Kenny Travis, Jr. v. State of Arkansas

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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS  No.  CR 07­238  Opinion Delivered  December 6, 2007  KENNY TRAVIS, JR.,  APPELLANT,  VS.  STATE OF ARKANSAS,  APPEAL  FROM  THE  MISSISSIPPI  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,  NO. CR­2006­202,  HON. VICTOR LAMONT HILL, JUDGE,  AFFIRMED.  APPELLEE,  JIM GUNTER, Associate Justice  This appeal arises from an order of the Mississippi County Circuit Court convicting  Appellant  Kenny  Travis,  Jr.  of  the  capital  murder  of  J.W.  Hall,  a  class  Y  felony  and  a  violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 5­10­101 (Supp. 2003), and aggravated robbery, a class Y  felony and a violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 5­12­103 (Repl. 1997), and sentencing him to life  imprisonment without the possibility of parole and ten years’ imprisonment, respectively.  On appeal, Appellant raises five allegations of error.  We affirm.  On June 24, 2005, Appellant, Kevin Ransom, and Acquilla Ramsey went to J.W.  Hall’s auto dealership under the pretense of showing Hall a VCR tape of his mistress and  another man having sex.  The victim told Appellant that he would pay three or four hundred  dollars for the tape.  However, once the three individuals got there, Ransom (a.k.a. Punch)  and Appellant went into the victim’s office and asked “where the money was at.” Appellant  shot the victim in the leg, asked where the safe was, started “tusslin’” with the victim, and shot the victim again in the upper body.  Appellant then stated that he shot the victim again  in the head.  During a car ride to Memphis, Andre Love (a.k.a. Coco) took his cell phone and  started recording Appellant’s confession to Love.  Love testified that he made the recording  because “I just knew it was gonna come down to a day like this when we was gonna be in  court, and like for some reason now, like he try to put me in it, and this was my way out of  it.”  On the night of the incident, there was a fire that was started outside Appellant’s mobile  home.  Osceola Police Department recovered some of the burned items.  On  August  3,  2005,  the  State  filed  a  felony  information  in  Osceola,  charging  Appellant with one count of capital murder.  An amended felony information was filed on  August 5, 2005, in which Appellant was charged with one count of capital murder and one  count of aggravated robbery.  On February 7, 2006, Appellant filed a motion for change of venue, claiming that the  case was highly publicized in Mississippi County and that Appellant could not receive a fair  and impartial trial in Mississippi County.  On July 11, 2006, the circuit court granted the  motion, transferring the matter to Blytheville for Appellant’s trial.  Appellant  filed  a  motion  in  limine  on  July  31,  2006,  moving  to  prohibit  the  introduction, reference, or playing of an alleged digital phone recording made by Love of his  discussion with Appellant.  On August 7, 2006, Appellant also filed a motion in limine to  exclude a video tape from surveillance cameras at Wal­Mart, as well as video tapes of the  statements given by Ramsey and Love, two of the State’s primary witnesses in the matter. ­2­  The case was submitted to a Mississippi County jury, and the jury found Appellant  guilty of capital murder and aggravated robbery and sentenced him to life imprisonment  without the possibility of parole,  as  well as 120 months, in the Arkansas Department of  Correction.  On August 11, 2006, a judgment and commitment order was entered by the  circuit court.  From his conviction and sentence, Appellant brings his appeal.  For his first point on appeal, Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in denying  his motion for a continuance or for a mistrial.  Specifically, Appellant contends that, during  Ransom’s testimony, Ransom indicated that there was a different copy of a voice recording  made by Love, that the prosecution did not make that recording available to him, and that the  circuit  court  abused  its  discretion  by  denying  Appellant’s  motions  for  mistrial  or  a  continuance to allow him to investigate.  Appellant asserts that Rules 17.1 and 19.2 of the  Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure placed an obligation upon the prosecuting attorney  to disclose the information of a different recording, and the prosecutor’s failure to disclose  that information amounted to a discovery violation.  