Christopher Branning v. State of Arkansas

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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS  No.  CR07­415  CHRISTOPHER BRANNING,  APPELLANT,  Opinion Delivered November 8, 2007  APPEAL FROM THE BOONE COUNTY  CIRCUIT COURT,  NO. CR2004­244­4,  HON. GORDON WEBB, JUDGE,  VS.  STATE OF ARKANSAS,  APPELLEE,  CIRCUIT COURT AFFIRMED; COURT  OF APPEALS REVERSED.  JIM HANNAH, Chief Justice  Appellant Christopher Branning was convicted of second­degree stalking, two counts  of first­degree terroristic threatening, and misdemeanor violation of a protection order, for  which he was sentenced to concurrent terms of 120 months, 72 months, 72 months, and 259  days, respectively, in the Arkansas Department of Correction.  On appeal, Branning argues  that  the  circuit  court  erred  in  denying  his  motion  to  dismiss  based  on  double­jeopardy  grounds and his motion to dismiss based on speedy­trial grounds. In an unpublished opinion,  the  court  of  appeals  reversed  and  dismissed  Branning’s  convictions  for  second­degree  stalking and  the  first  count  of  terroristic  threatening  based  on  double­jeopardy  grounds;  Branning’s speedy­trial argument was not addressed. Branning v. State, CACR 05­989 (Ark.  App. Apr. 4, 2007).  The State petitioned this court for review, contending that the decision  of  the  court  of  appeals  is  in  conflict  with  prior  case  law,  and  is  therefore  in  error.    We granted the State’s petition for review pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1­2(e).  When we grant  review following a decision by the court of appeals, we review the case as though the appeal  was originally filed with this court.  See, e.g., Porter v. State, 356 Ark. 17, 145 S.W.3d 376  (2004).  We affirm the circuit court and reverse the court of appeals.  Branning was arrested on December 3, 2003, and charged in Harrison District Court  with  four  misdemeanors:  harassing  communications,  terroristic  threatening,  carrying  a  weapon, and second­degree assault.  Pursuant to an agreement with the State, Branning pled  guilty on May 5, 2004,  to  carrying a weapon and second­degree assault.  Branning was  placed  on  a  suspended  sentence,  and  the  State  nol  prossed  the  charges  for  harassing  communications and terroristic threatening.  On  January  27,  2005,  in  circuit  court,  the  State  charged  Branning  by  amended  information with six felony offenses:  (1)  Stalking in the second degree, based on a course of conduct occurring  between December 3, 2003, and June 7, 2004;  (2)  Terroristic  Threatening  in  the  First  Degree,  Count  One,  based  on  conduct occurring December 3, 2003;  (3)  Criminal  Mischief  in  the  First  Degree,  based  on  conduct  occurring  February 15, 2004;  (4)  Criminal Trespass, based on conduct occurring May 1, 2004;  (5)  Terroristic  Threatening  in  the  First  Degree,  Count  Two,  based  on  conduct occurring May 15, 2004; and  (6)  Violation of an Order of Protection, based on conduct occurring June  7, 2004. ­2­  CR07­415  Branning filed motions to dismiss based on double­jeopardy grounds and speedy­trial  grounds.  The circuit court denied both motions, concluding that double jeopardy was not  implicated,  given  that  the  amended  information  did  not  reassert  any  charges  underlying  Branning’s district court convictions for carrying a weapon and second­degree assault.  The  circuit court also concluded that, “because the charges of harassing communications and  terroristic threatening were nol prossed, a procedure that allows for the refiling of those  charges, the State is entitled to proceed on those charges without being prevented from doing  so by the double jeopardy (former prosecution) provisions of the Arkansas Constitution and  the Arkansas Code Annotated § 5­1­110—112.”  Further, the circuit court concluded that,  while Branning was brought to trial more than one year after he was arrested, the State was  not  barred  from  prosecuting  him  because  the  period  of  delay  was  excludable  under  the  speedy­trial rule.  Branning  now  brings  this  appeal.  Because  Branning  alleges  a  double­jeopardy  violation based on convictions for conduct occurring on December 3, 2003, the charges of  terroristic threatening, count two, and violation of an order of protection,  both of which  occurred after December 3, 2003, are not at issue in this appeal.  In addition, the first­degree  criminal  mischief  and  criminal  trespass  charges  were  severed  and  are  not  a  part  of  this  appeal.  Thus, we address Branning’s double­jeopardy argument only as it applies to his  charges for stalking in the second degree and terroristic threatening in the first degree, count  one.  When reviewing a denial of a motion to dismiss for violation of the Double Jeopardy ­3­  CR07­415  Clause, typically, a question of law, a de novo review should be conducted.  Winkle v. State,  366 Ark. 318, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006) (citing United States v. Brekke, 97 F.3d 1043 (8th Cir.  (1996); Muhammad v. State, 67 Ark. App. 262, 998 S.W.2d 763 (1999)).  Branning first argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to dismiss  based on double­jeopardy grounds because he had already been charged and convicted of  misdemeanors arising out of the same occurrence.  He states that the nol prossing of the two  charges was “obviously part of a plea agreement.”  Accordingly, he argues that “he was  placed  in  jeopardy  for  all  events  occurring  on  December  3,  2003,”  and  that  successful  prosecution of him in district court precluded him from being charged with the same acts at  some later date, “as the element in a multi­element stalking charge.”  He states that he was  charged twice in two courts for the same thing and was convicted both times.  