Alan Ray Cluck v. State of Arkansas

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ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT  No.  CR 06­1213  Opinion Delivered  ALAN RAY CLUCK  Appellant  v.  STATE OF ARKANSAS  Appellee  October 25, 2007  PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT  COURT OF CRAWFORD COUNTY,  CR 2003­311, HON. GARY COTTRELL,  JUDGE  AFFIRMED.  PER CURIAM  In 2004, appellant Alan Ray Cluck was found guilty by a jury of possession of paraphernalia  with intent  to  manufacture  methamphetamine  and  sentenced  to  180  months’ imprisonment.    On  appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals reversed the conviction.  Cluck v. State, 91 Ark. App. 220,  209 S.W.3d 428 (2005).  Upon review, this court affirmed the jury’s verdict.  Cluck v. State, 365  Ark. 166, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006).  Subsequently, appellant filed in the trial court pro se petitions for relief pursuant to Ark. R.  1  Crim. P. 37.1.  The trial court denied the petitions after a hearing that spanned three days,  and  appellant has lodged an appeal here from the order.  We do not reverse a denial of postconviction relief unless the trial court’s findings are clearly  erroneous.  Greene v. State, 356 Ark. 59, 146 S.W.3d 871 (2004).  A finding is clearly erroneous  when,  although there  was  evidence  to  support  it,  the  appellate  court,  after  reviewing  the  entire  evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.  Flores v. 1  Rule 37.1 hearings were held on May 17, 2006, July 12, 2006, and July 13, 2006.  State, 350 Ark. 198, 85 S.W.3d 896 (2002).  We  first  address  jurisdictional matters  before  discussing  any  substantive  issues  raised  by  appellant.  In  the  instant matter, appellant failed to comply with the requirement that Rule 37.1  pleadings be verified.  The original Rule 37.1 petition was verified.  Appellant later filed in the trial  court “additional grounds” in support of his petition, and then filed a “brief in support of Rule 37  petition and amended petition,” although no amended petition was filed by appellant.  The latter two  pleadings did not contain appellant’s verified signature as required by Rule 37.1(c).  The verification  requirement  for  a  petition  seeking  postconviction  relief  is  of  substantive  importance  to  prevent  perjury.  Boyle v. State, 362 Ark. 248, 208 S.W.3d 134 (2005) (per curiam).  In order to serve this  purpose, a pro se petitioner must execute the verification.  Boyle, supra.  Rule 37.1(c) does not distinguish between the original petition and an amended petition with  regard to the verification requirement.  See e.g. Howard v. State, 366 Ark. 453, ___ S.W.3d ___  (2006) (per curiam); Shaw v. State, 363 Ark. 156, 211 S.W.3d 506 (2005) (per curiam).  As a result,  the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the “additional grounds” pleading and “brief in support”  of the petition.  Any issues raised by appellant in Rule 37.1 pleadings filed subsequent to the original  petition must therefore be excluded from consideration, as those issues were not properly before the  2  trial court.  In appellant’s first point on appeal, which contains seven sub­points, he argues that the trial  court erred by failing to grant Rule 37.1 relief.  The majority of the arguments are based upon various  allegations related to ineffective­assistance­of­counsel claims.  In an appeal from a trial court’s denial  of a petition under Rule 37.1 premised on ineffective assistance of counsel, the question presented 2  We note that at the Rule 37.1 hearing, appellant misrepresented to the trial court that the  subsequent pleadings contained no new issues.  ­2­  is whether, based on the totality of the evidence, the trial court clearly erred in holding that counsel’s  performance was not ineffective under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.  668 (1984).  Jackson v. State, 352 Ark. 359, 105 S.W.3d 352 (2003).  Under Strickland, a petitioner  must show that counsel’s performance was deficient through a showing that counsel made errors so  serious that  counsel was not  functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the petitioner by the Sixth  Amendment.  Additionally, a petitioner must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the  defense, which requires a showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the petitioner  of a fair trial.  Andrews v. State, 344 Ark. 606, 42 S.W.3d 484 (2001) (per curiam).  