In response, the State argues that the circuit court did not abuse  its  discretion by  denying Appellant’s motions for mistrial and continuance, nor did prejudice result from the  ruling.  Specifically, the State contends that the State complied with the rules of discovery,  and even if the State failed to comply with the rules of discovery, Appellant failed to meet  his  burden  of  demonstrating  how  he  was  prejudiced  by  the  circuit  court’s  denial  of  his  motions for a mistrial and a continuance. ­3­  The standard of review for alleged error resulting from denial of a continuance is  abuse of discretion.  Navarro v. State, ___ Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Oct. 4, 2007).  Absent  a showing of prejudice by the defendant, we will not reverse the decision of a trial court. Id.  Further, we have made it clear that a mistrial is a drastic remedy and should be declared  when there has been an error so prejudicial that justice cannot be served by continuing the  trial, or when it cannot be cured by an instruction.  Smith v. State, 354 Ark. 226, 243, 118  S.W.3d 542, 552 (2003).  The trial court has wide discretion in granting or denying a motion  for mistrial, and, absent an abuse of that discretion, the trial court’s decision will not be  disturbed on appeal.  Id.  We  discussed  the  rules  dealing  with  discovery  and  the  prosecutor’s  obligation  to  disclose certain statements to defense counsel in Tester v. State, 342 Ark. 549, 30 S.W.3d  99 (2000), where we stated:  Rule 17.1(a)(ii) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure mandates  that the prosecutor disclose, upon timely request,  “any written or recorded  statements and the substance of any oral statements made by the defendant.”  Rule  19.2  imposes  a  continuing  duty  on  the  prosecutor  to  disclose  this  information. In the event of noncompliance, Rule 19.7 allows the trial judge  to order the undisclosed evidence excluded, grant a continuance, or enter such  an  order  as  he  or  she  deems  proper  under  the  circumstances.  The  key  in  determining  whether  a  reversible  discovery  violation  exists  is  whether  the  appellant was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s failure to disclose. Bray v. State,  322 Ark. 178, 908 S.W.2d 88 (1995).  Tester, 342 Ark. at 557, 30 S.W.3d at 104­05.  Absent a showing of prejudice, we will not  reverse. Prince v. State, 304 Ark. 692, 805 S.W.2d 46 (1991).  The circuit court has four options under Rule 19.7 to remedy a violation of the rules: ­4­  (1) permit discovery, (2) exclude the undisclosed evidence, (3) grant a continuance, or (4)  enter an order as the court deems appropriate under the circumstances.  Reed v. State, 312  Ark. 82, 847 S.W.2d 34 (1993).  Under certain circumstances, a continuance to deal with the  surprise caused by the State’s failure to comply with pretrial discovery requirements may be  sufficient to cure any such errors.  See Reed, supra; Hughes v. State, 264 Ark. 723, 574  S.W.2d 888 (1978). It is within the trial court’s discretion to employ any one of the listed  sanctions under Rule 19.7(a) or one of its own choosing where there is a failure to disclose.  Renton v. State, 274 Ark. 87, 622 S.W.2d 171 (1981).  With  this  precedent  in  mind,  we  turn  to  the  present  case.    At  issue  are  Love’s  recordings played at trial for the jury.  Both Ransom and Officer Mike Grimes testified about  those recordings at trial.  First, Ransom testified that Officer Grimes and another officer  played  a  microcassette  copy  of  Love’s  cell­phone  recording  in  which  Ransom  heard  Appellant  say  that  “he  was  gonna  have  to  knock  my  [Ransom’s]  ass  off  too.”    Ransom  admitted during his testimony that he did not know who made the tape that he heard while  in  custody.  During  a  bench  conference,  Appellant  questioned  the  existence  of    the  1  microcassette.  After  the  bench  conference,  Appellant’s  attorney  continued  to  question  Ransom about the recording on the microcassette.  Second, Officer Grimes testified that he was able to download Love’s recording off 1  During this bench conference, the court reporter’s primary and back­up  recording equipment failed, and as a result, there is no record of the bench conference.  ­5­  his  cell  phone  onto  a  digital  recorder  and  then  onto  his  laptop  computer.    The  digital  recording was played again for the jury, and Officer Grimes testified that the microcassette  copy was played for Ransom during his interview with police.  