State of Arkansas v. Jose Blandin

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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS  No.  CR06­1117  Opinion Delivered May 10, 2007  STATE OF ARKANSAS,  APPELLANT,  VS.  JOSE BLANDIN,  APPEAL  FROM  THE  PULASKI  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,  NO. CR2006­1117,  HON. BARRY ALAN SIMS, JUDGE,  APPELLEE,  REVERSED AND REMANDED.  ANNABELLE CLINTON IMBER, Associate Justice  The State brings this interlocutory appeal pursuant to the rape­shield statute, Ark.  Code Ann. § 16­42­101(c) (Repl. 1999), and Ark. R. App. P.–Crim. 3 (2006).  Appellee Jose  Blandin was charged under Ark. Code Ann. § 5­14­103 (Repl. 2006) with the anal rape of  G.C., a nine­year­old girl.  Prior to trial, Blandin requested a rape­shield hearing pursuant  to  section  16­42­101(c).  At  the  hearing,  the  circuit  court  granted  the  State’s  motion  to  introduce evidence, under Ark. R. Evid. 404(b) (2006), of G.C.’s statements that, before the  rape, Blandin rubbed on her vagina while she was taking a bath.   In response, the defense  requested permission to introduce evidence of G.C.’s allegations of sexual abuse against  three other men in order to show that G.C. obtained her sexual knowledge from a source  other  than  Blandin.  Namely,  the  defense  wished  to  introduce  statements  G.C.  made  concerning three past incidents in which two men rubbed on her “privates” and another man ­1­  forcibly kissed her.  Upon hearing the arguments of counsel and testimony from G.C. and  Detective Marilyn Scott, the investigating officer in the instant case, the circuit court granted  Blandin’s motion.  However, the circuit court limited the admission of the evidence to show  (1) the time line of the prior allegations, and (2) the similarity and language that was used  by the victim.  Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 5­14­103(a)(3)(A), “a person commits rape if he or she  engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity with another person . . . . [w]ho is  less than fourteen (14) years of age.”  Generally, when a criminal defendant is charged with  violating section 5­14­103(a)(3)(A) consent is not an issue, and the State must only prove  that (1) the defendant engaged in intercourse or deviate sexual activity with the victim and  (2) the victim was under fourteen (14) years of age at the time of the sexual act.  See M.M.  v. State, 350 Ark. 328, 88 S.W.3d 406 (2002).  Pursuant to the rape­shield statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 16­42­101, a criminal defendant  is barred from introducing certain evidence to prove his or her defense:  (b) [O]pinion evidence, reputation  evidence, or evidence of specific  instances of the victim’s prior sexual conduct with the defendant or any other  person, evidence of a victim’s prior allegations of sexual conduct  with the  defendant or any other person, which allegations the victim asserts to be true,  or evidence offered by the defendant concerning prior allegations of sexual  conduct by the victim with the defendant or any other person if the  victim  denies  making  the  allegations  is  not  admissible  by  the  defendant,  either  through  direct  examination  of  any  defense  witness  or  through  cross­  examination of the victim or other prosecution witness, to attack the credibility  of the victim, to prove consent or any other defense, or for any other purpose.  Ark. Code Ann. § 16­42­101(b) (emphasis added).  However, “evidence directly pertaining ­2­  to  the  act  upon  which  the  prosecution  is  based  or  evidence  of  the  victim’s  prior  sexual  conduct with the defendant or any other person” may be admitted at trial if the defendant  files a written motion for a rape­shield hearing, and, following the hearing, the circuit court  “determines that the offered proof is relevant to a fact in issue, and that its probative value  1  outweighs  its  inflammatory  or  prejudicial  nature.”  Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  16­42­101(c)  (emphasis added).  The purpose of the rape­shield statute is to protect victims of rape or sexual abuse  from the humiliation of having their personal conduct, unrelated to the pending charges,  paraded before the jury and the public when such conduct is irrelevant to the defendant’s  guilt.  Harris v. State, 322 Ark. 167, 907 S.W.2d 729 (1995).  The circuit court is vested with  a great deal of discretion in ruling whether evidence is relevant and admissible under the  exception to the rape­shield statute.  Graydon v. State, 329 Ark. 596, 953 S.W.2d 45 (1997).  Accordingly, we will not overturn the circuit court’s decision unless it constituted clear error  or a manifest abuse of discretion.  Id.  We have generally held that when consent is not an issue, the victim’s prior sexual  conduct with another person is entirely collateral.  See M.M. v. State, supra.  Nevertheless, 1  Justice Corbin’s concurring and dissenting opinion attempts to circumvent the statutory  scheme of Ark. Code Ann. § 16­42­101 through its argument that prior sexual conduct of a child  victim is “simply not relevant.”  