In his first sub­point, appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective because counsel’s  work case load was too great to represent appellant competently, or prepare an adequate defense.  He further complains that he had limited contact with counsel prior to trial.  This specific allegation  was not contained in appellant’s original Rule 37.1 petition.  As explained above, any issues not  contained  in  appellant’s  original Rule  37.1  petition  will  not  be  considered  as  the  issue  was  not  properly raised in the trial court.  It is well settled that the we will not consider an argument raised  for the first time on appeal.  Ayers v. State, 334 Ark. 258, 975 S.W.2d 88 (1998).  In his next sub­point, appellant complains that he was viewed by jurors while hand­cuffed and  shackled.  He maintains that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a mistrial based upon the  jurors’ view of him while being restrained.  The trial transcript reveals that on the morning of the second day of trial, the sheriff’s office  transported appellant from the jail to the courtroom through the main hallway, where several jurors  stood, rather than through a back elevator reserved for transportation of prisoners.  These jurors may  have been able to see that appellant was restrained in shackles and handcuffs during transportation, ­3­  but the restraints were removed upon entering the courtroom for trial.  As the first order of business  that day, trial counsel moved for a mistrial.  The trial court denied the motion, finding that it was not  certain that appellant was viewed by the jurors in the hallway, and if they did see the restraints, it was  not sufficient to declare a mistrial.  The trial court offered to admonish the jury, but trial counsel  declined, stating that he did not want to bring the shackles to the attention of jurors who had not  already seen the restraints.  Appellant cannot meet either prong of Strickland regarding this allegation, as trial counsel did  move  for  a  mistrial,  contrary  to  appellant’s  contention,  but  was  overruled  by  the  trial  court.  Additionally, the decision to reject an admonishment to the jury amounted to trial strategy on the part  of counsel.  Matters of trial strategy and tactics, even if arguably improvident, fall within the realm  of counsel’s professional judgment  and are not  grounds for a finding of ineffective  assistance of  counsel.  Noel v. State, 342 Ark. 35, 26 S.W.3d 123 (2000).  On appeal, appellant extends this allegation to include the claim that appellate counsel was  also  ineffective  for  failing  to  raise  this  issue  on  direct  appeal.    However,  he  did  not  make  this  allegation in his original Rule 37.1 petition, and the argument will not be considered for the first time  on appeal.  Ayers, supra.  In his third sub­point, appellant posits that trial counsel and appellate counsel failed to argue  at trial and on direct appeal that the jury should have been instructed as to a lesser­included offense.  This argument was not included in appellant’s original Rule 37.1 petition, and cannot be raised on  appeal for the first time.  Ayers, supra.  Next, appellant complains that trial counsel failed to investigate all witnesses suggested by  appellant,  and  that  counsel’s  failure  to  do  so  resulted  in  deficient  performance  and  violated  his ­4­  constitutional rights.  As with most of his prior arguments on appeal, appellant failed to make this  claim in his original petition.  Thus, our court will not address this matter on appeal.  Ayers, supra.  Appellant’s fifth sub­point is that trial counsel failed to call appellant’s doctor as a witness or  introduce evidence that appellant had been given a prescription for Sudafed, which contained an  ingredient  used  to  make  methamphetamine,  pseudoephedrine.    The  police  seized  three  boxes  of  allergy medicine belonging to appellant.  This argument was not contained in appellant’s Rule 37.1  petition, and will not be considered on appeal.  Ayers, supra.  Next, appellant argues that counsel failed to pursue a motion to suppress the introduction of  items obtained by the police during a search of the residence where appellant was located.  These  items  formed  the  basis  of  the  charge  of  possession  of  paraphernalia  with  intent  to  manufacture  methamphetamine.  During the Rule 37.1 hearing, appellant maintained that he was not a resident of  3  the house, and did not have access to or own the confiscated items.  