Appellant called a second  bench conference during which he argued that the microcassette was not made available to  him and he could have sent “it off to an expert to determine if it had been tampered with.”  Appellant then moved for a mistrial, which the circuit court denied.  Officer Grimes later  testified that he made a microcassette copy before recording a digital copy.  The digital copy  was made available to Appellant before trial, but he declined it.  The Arkansas State Crime  Lab was unable to improve the quality of the recording.  Officer Grimes testified that the  microcassette contained the exact voice recording that was heard by the jury via the digital  copy.  Under the circumstances in the present case, the prosecutor disclosed the statement.  Officer Grimes testified:  Yes, the record I have here that is downloaded on my laptop is the same  as what you hear on the phone.  I recorded it on my laptop just actually by  playing it just not in a data cable, just playing it in open air.  Just using the  digital  recorder  and  just  record  off  of–I think you  seen  a  device  yesterday  where you use to play it with a speaker phone.  Basically with using that type  of  device  just  recorded  it  digitally  on  my  recorder.    Yes,  you  just  take  a  recorder [with a microcassette] and hold it up there to the speaker. Then with  the digital recording device I was able to plug it into my laptop and download  it  to  that.  Also,  I  was  able  to  burn  a  CD  after  that  point.    I  also  have  a  recording stored on my hard drive.  That’s actually put into a wave file, to do  that.  However, the dictation module software that comes directly from the  digital recorder has a clearer version of that.  Once it goes to a wave file it  loses a little bit of quality. ­6­  Based upon this testimony, it is clear that the microcassette copy, while it was not  played for the jury, contained the same recording on both the cell phone  and  the digital  recording on the laptop.  Thus, there was only one recording, and it was simply in three  different copies: cell phone, microcassette, and digital.  Ultimately, Appellant declined the  digital copy, which contained the same voice recording that was on the microcassette, and  as a result, Appellant is not prejudiced by any alleged failure to disclose.  See Tester, supra.  Therefore, the circuit court’s denial of his motions for mistrial and continuance is affirmed.  For  his  second  point  on  appeal,  Appellant  argues  that  the  circuit  court  erred  in  denying his  Batson  challenge  to  the  State’s  exclusion  of  jurors.  Specifically,  Appellant  contends that out of thirty­two potential jurors, six were African­American, and the State  struck five  of  them.  The  State,  however,  argues  that  the  circuit  court  did  not  abuse  its  discretion by denying Appellant’s Batson challenges.  Specifically, the State contends that  Appellant’s  Batson  challenges  have  no  merit,  and  the  circuit  court’s  rulings  should  be  upheld.  This court has previously stated our standard of review for Batson challenges: “This  court will reverse a circuit court's ruling on a Batson challenge only when its findings are  clearly  against  the  preponderance  of  the  evidence.  We  further  accord  some  measure  of  deference to the circuit court, because it is in a superior position to make determinations of  juror credibility.”  Owens v. State, 363 Ark. 413, 416, 214 S.W.3d 849, 850­51 (2005).  Under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), a prosecutor in a criminal case may ­7­  not use his peremptory strikes to exclude jurors solely on the basis of race.  Ratliff v. State,  359 Ark. 479, 199 S.W.3d 79 (2004).  In determining whether such a violation has occurred,  a three­step analysis is applied.  Stokes v. State, 359 Ark. 94, 194 S.W.3d 762 (2004). The  first step requires the opponent of the peremptory strike to present facts that show a prima  facie case of purposeful discrimination. Id.  This first step is accomplished by showing the  following:  (a)  the  opponent  of  the  strike  shows  he  is  a  member  of  an  identifiable  racial  group; (b) the strike is part of a jury­selection process or pattern designed to discriminate;  and (c) the strike was used to exclude jurors because of their race.  Id. (citing MacKintrush  v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998)).  Once a prima­facie case of discrimination has been shown, the process moves to the  second step, wherein the burden of producing a racially neutral explanation shifts to the  proponent of the strike.  