Rhodes v. State
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Cite as 2011 Ark. 146
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No.
CR09-76
Opinion Delivered
JARVIS RHODES,
APPELLANT,
VS.
April 7, 2011
APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
NO. CR-1984-358-2-5-2,
HON. ROBERT H. WYATT, JR.,
JUDGE,
STATE OF ARKANSAS,
APPELLEE,
AFFIRMED.
JIM GUNTER, Associate Justice
Appellant appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus based on new
scientific evidence. On appeal, appellant urges this court to reevaluate our holdings regarding
the State’s duty to preserve evidence and find that a defendant has greater due-process rights
regarding the preservation of evidence under the Arkansas Constitution than under the United
States Constitution. Because this argument is not preserved for appellate review, we affirm.
Appellant was originally convicted of capital felony murder in 1985, but this court
reversed his conviction because of the equivocation of a juror. Rhodes v. State, 290 Ark. 60,
716 S.W.2d 758 (1986). Upon remand and retrial, appellant was again convicted of capital
felony murder and sentenced to life without parole. His counsel filed a “no merit” brief, and
this court affirmed the conviction in an opinion not designated for publication. Rhodes v.
State, CR 88-41 (Ark. Dec. 12, 1988). Appellant then sought postconviction relief pursuant
Cite as 2011 Ark. 146
to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37, but this court denied his petition to pursue such relief in an
unpublished per curiam opinion. Rhodes v. State, CR 88-41 (Ark. Dec. 17, 1990).
On October 15, 2002, appellant filed, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-112-201
through -207 (Supp. 2001), a pro se “Petition For Analyze of Scientific Evidence,” asking the
court to order testing on the physical evidence from his case, including the debris removed
from under the victim’s fingernails. On December 9, 2003, appellant filed another petition
to “vacate and set aside judgment,” in which he again asked for DNA testing of the skin
samples taken from the victim. On February 10, 2004, the Office of the Public Defender was
appointed to represent appellant.
Effective August 12, 2005, the Arkansas DNA testing statutes were amended by Act
2250. On September 13, 2005, appellant again filed a petition asking for DNA testing of “all
evidence currently in possession of the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory” and alleging that
such testing would “scientifically establish that petitioner was not present when decedent was
killed.” On October 13, 2005, the court entered an order that “[a]ll evidence currently in
possession of the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory or any of its authorized personnel should
be tested pursuant to Act 2250 of 2005, A.C.A. 16-112-201, et. seq.”
On May 1, 2007, a hearing was held, at which Sergeant Charles Cash with the Pine
Bluff Police Department, who was in charge of the crime scene and evidence division,
testified that the nail clippings from the victim could not be located. He testified that the
paperwork indicated that custody of the clippings was transferred to John Cone, a prosecuting
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attorney. Appellant’s counsel requested that DNA testing be performed on all evidence that
had been submitted to the State Crime Laboratory, which included a spray can, paint
scrapings, an Exacto-type knife, two glass vials, hair samples, and a length of string. The State
agreed to the testing of those items. Appellant then asked the court directly what was to be
done about the missing fingernails, which appellant said was the only thing that could
exonerate him, and the court told him that without proof that the fingernails were
intentionally destroyed, the court could not grant him any relief. On May 4, 2007, the court
entered an order listing the evidence to be tested and ordering the State Crime Laboratory to
submit its findings in a report to the court within forty-five days of the entry of the order.
On November 6, 2007, another hearing was held. Edward Vollman, a forensic
serologist at the State Crime Laboratory, testified that no male-specific DNA was found on
the vaginal, rectal, and oral swabs from the victim, nor was there male-specific DNA found
on the wooden handle of the knife. Vollman also testified that a bag marked “possible human
hair” and the length of string had not been tested. The State indicated that it would resubmit
the possible head hairs and the piece of string to determine whether a DNA profile could be
obtained from either item.
A third hearing was held on September 17, 2008. At the hearing, Mary Simonson, a
DNA examiner for the State Crime Laboratory, testified that she tested item E-Q1, identified
as multi-colored fibers, and item H-Q1, identified as swabs from a piece of string, and
compared these items to a known DNA sample from the victim. Simonson testified that the
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partial profile obtained from both items was consistent with the profile from the victim.