As quoted above, while subsection (b) of that statute generally  prohibits the admission of evidence of a victim’s prior sexual conduct, subsection (c) provides an  exception to that prohibition by way of a rape­shield hearing.  The text of section 16­42­101 does  not exclude child victims from the application of subsection (c).  When the victim is a child,  Townsend v. State, infra, simply provides a framework for circuit courts to use in conjunction  with section 16­42­101(c).  ­3­  in  our  recent  opinion  in  State  v.  Townsend,  366  Ark.  152,  ___  S.W.3d  ___  (2006),  we  recognized that evidence of a child victim’s prior sexual conduct could be relevant to rebut  the weighty inference that the victim must have received his or her knowledge of sexual  2  matters from the alleged encounters with the defendant.  See id.  In Townsend, we adopted a five­factor test from Pullizzano v. State, 155 Wis. 2d 633,  456 N.W.2d 325 (1990), for determining whether evidence of a child victim’s prior sexual  conduct is admissible for the limited purpose of proving an alternative source for the child’s  sexual knowledge.  For the evidence to be admissible, the defendant must offer proof  (1) that the prior act clearly occurred; (2) that the acts closely  resembled  those  of  the  present  case;  (3)  that  the  prior  act  is  clearly  relevant  to  a  material  issue;  (4)  that  the  evidence  is  necessary to the defendant’s case; (5) that the probative value of  the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.  State v. Townsend, 366 Ark. at 158, ___ S.W.3d at ___ .  In adopting the Pulizzano factors,  we stated,  [T]his  analytical  approach  has  merit  when  ruling on  the  admissibility  of  a  child’s previous sexual experiences.  We also believe that a comparison of the  child’s descriptions of the respective sexual encounters is relevant in cases  such  as  these,  because  if  a  description  is  given  after  the  first  incident  but 2  Despite any protest to the contrary, the Townsend court clearly explained why a child  victim’s descriptions of prior sexual abuse may be relevant.  We stated that a comparison of the  victim’s descriptions of the prior and current sexual abuse could tend to show the victim’s  “degree of sexual knowledge at the time of each incident” and thereby mitigate the assumption  that the victim obtained his or her current sexual knowledge from the defendant.  Townsend v.  State, supra, 366 Ark. at 158, ___ S.W.3d at ___ (2006).  In fact, Justice Corbin’s concurring  and dissenting opinion cites a portion of our reasoning as to why such evidence may be relevant,  but the dissent omits the very next sentence, which states “[t]he similarity requirement makes it  more likely that the sexual knowledge displayed by a victim in one case was actually derived from  a prior encounter, and that assumption is essential to the defendant’s argument in these  situations.”  Id. at 158, ___ S.W.3d at ___ (2006).  ­4­  before the second, it provides a basis for assessment and comparison of the  child’s degree of sexual knowledge at the time of each incident.  Also, the use  of common or similar terms or phrases by the child in various descriptions  may  indicate  a  congruent  similarity  of  acts  in  different  incidents,  and  is  therefore relevant.  The similarity requirement makes it more likely that the  sexual knowledge displayed by a victim in one case was actually derived from  a prior encounter, and that assumption is essential to the defendant’s argument  in these situations.  State v. Townsend, 366 Ark. at 158, ___ S.W.3d at ___.  The State argues that the evidence of G.C.’s prior allegations does not satisfy the  Townsend test because Blandin never proved that the allegations were relevant to his defense  or even to the act for which Blandin was charged—rape.  Blandin, on the other hand, argues  that  G.C.’s  use  of  similar  language  to  describe  both  the  prior  abuse  and  her  alleged  encounters with him is relevant to show that he did not commit the charged act.  Blandin also  argues that because this court has held that the testimony of a rape victim is sufficient to  sustain  a  rape  conviction,  see  Williams  v.  State,  331  Ark.  263,  962  S.W.2d  329  (1998),  G.C.’s testimony about the prior allegations is sufficient to prove that the prior allegations  were true and the prior incidents of sexual abuse did actually occur.  We agree with the State  3  and reverse and remand.  Even assuming, without deciding, that a victim’s testimony as to prior sexual acts is  sufficient  to  prove  that  the  prior  acts  actually  occurred,  the  evidence  here  still  does  not  satisfy the second factor under Townsend.  In that case, Townsend was charged with  raping his six­year­old step­granddaughter.  See State v. Townsend, supra.  When explaining 3  At this juncture, we would point out that, even though Justice Corbin calls for this court  to overturn Townsend, neither party has asked us to overrule our decision in that case.  ­5­  the  acts  Townsend  performed  on  her,  the  victim  used  graphic  descriptions,  including  descriptions of positions he placed her in, how he penetrated her, how he disrobed her, where  the abuse took place, and detailed descriptions of Townsend’s penis.  