Id.  This explanation, according to Batson, must be more than a  mere denial of discrimination or an assertion that a shared race would render the challenged  juror partial to the one opposing the challenge. Weston v. State, 366 Ark. 265, ___ S.W.3d  ___ (2006).  Under Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam), this explanation need  not be persuasive or even plausible. Indeed, it may be silly or superstitious. The reason will  be  deemed  race  neutral  “[u]nless  a  discriminatory  intent  is  inherent  in  the  prosecutor’s  explanation.” Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768.  But, according to Purkett, a trial court must not end  the Batson inquiry at this stage, and, indeed, it is error to do so.  If a race­neutral explanation is given, the inquiry proceeds to the third step, in which ­8­  the  trial  court  must  decide  whether  the  opponent  of  the  strike  has  proven  purposeful  discrimination.  Stokes, supra.  We will reverse a trial court’s findings on a Batson objection  when the trial court’s decision was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Ratliff,  supra.  Appellant made Batson challenges to five out of the  six  African­American jurors  during voir dire, but on appeal, he only raises a challenge to the circuit court’s ruling on four  jurors, namely Gillespie, Williams, Hopkins, and Langel.  First, Juror Gillespie stated that  she knew Appellant’s daughter and that she knew a guilty verdict would be difficult for the  daughter.  She further stated that she would not want to be on the jury.  She was excused by  the  State,  and  Appellant  raised  a  Batson  challenge.  The  State  offered  a  race­neutral  explanation  of  excluding  Juror  Gillespie  because  of  her  ties  with  Appellant’s  daughter.  Based upon Juror Williams’s answers, the circuit court upheld the strike.  For those race­  neutral reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s ruling.  Second, Juror Williams indicated that her son had recently been tried for murder and  that she would get quite emotional during Appellant’s trial if selected as a venireperson.  She  claimed that she would try to be fair, but that the State would “have to really show it to me.”  Further, she testified that she would “[c]ry like a baby” because her “son didn’t do it,” and  she  did  not  “want  to  say  guilty  to  one’s  son,  you  know?”    Responding  to  the  Batson  objection, the State argued that her son had recently been a defendant in a murder trial and  that she believed he was not guilty.  The circuit court ruled that the explanation was race­ ­9­  neutral, and for those reasons, we agree and will not disturb the circuit court’s ruling.  Third, Juror Hopkins indicated that he knew Rev. Moses Black, one of Appellant’s  witnesses.  She stated that she would rather not determine who was telling the truth and that  she should not judge anybody.  She further stated during voir dire that she “would probably  say to the rest of the jury, whatever y’all want to do.”  The State excused her, and Appellant  raised a Batson challenge. The State argued that she and Rev. Black “worship[ped] together”  and that cross­examining a minister with the presence of Juror Hopkins is “not something  you look forward to,” particularly when the State believed that Rev. Black “knew exactly  what had taken place.”  Based upon the fact that Juror Williams and Rev. Black worshipped  together, the circuit court upheld the strike.  For those reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s  ruling.  See Stenhouse v. State, 362 Ark. 480, 209 S.W.3d 352 (2005) (upholding a Batson  challenge when the pastor was to be a witness and the State offered that reason as a race­  neutral explanation in response to the Batson challenge).  Lastly, Juror Langel also indicated that she knew Rev. Black from her church and that  he  visited  her  elderly  mother.  The  State  excused  Juror  Langel,  and  in  response  to  Appellant’s  Batson  challenge,  the  State  cited  the  same  reasons  as  it  had  given  for  Juror  Hopkins.  Additionally, the State was concerned that Juror Langel would give Rev. Black  more credibility because of the close ties that he had to her mother.  The circuit court found  that the State gave a sufficient race­neutral explanation, and for those reasons, we affirm.  