Simonson testified that she also analyzed anal swabs that had previously been tested but not
compared to the victim’s profile and that no foreign DNA was found on those swabs.
Simonson concluded that no DNA matter from any male was found on the items that she
tested, and she stated that no fingernail clippings had ever been submitted to her for testing
in reference to this case.
Appellant’s counsel then explained to the court that the fingernail clippings were of
vital importance to his client’s case and asked that, if those fingernail clippings are found in
the future, the public defender’s office be notified. The court agreed that if the fingernail
clippings “ever show up and I’m still here, I will enter an order that they be tested.”
However, the court found that, based on everything that had been tested, there was nothing
that “would rise to the level to where this Court could offer Mr. Rhodes any relief from his
conviction.” Therefore, the court denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus because
“there’s nothing new here for the Court to look at that would exonerate Mr. Rhodes in this
matter.” On October 27, 2008, the court entered an order finding that appellant had failed
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was entitled to any relief under Act
2250. Appellant filed a notice of appeal from this order on November 4, 2008.
On appeal, appellant argues that this court should grant his petition for habeas corpus
because the State’s failure to preserve physical evidence, specifically the fingernail clippings,
deprived him of due process under the Arkansas Constitution. Appellant acknowledges that
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this court has previously followed the standard set by the United States Supreme Court in
Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), in which the Court held that unless a criminal
defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful
evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law. See Lee v. State, 327 Ark. 692, 942
S.W.2d 231 (1997) (holding that defendant had failed to establish that the State’s failure to
preserve a blood sample was in bad faith, thus defendant was not deprived of his right to due
process); Wenzel v. State, 306 Ark. 527, 815 S.W.2d 938 (1991) (holding that the State’s
failure to preserve samples so that the defense could conduct its own tests did not violate due
process in the absence of a showing that the evidence possessed any apparent exculpatory
value before it was destroyed or that the State acted in bad faith). Appellant argues, however,
that this is the appropriate case for this court to reevaluate our holdings and find that a
defendant has greater due-process rights regarding the preservation of evidence under the
Arkansas Constitution than under the United States Constitution.
In place of the bad-faith standard, appellant urges this court to adopt the Connecticut
Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Morales, 657 A.2d 585 (Conn. 1995). In Morales, the court
held that, under its state constitution, due process required the trial court to apply a balancing
test,
weighing the reasons for the unavailability of the evidence against the degree of
prejudice to the accused. More specifically, the trial court must balance the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the missing evidence, including the following factors:
“the materiality of the missing evidence, the likelihood of mistaken interpretation of
it by witnesses or the jury, the reason for its nonavailability to the defense and the
prejudice to the defendant caused by the unavailability of the evidence.”
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Morales, 657 A.2d at 594–95 (quoting State v. Asherman, 478 A.2d 227, 246 (Conn. 1984)).
The court also held that, if a due-process violation is found, the trial court may fashion the
appropriate remedy, which in some cases may require the dismissal of charges.
Appellant argues that, in this case, it should not matter whether the Pine Bluff Police
Department or the prosecutor’s office acted in bad faith, because the end result is that the
fingernail clippings are unavailable for DNA testing, and thus appellant has lost any chance
of being exonerated by the scientific analysis of the fingernail clippings. Appellant contends
that this court should find that the loss of the fingernail clippings renders his conviction
fundamentally unfair and that, using a balancing of the Morales factors above, he should be
granted a new trial.
However, we are precluded from reaching the merits of appellant’s argument because
it is being raised for the first time on appeal. There is no evidence that appellant raised this
due-process argument below or that he ever requested the circuit court to consider granting
him greater due-process rights regarding the preservation of evidence under the Arkansas
Constitution than under the United States Constitution. In short, appellant’s argument on
appeal was never articulated to the circuit court, and this court has held many times that
constitutional claims may not be raised for the first time on appeal. See Randall v. State, 368
Ark. 279, 244 S.W.3d 662 (2006) (affirming denial of habeas corpus relief because defendant
failed to raise constitutional arguments at the circuit court level). Therefore, we find that
appellant’s argument on appeal is not preserved for appellate review and affirm.
Affirmed.
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