James Everett Nelson v. State of Arkansas
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ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT
No.
CR 07-418
Opinion Delivered
JAMES EVERETT NELSON
Appellant
v.
STATE OF ARKANSAS
Appellee
September 27, 2007
APPELLEE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
APPEAL [CIRCUIT COURT OF
WASHINGTON COUNTY, CR 20022121, HON. KIM MARTIN SMITH,
JUDGE]
MOTION GRANTED; APPEAL
DISMISSED.
PER CURIAM
In 2003, a jury found appellant James Everett Nelson guilty of possession of drug
paraphernalia with intent to manufacture methamphetamine and possession of pseudoephedrine and,
in 2004, the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate sentence of 600 months’ imprisonment in the
Arkansas Department of Correction. Appellant appealed the judgment and the Arkansas Court of
Appeals reversed. Nelson v. State, 92 Ark. App. 275, 212 S.W.3d 31 (2005). However, on review,
this court affirmed the trial court. Nelson v. State, 365 Ark. 314, 229 S.W.3d 35 (2006). The
mandate issued on March 7, 2006.
On February 5, 2007, appellant filed a pro se pleading in the trial court in Washington County
styled “Petition to Correct Illegal Sentence.” The trial court denied the petition, and appellant lodged
an appeal of that order in this court. The State now brings a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing
that appellant’s petition was a petition for postconviction relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, and that
we must dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The State asserts that, because appellant’s petition was a
petition under Rule 37.1, it must be verified in accordance with Rule 37.1(c) and filed within sixty
days of the date the mandate issued under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(c). We agree that the trial court did
not have jurisdiction to grant relief upon appellant’s petition, that the petition was properly dismissed
for that reason, and we must dismiss the appeal on that basis.
Appellant’s petition did not reference Rule 37.1, nor did it reference Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90111 (Supp. 2005), or any other rule or statute as authority for a grant of relief. In fact, appellant did
not clearly state in his petition on what basis that he sought relief. He sought correction of the
sentence because he asserted that the charge of possession of pseudoephedrine was a lesser-included
offense of the charge of possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture
methamphetamine and his convictions on the two charges violated double jeopardy, but he did not
indicate the basis under which he would request that the court correct his sentence. The circuit court
did not state in its order the basis on which it denied the petition. However, it is clear that the trial
court did not have authority on any possible basis to grant the petition, and we dismiss the appeal
because it is therefore clear that the court lacked jurisdiction.
Although a writ of habeas corpus may be used to correct an illegal sentence, appellant did
not indicate in the petition that he sought the writ. Moreover, appellant was not incarcerated in
Washington County, and the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to consider a petition seeking that
relief. Any petition for writ of habeas corpus to effect the release of a prisoner is properly addressed
to the circuit court in the county in which the prisoner is held in custody, unless the petition is filed
pursuant to Act 1780 of 2001, which provides a means to assert that the petitioner is entitled to
scientific testing of evidence in his case. Lukach v. State, 369 Ark. 475, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2007) (per
curiam). Appellant’s petition plainly did not seek scientific testing so as to fall under Act 1780. As
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the circuit court could not have provided relief through a writ of habeas corpus, even were it clear
that appellant had sought such relief, the court would not have had jurisdiction to consider a petition
to correct an illegal sentence on that basis.
We next consider whether appellant could have sought relief under section 16-90-111 or Rule
37.1, and must conclude that a petition seeking relief under the statute or the rule would not have
been timely. We have held that section 16-90-111 has been superceded to the extent that it conflicts
with the time limitations for postconviction relief under Rule 37.2(c). Reeves v. State, 339 Ark. 304,
5 S.W.3d 41 (1999). Whether appellant sought relief under the statute or under Rule 37.1, the
petition must have been filed within sixty days of the date the mandate issued on appellant’s direct
appeal. Appellant’s petition was filed almost eleven months after that date, and was therefore not
timely as either a request for relief under section 16-90-111 or under Rule 37.1.
We do not determine whether the petition should have been verified because the petition was
not timely under either the statute or the rule. The time limitations imposed in Rule 37.2(c) are
jurisdictional in nature, and the circuit court may not grant relief on an untimely petition. Womack
v. State, 368 Ark. 341, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006) (per curiam); Harris v. State, 318 Ark. 599, 887
S.W.2d 514 (1994) (per curiam). This court has consistently held that an appeal of the denial of
postconviction relief will not be permitted to go forward where it is clear that the appellant could not
prevail. Booth v. State, 353 Ark. 119, 110 S.W.3d 759 (2003) (per curiam); Pardue v. State, 338
Ark. 606, 999 S.W.2d 198 (1999) (per curiam); Seaton v. State, 324 Ark. 236, 920 S.W.2d 13 (1996)
(per curiam); Reed v. State, 317 Ark. 286, 878 S.W.2d 376 (1994) (per curiam). Here, it is clear that
appellant could not prevail because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to grant the relief that he
requested upon any basis that might have been available for relief. We therefore grant the State’s
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motion and the appeal is dismissed.
Motion granted; appeal dismissed.
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