See Stenhouse, supra. ­10­  For his third point on appeal, Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in refusing  to  allow  the  admission  of  three  taped  phone  conversations  between  Acquilla  Ramsey,  Appellant’s girlfriend and co­defendant, and Ann Travis, Appellant’s aunt.  Specifically,  Appellant contends that the circuit court’s ruling was in violation of the Arkansas Rules of  Evidence 607 and 613 (2007) because Ramsey’s statements contained prior inconsistent  statements.  According to Appellant, the circuit court denied the admission of these taped  conversations during an in­chambers discussion because “[w]hen Acquilla Ramsey testified,  she admitted she had made the statements to Ann Travis during telephone conversations.”  The  State  responds  by  arguing  that  we  should  decline  to  address  this  argument  because the in­chambers discussion, in which the circuit court ruled upon this issue, is not  contained in the record on appeal.  Further, the State asserts that “there is no indication that  Appellant has attempted to settle or correct the record to include the unrecorded segments  upon which he predicates error.”  In the alternative, the State contends that the circuit court  did not abuse its discretion because Appellant cannot demonstrate prejudice.  With regard to the standard of review for evidentiary rulings, we have said that trial  courts have broad discretion and that a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence  will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.  See Navarro, supra.  In Fountain v.  State, 269 Ark. 454, 601 S.W.2d 862 (1980), we stated that all bench conferences and in­  chambers conferences should be on the record unless they involve matters unrelated to the  current trial, in which case, a note to that effect may be made. ­11­  In the present case, Appellant’s Exhibits 16, 17, and 18 were proffered into evidence.  Counsel for Appellant stated:  Your Honor, based on our conversation in chambers Defendant proffers  tapes which have been identified as proffer 16, 17, and 18 which would have  been  conversations  with  Acquilla  Ramsey  that  were  played.  These  tapes  contain  conversation  [sic]  with  Acquilla  Ramsey  which  the  court  ruled  in  chambers  they  were  inadmissible  because  we  didn’t  offer  them  for  impeachment purposes.  She had admitted that she had these conversations.  While it may be possible to glean the circuit court’s ruling from counsel’s statement,  we cannot hazard a guess as to the rationale behind the ruling, nor do we have a record that  may contain any objection to it.  Additionally, we cannot discern whether Appellant raised  the arguments concerning Ark. R. Evid. 605 or 613 before the circuit court.  Without such  proof in the record, we refuse to reach arguments raised for the first time on appeal.  Any  such argument is precluded on appeal.  See, e.g., White v. State, ___ Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d  ___ (June 21, 2007) (holding that an argument may not be raised for the first time on appeal).  For these reasons, we decline to reach the merits of this argument.  For the fourth point on appeal, Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in not  allowing him to demonstrate a voice­record recording with Love’s cell phone.  Specifically,  Appellant contends that the circuit court should not have sustained the State’s objection to  the demonstration. Appellant asserts that the demonstration would show that Love could not  have recorded the conversation on any Motorola cell phone because such a recording “would  not be identical to the recording made by Mr. Love since the persons were not in the same  environment, that being in an automobile.”  In response, the State argues that Appellant’s ­12­  argument is barred because there was no ruling upon  which  he  predicated error.  In the  alternative, the State asserts that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion, and if it did,  then any alleged error was harmless.  At  issue  was  Appellant’s  attempt  to  reenact  Love  recording  on  his  cell  phone  Appellant’s confession to killing Hall.  We have held that the admissibility of demonstrative  evidence is a matter falling within the wide discretion of the trial court.  See Hamilton v.  State, 348 Ark. 532, 74 S.W.3d 615 (2002).  Here, a bench conference was conducted to  determine whether the demonstrative evidence would be admitted.  However, after hearing  arguments on the matter, the circuit court stated, “I’ll tell you what, Mr. Love is not going  anywhere.  