Kenneth Harrison v. State of Arkansas

 Annotate this Case
Download PDF
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS  No.  CR 07­357  KENNETH HARRISON,  Opinion Delivered  APPELLANT,  VS.  STATE OF ARKANSAS,  APPELLEE,  December 6, 2007  APPEAL  FROM  THE  PULASKI  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,  NO. CR2006­149,  HON. MARION ANDREW HUMPHREY,  JUDGE,  AFFIRMED.  PAUL E. DANIELSON, Associate Justice  Appellant  Kenneth  Harrison  appeals  from  his  capital­murder  conviction  and  his  sentence to life imprisonment without parole.  He asserts two points on appeal: (1) that the  circuit court erred in denying his motion for mistrial, the premise of which was alleged juror  misconduct,  and (2) that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for new trial, which  was  based  upon  newly  discovered  evidence  of  a  witness’s  prior  juvenile  conviction  for  capital murder.  We affirm.  Because Harrison does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, only a brief  recitation of the facts with respect to the crime is required.  Suffice it to say, Harrison was  accused and convicted of capital murder after he shot and killed Fulton Watson at Roy’s  Service Center on West 12th Street in Little Rock on November 11, 2005.  Two witnesses,  Shuntae Ingram and Jacque Snider, were at the scene at the time of the shooting, and both testified against Harrison at his trial. As already stated, the jury convicted Harrison of capital  murder, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.  He now appeals.  Harrison first argues that the circuit court erred in denying his mistrial motion, which  was based on one juror’s comments to two other jurors.  He alleges that jurors Hall and  Westbrook received improper information from juror Wright, which was not in evidence.  He  contends  that  the  circuit  court’s  denial  of  his  mistrial  motion,  which  left  Hall  and  Westbrook on the jury, had the effect of tainting the jury’s verdict by the outside information  given to the two.  Harrison avers that because there was a reasonable possibility of resulting  prejudice to him by the circuit court’s decision, this court should reverse the circuit court’s  denial of his motion for mistrial.  The State urges that juror Wright’s limited knowledge of  Harrison and her vague statements caused no prejudice to him, especially due to the fact that  both jurors who remained on the jury affirmed their ability to be impartial.  In  the  instant  case,  a  review  of  the  record  reveals  the  following  events.    On  the  morning of the second day of trial, the bailiff alerted the circuit court to a problem regarding  certain jurors, stating:  BAILIFF:  Before we get started, I have not mentioned this to anyone. I just  had two jurors, Ms. Westbrook and Ms. Hall, come to me this morning and  said that yesterday afternoon when the Court recessed and they went back to  the back, juror number one, Ms. Wright, made a comment before the rest of  the jurors, that she knew Mr. Harrison, and that she knew he was a mechanic.  And Ms. Westbrook questioned Ms. Wright and asked her why did she not  make that statement to the Court, when we – the Court, first asked her that.  And she said it didn’t matter.  Ms. Hall also said that she concurred with that,  that she could not sleep last night, because they knew that Ms. Wright knew  Mr. Harrison, and that they had some problems with that this morning.  They did not want it divulged, but I told them ethically, we didn’t have ­2­  CR 07­357  a choice, but to notify the Court.  But, they do have some problems with Ms.  Wright, and she made the statement in front of the other jurors.  At that time, the circuit court called juror Wright and inquired of her.  She stated that she  “just” knew Harrison from when he worked “at the shop on 12th Street,” denying that she  knew him personally.  The circuit court then inquired of her further:  CIRCUIT COURT:  12th Street?  Then, how did you come to know that he worked there on  MS. WRIGHT:  Because, over the years, I have stopped by there once,  and he just looked at my car for something.  I asked a question about my car.  That was all.  CIRCUIT COURT:  And he had dealt with your car?  MS. WRIGHT:  No, he just gave me an opinion.  The  circuit  court  then  asked  whether  either  of  the  attorneys  had  any  questions  for  Ms.  Wright, and defense counsel stated that he had none.  After Ms. Wright was permitted to  return to the  jury  room  and the State suggested excusing her, defense counsel made the  following objection and requested a mistrial:  DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Your Honor, I think the jury is tainted now, not just Ms.  Wright,  but  the  other  two  jurors  who  heard  that;  obviously  the  one  was  troubled by it.  I think the whole jury pool is tainted, and I’d ask for a mistrial.  Upon defense counsel’s motion for mistrial, the circuit court called Ms. Hall and Ms.  Westbrook.  Ms. Hall acknowledged Ms. Wright’s statement that she knew Harrison, and  defense counsel then inquired of Ms. Hall:  DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Is that going to have any affect [sic] on you as a juror  today?  