Id.  For rebuttal, the  circuit court allowed Townsend to introduce the victim’s statements concerning how another  man abused her when she was four years old.  Id.  In those statements, however, the victim  used vague terms such as “his thingy,” and the victim’s language was unclear as to whether  the prior perpetrator ever penetrated the victim or whether the victim and perpetrator were  clothed when the incident occurred.  Id.  We reversed on the second factor— the similarity of the prior incident to the charged  act.  Id.  After examining the victim’s descriptions of both incidents we concluded that “[the  victim’s] descriptions of the two incidents are substantially dissimilar as to definition and  terminology, which supports the conclusion that [the victim] acquired her current stock of  sexual knowledge after the first incident, and the respective descriptions show little similarity  between the two acts described.”  Id. at 159, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006).  Likewise, here the victim’s descriptions of the prior abuse and the charged act are  very dissimilar.  In her allegations of prior abuse, G.C. stated that her Grandpa Larry “rubbed  on her private spot” when she was five (5) years old and, at some point later, her Uncle  James  “wiped  in  her  private  spot”  while  she  was  bathing.    Finally,  G.C.  alleged  that  in  December 2005, a man named Carlos, who was living in her mother’s home, pushed her onto  the couch and kissed her.  However, when she described Blandin’s actions towards her,  G.C. stated that Blandin “rubbed on her privates” while she was bathing and later “stuck his ­6­  privates into [her] butt.”  The acts described by G.C. are strikingly dissimilar.  When G.C. described the prior  abusers  she  simply  stated  that  the  men  rubbed  on  her  private  area,  but,  with  regard  to  Blandin, she described a completely different act—anal rape.  If anything, the shift in G.C.’s  descriptions from that of a man touching her genitalia to Blandin’s male genitalia penetrating  her anus implies an evolution in her sexual knowledge after her alleged encounters with  Blandin.  Moreover, although, G.C. did use similar language and describe similar acts in her  statements regarding both Uncle James and Blandin rubbing on her “privates” during her  bath, the statement concerning Blandin was only introduced as a prior bad act under Rule  404(b) and did not describe the charged crime.  Additionally, the evidence of G.C.’s allegations of prior abuse is inadmissible for  another reason.  As previously quoted above, in Townsend we adopted the five­factor test  because “a comparison of the child’s descriptions of  the  respective sexual encounters is  relevant in cases such as these, because if a description is given after the first incident but  before the second, it provides a basis for an assessment and comparison of the child’s degree  of sexual knowledge at the time of each incident.”  State v. Townsend, 366 Ark. at 158, ___  S.W.3d ___ (2006).  In Townsend, we examined statements the victim made to police when  she was four years old and statements she made two years later.  See id.  In the instant case,  however, no evidence was presented as to G.C.’s statements at the time that the alleged prior  abuse occurred.  Instead, the testimony at the hearing only related what G.C. said during her  interview with Detective Scott and not what she said after each alleged incident of prior ­7­  abuse.  Thus, the purpose of the test—to compare the similarity of G.C.’s statements made  prior to the occurrence of the charged acts with those statements made after the charged  acts—was frustrated in this case.  Accordingly, we conclude that, under our Townsend analysis, the evidence of G.C.’s  allegations of prior abuse is not relevant to the current rape charge against Blandin.  The  circuit  court  clearly  erred  in  ruling  otherwise.  Therefore,  we  reverse  the  court’s  order  granting Blandin’s  motion  under  the  rape­shield  statute  and  remand  the  case  for  further  proceedings consistent with this opinion.  Reversed and remanded.  CORBIN, BROWN, AND GUNTER, J.J., concurring in part; dissenting in part.  DONALD L. CORBIN, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part. While I agree  with the outcome in the present case, I write separately to emphasize my belief that this  court’s decision in State v. Townsend, 366 Ark. 152, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006), should be  overruled.  Originally,  I  joined  in  the  majority  opinion  in  Townsend,  but  upon  further  reflection, I have come to the conclusion that our decision in that case runs contrary to the  overall intent of the rape­shield statute, codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 16­42­101(c) (Repl.  1999).  It has long been recognized that the purpose of the rape­shield statute is to shield  victims  of  rape  or  sexual  abuse  from  the  humiliation  of  having  their  sexual  conduct,  unrelated to the charges pending, paraded before the jury and the public when such conduct  is irrelevant to the defendant’s guilt.  