Thus, he claims he should not  have been charged with possession of these items. However, appellant simultaneously contended that  the police failed to properly inform him that he could have refused permission to search the residence,  resulting in an illegal and unconstitutional search and seizure.  At  trial,  counsel initially filed  a  motion to  suppress  the  evidence,  but  later  withdrew  the  motion after determining that it had no merit or basis in the law.  In its order denying appellant’s Rule  37.1 petition, the trial court concluded that had counsel pursued the motion to suppress, the court  would have denied the motion.  Appellant did not demonstrate in the Rule 37.1 petition that counsel  could have argued meritorious grounds for suppressing the evidence.  Trial counsel is not ineffective 3  Testimony at trial showed that appellant’s mother owned the house where appellant was  located, and appellant had been living in the house for approximately seven months prior to his  arrest, and he had access to all areas of the house.  Appellant’s father testified that appellant co­  owned the house with his mother.  ­5­  for failing to make an argument that is meritless, either at trial or on appeal.  Greene, supra; Camargo  v.  State,  346  Ark.  118,  55  S.W.3d  255  (2001).    Appellant  failed  to  meet  either  prong  of  the  Strickland test as to this argument, and we affirm the trial court on this point.  In his next sub­point, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied  appellant’s motion for the trial court to recuse from presiding over the postconviction proceeding.  Here, while the Rule 37.1 petition was pending, appellant sought to issue a subpoena for the trial  court  to  be  a  witness  at  the  Rule  37.1  hearing.  He  also  filed  a  motion  for  either  mandatory  disqualification of the court, or the court’s recusal from presiding over disposition of the Rule 37.1  petition.  In the motion, appellant claimed that the trial court was a material witness in the matter.  The record reveals that the trial court denied the motion to recuse in an order filed on July  11, 2006, and at the continuation of the Rule 37.1 hearing on July 12, 2006, the trial court explained  to appellant the basis for the ruling from the bench.  On July 20, 2006, appellant filed a notice of  4  appeal from the denial of the Rule 37.1 petition from the order “entered on July 13, 2006,”  and on  August 21, 2006, appellant filed a notice of interlocutory appeal from the order “entered on July 13th,  2006, Motion to Recluse [sic] for Material Witness purposes.”  We do not reach this issue as it is not properly before this court on appeal.  The notice of  appeal was filed more than thirty days after entry of the July 11, 2006, order denying the motion,  making the notice of appeal untimely filed.  Ark. R. App. P.–Civ. 4(a).  Further, the notice incorrectly  stated that the appeal was being taken from the order “entered on July 13, 2006,” and if appellant 4  Pursuant to Ark. R. App. P.–Civ. 4(a), a notice of appeal that is filed prior to entry of the  order from which the appeal will be taken “shall be treated as filed on the day after” the order is  entered.  Here, the trial court orally denied the Rule 37.1 petition at the conclusion of the July 13,  2006, hearing.  Appellant filed a notice of appeal on July 20, 2006, and the trial court entered the  order denying the Rule 37.1 petition on August 10, 2006.  Therefore, the notice of appeal was  deemed timely filed on August 11, 2006.  ­6­  intended to refer to the trial court’s final order disposing of the Rule 37.1 petition entered on August  10, 2006, that order did not concern or address the motion to recuse.  Therefore, appellant failed to  properly appeal the trial court’s denial of the motion to recuse.  Moreover, even had appellant timely  sought an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s order, Ark. R. App. P.–Civ. 2 does not authorize  an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to recuse.  Manila School District No. 15 v.  Wagner,  357 Ark. 20, 159 S.W.3d 285 (2004).  For  his  second  point  on  appeal,  appellant  argues  that  he  was  improperly  convicted  and  sentenced for a crime with which he was not charged.  He specifically alleges that he was charged  pursuant  to  Ark.  Code  Ann.  §5­64­403  (Supp.  2003),  but  was  convicted  under  section  5­64­  403(c)(5).  However, he did not raise this issue in his original Rule 37.1 petition.  As he is raising this  issue for the first time on appeal, we will not consider it.  Ayers, supra.  Affirmed.  Brown, J., not participating. ­7­ 

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