Thus, he  claims that the State is barred from prosecuting him in circuit court.  The State argues that it was not barred from prosecuting Branning in circuit court,  pursuant to this court’s holding in McKinney v. State, 215 Ark. 712, 223 S.W.2d 185 (1949).  We agree.  In McKinney, we held that “the State’s dismissal of a case before the trial has  begun does not prevent a subsequent prosecution.”  Id. at 713, 223 S.W.2d at 185 (citing  JUSTIN MILLER, MILLER ON CRIMINAL  LAW § 186 (1934)).  Here, the acts constituting the  stalking charge in circuit court were the basis of the harassing­communications charge in  district court, and count one of the terroristic­threatening charge in circuit court was based  on the same conduct as the terroristic­threatening charge in district court.  However, as we  previously noted, the harassing­communications charge and terroristic­threatening charge in ­4­  CR07­415  district court were nol prossed and constituted separate crimes, even though they arose from  the same criminal episode.  Thus, Branning’s argument that “he was charged twice in two  courts for the same thing and was convicted both times” is simply without merit.  A nolle  prosequi, or nol pros, is a dismissal of a prosecution without prejudice to refile.  See Jones  v. State, 347 Ark. 455, 65 S.W.3d 402 (2002).  See also Black’s Law Dictionary 1074 (8th  ed. 2004) (The Latin words translated into English mean “not to wish to prosecute”).  The  State,  having  nol  prossed  the  charges  in  district  court,  was  free  to  bring  a  subsequent  prosecution.  See McKinney, supra; see also Halton v. State, 224 Ark. 28, 271 S.W.2d 616  (1954) (stating that a dismissal of an indictment is not a bar to a future prosecution for the  same offense).  We hold that the circuit court did not err in denying Branning’s motion to  dismiss on double­jeopardy grounds.  Branning next argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the  case against him due to a violation of the speedy­trial rules.  We recently stated in Yarbrough  v. State, 370 Ark. 31, ___, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___ (2007):  Under Rule 28.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant  must be brought to trial within twelve months unless there are periods of delay  that are excluded under Rule 28.3. Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.1(c) (2006); Gamble  v.  State,  350  Ark.  168,  85  S.W.3d  520  (2002);  Doby  v.  Jefferson  County  Circuit Court, 350 Ark. 505, 88 S.W.3d 824 (2002).  If the defendant is not  brought to trial within the requisite time, the defendant is entitled to have the  charges dismissed with an absolute bar to prosecution.  Ark. R. Crim. P. 30.1  (2006);  Gamble  v.  State,  supra;  Doby  v.  Jefferson  County  Circuit  Court,  supra.  Once  a  defendant  establishes  a  prima  facie  case  of  a  speedy­trial  violation, i.e., that his or her trial took place outside of the speedy­trial period,  the  State  bears  the  burden  of  showing  that  the  delay  was  the  result  of  the  defendant’s conduct or was otherwise justified. Gamble v. State, supra; Doby  v. Jefferson County Circuit Court, supra. ­5­  CR07­415  In the case before us, Branning was arrested on December 3, 2003.  On February 1,  2005, Branning filed a motion to dismiss for violation of his speedy­trial rights based on a  scheduled trial  date  of February 2, 2005.  We have held that the filing of a speedy­trial  motion tolls the running of the time for a speedy trial under our rules.  Yarbrough, supra.  Here,  the  State  concedes  that  Branning  made  a  prima  facie  showing  of  a  speedy­trial  violation, and that the burden shifted to the State to show the delay was the result of the  defendant’s conduct or was otherwise justified.  On appeal, we conduct a de novo review to determine whether specific periods of  time are excludable under our speedy­trial rules.  Yarbrough, supra; Cherry v. State, 347  Ark.  606,  66  S.W.3d  605  (2002).    There  were  426  days  between  Branning’s  arrest  on  December 3, 2003, and February 1, 2005, the day his speedy­trial motion was filed.  The  district  court  docket  sheet  reflects  that  on  May  5,  2004,  the  charges  of  harassing  communications and terroristic threatening, based on the conduct that occurred on December  3, 2003, were nol prossed by the State.  The prosecutor filed a felony information in circuit  court on June 25, 2004.  The period of delay due to the State’s nol prossing of charges for  good cause is excludable under the speedy­trial rule.  Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.3(f).  Branning  does not contend that the State lacked good cause.  The district court disposed of the four  charges  in  that  court  by  taking  two  charges,  harassing  communications  and  terroristic  threatening, under advisement for one year, until May 4, 2005, conditioned upon, among  other things, no like charges being filed and by nol prossing the other two charges.  The  period between the nol pros in district court and the filing of charges in circuit court—May ­6­  CR07­415  5 to June 25, 2004—is 51 days.  At Branning’s request, the circuit court granted a continuance from November 5 to  December 3, 2004, a period of 28 days.  Delays resulting from continuances given at the  request of the defendant are excluded in calculating the time for speedy trial.  Ark. R. Crim.  P. 28.3(c); Ferguson v. State, 343 Ark. 159, 33 S.W.3d 115 (2000).  Subtracting the nol pros and continuance periods (51 and 28 days, respectively) from  the overall 426­day period leaves 347 days, well within the one­year period of the speedy­  trial rule.  Thus, the circuit court did not err in denying Branning’s motion to dismiss on  speedy­trial grounds.  Affirmed. ­7­  CR07­415 

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