Do you think you can be a fair and impartial juror, knowing that? ­3­  CR 07­357  MS. HALL:  Oh, yeah.  DEFENSE COUNSEL:  No problems?  MS. HALL:  other.  Definitely no problem.  And she didn’t sway me, one way or the  DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Okay.  That’s all.  The circuit court then called Ms. Westbrook.  When asked by the circuit court, she relayed  the following account:  MS. WESTBROOK:  Well, she – I mean, she made the statement that she knew  something, a little bit about, you know, what had happened, the day that it had  happened.  And I questioned her.  I asked her why she didn’t say anything  when you all asked us if anyone knew anything about the case.  And then she  said, “Well, I don’t really know him.”  But, you know, so –  . . . .  She just didn’t believe that he would do something like that.  And, I  mean,  that’s  when  –  I don’t  know  if  everybody  else  caught  on  it,  because  everybody was kind of talking, but I’m the one who actually questioned her  and asked her, “Well, why didn’t you say anything when we were asked if you  knew  anything  concerning  the  case?”    And  Ms.  Hall,  she  looked  at  me,  because she – she heard it, too, evidently.  The prosecutor then asked Ms. Westbrook whether she would still be able to fairly weigh the  evidence, to which she responded that she could.  Defense counsel had no questions for her.  Following some discussion between the circuit court and defense counsel, the circuit court  excused Ms. Wright, but permitted Ms. Hall and Ms. Westbrook to remain on the jury, and  denied Harrison’s motion for mistrial.  We have held that a mistrial is an extreme and drastic remedy that will be resorted to  only when there has been an error so prejudicial that justice cannot be served by continuing ­4­  CR 07­357  with the trial or when the fundamental fairness of the trial has been manifestly affected.  See  Thessing v. State, 365 Ark. 384, 230 S.W.3d 526 (2006).  A circuit court has wide discretion  in granting or denying a mistrial motion, and, absent an abuse of that discretion, the circuit  court’s decision will not be disturbed on appeal.  See id.  We  cannot  say  that  the  circuit  court  abused  its  discretion  in  denying  Harrison’s  mistrial  motion.  A  review  of  the  events  reveals  no  evidence  of  prejudice  to  Harrison.  Indeed, as the State points out in its brief, it could be said that Ms. Wright’s statements were  actually in favor of Harrison.  Here, the circuit court removed Ms. Wright and questioned  Ms.  Westbrook  and  Ms.  Hall,  both  of  whom  stated  that  they  would  be  impartial.  Accordingly, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Harrison’s motion for  mistrial.  Harrison’s second point on appeal relates to his motion for new trial.  A review of the  record reveals that on September 8, 2006, Harrison filed his motion for new trial.  In it, he  asserted that the State failed to provide him with information that Shuntae Ingram had been  convicted of capital murder when he was a juvenile.  Harrison asserted that because it was  a juvenile adjudication, it could not have been obtained by his due diligence.  He claimed  that he was prejudiced by the State’s failure to disclose in that he was prevented from using  that information to attack Ingram’s credibility, prevented from questioning potential jurors  on the matter during voir dire, and prevented from “developing a strategy of implicating Mr.  Ingram in the murder.”  Harrison further requested a hearing on his motion.  Four days later,  on  September  12,  2006,  the  circuit  court  denied  the  motion  “[b]ased  upon  a  review  of ­5­  CR 07­357  Defendant’s  motion,  applicable  case  law,  and  all  other  matters  and  things  pertaining  thereto[.]”  With respect to the denial of his new­trial motion, Harrison initially argues, without  citing to any authority, that the circuit court’s denial of his motion for new trial, without  hearing any evidence or receiving a response to the motion by the State, violated his due­  process rights under the federal and state constitutions and that this court should remand the  matter  for  a  full  hearing  on  the  motion.  He  further  contends  that  he  could  have  used  Ingram’s juvenile conviction for impeachment purposes, had he known about it prior to trial.  The State responds that a hearing was not necessary on Harrison’s new­trial motion, as one  is not required when it would be superfluous.  In addition, the State points to the fact that  when  Ingram  testified,  he  was  in  prison  clothes,  due  to  his  incarceration  at  the  time  of  Harrison’s trial, and that defense counsel had the opportunity to, and did, impeach Ingram.  For  these  reasons,  the  State  concludes,  Harrison  cannot  demonstrate  any  reasonable  probability that the result of his trial would have differed had he received the information and  been able to use it.  We first hold that we are precluded from addressing Harrison’s claim that the circuit  court’s failure to conduct a hearing on his new­trial motion violated his due­process rights,  due to his failure to cite to any legal authority in support of that proposition.  