Danny Lee Hooper v. State of Arkansas

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ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT  No.  CR 07­816  Opinion Delivered  November 29, 2007  PRO SE MOTION FOR DUPLICATION  OF BRIEF AT PUBLIC EXPENSE  [CIRCUIT COURT OF WASHINGTON  COUNTY, CR 2005­761, HON.  WILLIAM A. STOREY, JUDGE]  DANNY LEE HOOPER  Appellant  v.  STATE OF ARKANSAS  Appellee  APPEAL DISMISSED; MOTION  MOOT.  PER CURIAM  In 2005, appellant Danny Lee Hooper was found guilty by a jury of three counts of rape,  kidnapping,  robbery,  residential  burglary,  and  third­degree  battery  and  sentenced  as  a  habitual  offender to an aggregate sentence of 1,320 months’ imprisonment.  The Arkansas Court of Appeals  affirmed.  Hooper v. State, CACR 05­1381 (Ark. App. Aug. 30, 2006).  Subsequently,  appellant  timely  filed  in  the  trial  court  a  verified  pro  se  petition  for  relief  pursuant to Ark. R. Crim P. 37.1.  The trial court denied the petition after a hearing, and appellant  has lodged an appeal here from the order.  Now  before  us  is  appellant’s  pro  se  motion for  duplication of his  brief­in­chief at  public  expense.  We need not consider the motion as it is apparent that appellant could not prevail in this  appeal if it were permitted to go forward.  Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and hold the motion  moot.  An appeal from an order that denied a petition for postconviction relief will not be permitted  to go forward, where it is clear that the appellant could not prevail.  Pardue v. State, 338 Ark. 606,  999 S.W.2d 198 (1999) (per curiam); Seaton v. State, 324 Ark. 236, 920 S.W.2d 13 (1996) (per curiam).  Evidence adduced at trial showed that appellant broke into the victim’s house, tied her up,  raped her, and hit her.  In the Rule 37.1 petition and at the hearing on the petition, appellant raised  the following arguments:  (1) that he should have been found guilty of a single count of rape, rather  than three  counts; (2)  that  trial counsel rendered  ineffective  assistance  by  failing  to  move  for  a  directed verdict after the defense rested; (3) that the sentences appellant received for all counts should  have been imposed concurrently, rather than consecutively; (4) that he was not told by counsel that  he did not have to testify.  In his first argument, appellant raised a direct attack on the judgment, and such claims are not  cognizable in a Rule 37.1 proceeding.  Camargo v. State, 346 Ark. 118, 55 S.W.3d 255 (2001)  (citing Davis v. State, 345 Ark. 161, 44 S.W.3d 726 (2001)).  Rule 37.1 is a means to collaterally  attack a conviction and does not provide a method for the review of mere error in the conduct of the  trial or to serve as a substitute for appeal.  Id.  His argument regarding whether he should have been  convicted for one count or three counts of rape was previously raised in his direct appeal.  Rule 37.1  does not provide appellant a means to raise the issue again.  Davis, supra.  For his second argument, appellant contended that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance  by failing to renew the defense’s motion for directed verdict at the end of the trial.  This failure, he  maintains, denied him his right to challenge his conviction on the grounds that the evidence was  insufficient to sustain the judgment.  In an appeal from a trial court’s denial of a petition under Rule  37.1, the question presented is whether, based on the totality of the evidence, the trial court clearly  erred  in  holding  that  counsel’s  performance  was  not  ineffective  under  the  standard  set  forth  in  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  Jackson v. State, 352 Ark. 359, 105 S.W.3d 352 ­2­  (2003).  Under Strickland, a petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was deficient through  a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel”  guaranteed the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment.  Additionally, a petitioner must show that the  deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which requires a showing that counsel’s errors were  so serious as to deprive the petitioner of a fair trial.  Andrews v. State, 344 Ark. 606, 42 S.W.3d 484  (2001) (per curiam).  The standard for proving ineffective assistance of counsel places the burden on appellant to  provide facts to support his claims of prejudice.  Nelson v. State, 344 Ark. 407, 39 S.W.3d 791  (2001) (per curiam).  Allegations without  factual substantiation are insufficient to overcome the  presumption  that  counsel  is  effective.  Id.  Conclusory  statements  cannot  be  the  basis  for  postconviction relief.  Jackson, supra.  In his direct appeal, the court of appeals refused to consider the issue of whether appellant  should have been found guilty of one count or three counts of rape or address the sufficiency of the  evidence, based on counsel’s failure to renew the motion for directed verdict.  However, failure to  renew  a  motion  for  directed  verdict  is  not,  in  itself,  sufficient  to  support  a  claim  of  ineffective  assistance.  Here, appellant failed to show that an argument based on the sufficiency of the evidence  or attacking his conviction for three counts of rape would have been successful at trial or on appeal.  Without such a showing, appellant could not meet his burden of proving the prejudice component of  Strickland.  Nelson, supra.  As a result, appellant’s argument was merely conclusory and could not  overcome the presumption that counsel was effective.  Jackson, supra; Nelson, supra.  1 Next, as to whether his sentences should have been imposed concurrently or consecutively,  1  The judgment entered in this matter reflected that the sentence imposed for Count 3 will  run consecutively to the sentences imposed in Counts 1 and 2.  The sentences imposed in Counts  ­3­  that decision was solely within the province of the trial judge.  Smith v. State, 352 Ark. 92, 98 S.W.3d  433 (2003).  So long as appellant’s sentences were not excessive, the issue of whether his sentences  should have run concurrently or consecutively should have been raised at trial or on appeal and does  not present the proper basis for a Rule 37.1 claim.  Camargo, supra; Davis, supra.  To the degree  that the issue could be raised as a claim that counsel was ineffective for failure to obtain concurrent  sentences, appellant failed to show how counsel could have achieved that result.  Jackson, supra;  Nelson, supra.  As to his fourth claim, in the Rule 37.1 hearing, appellant maintained that counsel failed to  advise him that he did not have to testify at trial.  However, counsel testified that he discussed with  appellant his right not to testify, and a strategic decision was made for appellant to take the stand.  Matters of trial strategy and tactics fall within the realm of counsel’s professional judgment and are  not grounds for a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Camargo, supra; Noel v. State, 342  Ark. 35, 26 S.W.3d 123 (2000).  Conflicts in the testimony at the hearing were for the trial judge to resolve.  The judge was  not required to believe the testimony of any witness, especially that of the petitioner as he was the  person most interested in the outcome of the proceedings.  See Harper v. State, 359 Ark. 142, 194  S.W.3d 730 (2004).  Here, the trial court found the testimony of counsel to be more believable and  that appellant had been advised of his right not to testify.  Appeal dismissed; motion moot. 4, 5 and 6 will run concurrently as to each other but will run consecutively to the sentences for  Counts 1, 2 and 3.  ­4­ 

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