." City oJCreenruood,2015 would be dependent Ark. 143, at7,459 S.W.3d or-r thc specific ^t296. Thus, cv-15-27 2015 Ark. 388 "any decision by this court would not serve to prevent ltrture litigation." Id. Accordinel;,, we disnriss the instant appeal as rlloot. Appeal dismissed. Leslie Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Gary L. Sullivan, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellants. Tiffany F. Flock; and Hope, Trice, O'Dwyer & Wilson, P.A., by: Ralph "Win" Wilson III, and Ronald A. Hope, for appellee. cv-15-27

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