We have held  time  and  time again that we will not reach the merits of an argument on appeal, even  a  constitutional argument, when the appellant presents no citation to authority or convincing  argument in its support, and it is not apparent without further research that the argument is ­6­  CR 07­357  well taken.  See Williams v. State, 363 Ark. 395, 214 S.W.3d 829 (2005).  Therefore, we  decline to address his argument that the circuit court’s failure to hold a hearing violated his  due­process rights.  Turning to the merits of the circuit court’s denial of the motion, we have held that the  decision on whether to grant or deny a motion for new trial lies within the sound discretion  of the circuit court.  See Henderson v. State, 349 Ark. 701, 80 S.W.3d 374 (2002).  We will  reverse a circuit court’s order granting or denying a motion for a new trial only if there is a  manifest  abuse  of  discretion.  See  id.    In  addition,  we  have  emphasized  that,  in  matters  dealing  with  the  prosecution’s  failure  to  disclose  prior  convictions,  the  crucial  issue  is  whether the appellant was prejudiced by the failure to disclose.  See, e.g., Lee v. State, 340  Ark. 504, 11 S.W.3d 553 (2000).  We  cannot  say  that  the  circuit  court  manifestly  abused  its  discretion  in  denying  Harrison’s motion, as our review reveals that Harrison was not prejudiced by the alleged lack  of  disclosure  of  Ingram’s  alleged  juvenile  conviction.  First,  during  direct  examination,  Ingram acknowledged that he was dressed  in  blue and was currently incarcerated in the  Arkansas Department of Correction.  In addition, he acknowledged having several felony  convictions:  PROSECUTOR:  And  you’ve  got  some  felony  convictions,  I  think,  for  breaking or entering, back in 2000, is that correct?  INGRAM:  Yes.  PROSECUTOR:  And a couple of theft by receiving’s [sic] in 2002? ­7­  CR 07­357  INGRAM:  Yes.  PROSECUTOR:  And then a couple more theft by receiving’s [sic] in 2005,  and a failure to appear.  Is that right?  INGRAM:  Yes.  Then, on cross­examination, defense counsel also pointed out  that Ingram was currently  serving time in prison and that he was out on bond at the time of the shooting:  DEFENSE COUNSEL:  So, you’re serving 15 years in the penitentiary for theft  of property, is that right?  INGRAM:  Theft by receiving.  DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Cars – stealing cars?  INGRAM:  Yeah.  DEFENSE COUNSEL:  And was that during this time?  INGRAM:  During the time, what?  DEFENSE COUNSEL:  When  this  shooting  happened,  were  you  stealing cars  then, or were you waiting to get to go to Court then, or –  INGRAM:  I was out on bond.  It is clear to this court that Ingram’s criminal record was made known to the jury and  was used by the defense in an attempt to impeach him.  We cannot say that a juvenile capital­  1  murder conviction, if there indeed was one,  would have affected the jury’s assessment of  Ingram’s credibility.  For that reason, we cannot say that any lack of disclosure of Ingram’s 1  It is not evident from Harrison’s motion for new trial that a juvenile conviction, in  fact, existed.  ­8­  CR 07­357  alleged juvenile conviction undermined confidence in the outcome of Harrison’s trial.  See,  e.g., Lee v. State, supra.  Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Harrison’s  2  motion for new trial.  Pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4­3(h), the record has been examined for all objections,  motions, and requests made by either party that were decided adversely to appellant, and no  prejudicial error has been found.  See White v. State, 370 Ark. 284, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2007).  Affirmed.  BROWN  and IMBER, JJ., concur.  IMBER, J., concurring. The circuit court’s denial of Harrison’s motion for new trial  should be summarily affirmed.  This point on appeal is not preserved for appellate review  because Harrison failed to prove the existence of Ingram’s alleged juvenile conviction by  means of a proffer under seal.  Without such a proffer, any opinion on the merits is merely  advisory.  For this reason, I respectfully concur. 2  While we find no prejudice in the instant case, we do take this opportunity to remind  the bench and bar that prior convictions shall be disclosed by the prosecution to the defense,  upon request.  Rule 17.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in pertinent  part:  (a) Subject to the provisions of Rules 17.5 and 19.4, the prosecuting  attorney shall disclose to defense counsel, upon timely request, the following  material and information which is or may come within the possession, control,  or knowledge of the prosecuting attorney:  . . . .  (vi)  any  record  of  prior  criminal  convictions  of  persons  whom  the  prosecuting attorney intends to call as witnesses at any hearing or at trial, if the  prosecuting attorney has such information.  Ark. R. Crim. P. 17.1(a)(vi) (2007).  ­9­  CR 07­357  BROWN, J. joins this concurrence. ­10­  CR 07­357 

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.