Let’s go on to something else right now, and we’ll look at these phones and  discuss the variables a little later on.”  Toward the end of the bench conference, the circuit  court further stated, “Well, I still think you need to ask him something else right now, and  we’ll get to this issue a little later on.”  Based upon these statements, we hold that Appellant  did not obtain a clear ruling from the circuit court on this issue, and as a result, the issue is  precluded from appellate view.  See Small v. State, ___ Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Oct. 4,  2007).  For his fifth point on appeal, Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in denying  his motion in limine concerning introduction and reference to the cell phone and voice record  of Andre Love.  Specifically, Appellant contends that the circuit court  “allowed the cell  phone to be introduced into evidence even though the State took no steps to establish the ­13­  integrity of the recording or to establish that the same had not been altered or impaired.”  The  State responds by arguing that Appellant’s failure to obtain a ruling  precluded appellate  review.  In the alternative, the State asserts that there was no abuse of discretion, and if there  were, then the error was harmless.  In discussing our standard of review for evidentiary rulings, we have said that the trial  courts have broad discretion and that a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence  will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.  White v. State, 367 Ark. 595, ___  S.W.3d ___ (2006).  Appellant makes a chain­of­custody argument.  On July 31, 2006, Appellant filed a  motion in limine in which he stated:  On July 18, 2006, Defendant and undersigned counsel were allowed to  hear  what  purported  to  be  an  audio  recording  of  Defendant  discussing  the  crime in this matter, which recording had allegedly been preserved on phone  owned  by  Andre  Love.    After  discussions  with  the  prosecutor  and  Mike  Grimes of the Arkansas State Police, it was discovered that the audio recording  could not be copied for Defendant, although it had been requested.  It was  further discovered that the recording had allegedly remained on the phone,  which phone had apparently remained in the possession of Andre Love until  some  two  weeks,  or  so,  prior  to  July  18,  2006,  at  which  time  the  State  of  Arkansas purchased a different phone for Mr. Love and took possession of the  phone in question.  To date, undersigned counsel and Defendant have been told by the State  that  it  has  been  unable  to  download  or  transfer  the  recording  from  the  telephone to any other form of media or recording.  Defendant objects to the  introduction of said evidence inasmuch as the  State has  not  preserved the  same so as to establish a proper chain of custody.  Mr. Love has a multitude  of reasons to alter, modify or change the recording to enure to the determent  [sic] of Defendant, Kenny Appellant, inasmuch as he knows that Defendant,  Kenny Appellant, has always maintained that Andre Love was involved in the  shooting of J.W. Hall and in fact was the shooter.  The State, for whatever ­14­  reason,  chose  to  allow  this  phone  to  remain  in  the  hands  of  non­law  enforcement and to be used repeatedly for the course of the better part of a  year while not taking proper steps to preserve the integrity of the evidence.  There is no way for this court to make a determination as to whether there is  a  reasonable  probability  that  the  integrity  of  the  evidence  has  not  been  impaired.  Prior to trial, Appellant raised his motion in limine, but the circuit court stated, “I have  a good idea.  We’ll cross that bridge when and if we get to it.”  Appellant’s attorney replied,  “I agree.”  However, the cell phone was admitted without objection at trial, and the recording  on it was played without objection.  We have repeatedly said that failure to obtain a ruling  on an issue at the trial court level precludes review on appeal.  See Small, supra.  Here, the  trial court provided no ruling on the issue.  Thus, we are precluded from reaching the issue  on appellate review.  Pursuant to Ark. R. Sup. Ct. 4­3(h) (2007), the record in this case has been reviewed  for all objections, motions, and requests made by either party, which were decided adversely  to Appellant, and no prejudicial error has been found.  See, e.g., Bell v. State, ___ Ark. ___,  ___ S.W.3d ___ (Nov. 1, 2007).  Affirmed. ­15­ 

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