Graydon v. State, 329 Ark. 596, 953 S.W.2d 45 (1997). ­8­  Moreover, as the majority correctly points out, this court has held that evidence intended to  impeach a victim’s credibility is improper under the rape­shield statute, especially in cases  in which the defendant is accused of raping someone under the age of fourteen, because  “[w]hen consent is not an issue, whether the victim had sexual relations with another person  is ‘entirely collateral.’” M.M. v. State, 350 Ark. 328, 333, 88 S.W.3d 406, 409 (2002) (citing  Evans v. State, 317 Ark. 532, 878 S.W.2d 750 (1994)).  Despite this clearly stated precedent,  our court in Townsend, 366 Ark. 152, ___ S.W.3d ___, carved out an exception that now  allows a defendant to delve into a victim’s prior sexual contact thereby subjecting victims  to even more humiliation and degradation.  A review of our decision in Townsend reveals that it is a significant departure from  this court’s previous conclusions that evidence of a minor victim’s prior sexual activity is not  relevant or admissible in a subsequent court proceeding.  See, e.g., Standridge v. State, 357  Ark. 105, 161 S.W.3d 815 (2004) (holding that evidence that minor victim had made prior  sexual­abuse allegations against her former stepfather was inadmissible under the rape­shield  statute); M.M., 350 Ark. 328, 88 S.W.3d 406 (holding that evidence of prior sexual history  of  a  nine­year­old  child  was  not  admissible  in  defendant’s  trial  for  rape  because  it  was  irrelevant); and  Ridling v. State, 348 Ark. 213, 72 S.W.3d 466 (2002) (holding that evidence  of  the  victim’s  prior  sexual  encounters  was  irrelevant  and  thus  inadmissible  where  the  defendant had sexual intercourse with someone less than fourteen years of age). Despite this  court’s clearly established precedent that prior sexual history is particularly irrelevant in  cases involving a victim less than fourteen years of age, the court in Townsend, 366 Ark. 152, ­9­  ___ S.W.3d ___,  chose to look to other jurisdictions to determine whether evidence that the  victim had been previously raped when she was four years of age was somehow admissible.  Ultimately, this court decided to adopt the test set out by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in  State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990), to answer the issue raised in  Townsend.  I now realize the error in this approach.  In adopting the Pulizzano factors, this  court stated:  We  think  that  this  analytical  approach  has  merit  when  ruling  on  the  admissibility of a child’s previous sexual experiences.  We also believe that  a comparison of the child’s descriptions of the respective sexual encounters is  relevant in cases such as these, because if a description is given after the first  incident  but  before  the  second,  it  provides  a  basis  for  an  assessment  and  comparison  of  the  child’s  degree  of  sexual  knowledge  at  the  time  of  each  incident. Also, the use of common or similar terms or phrases by the child in  the  various  descriptions  may  indicate  a  congruent  similarity  of  the  acts  in  different incidents, and is therefore relevant.  366 Ark. at 158, ___ S.W.3d at ___.  It is interesting to me that while this court announced  that a child’s prior sexual knowledge is now relevant, the opinion made no effort to explain  how it is relevant.  Simply  put,  this  court  should  overrule  Townsend  and  the  test  it  adopted  because  evidence of prior sexual conduct of a victim less than fourteen years of age is simply not  relevant  or  admissible.    Moreover,  the  Pulizzano  test  was  originally  adopted  by  the  Wisconsin  court  in  the  limited  context  of  a  finding  that  the  defendant’s  rights  to  confrontation and compulsory process were denied where she was prohibited from presenting  evidence of a minor victim’s prior sexual assault that the court deemed to be relevant.  See  State v. Dunlap, 250 Wis. 2d 466, 640 N.W.2d 112 (2002) (explaining that the court adopted ­10­  the five­factor test in order to balance the interests of the defendant and the complainant and  to  determine  when  a  defendant’s  right  to  present  a  defense  should  supersede  the  state’s  interest in protecting the complainant).  In adopting the test in Townsend, 366 Ark. 152, ___  S.W.3d ___, this court took the test out of context, and it can now be used by defendants to  impeach the credibility of minor victims by delving into their sexual histories.  Because I  believe that Townsend is a significant departure from this court’s well­established precedent,  I believe it should be overruled.  Concurring in part; dissenting in part.  ROBERT L. BROWN, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I, too, would  reverse  and  remand,  but  I  would  do  so  to  require  the  circuit  judge  to  first  perform  the  Townsend analysis.  See State v. Townsend, ___ Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (April 13, 2006).  In Townsend, this court adopted five factors to be used by the circuit judges of this state for  determining prior knowledge of a child of sexual events and terminology.  In the case before  us  today,  the  circuit  judge  did  not  make  the  findings  or  conclusions,  as  required  by  Townsend.  The majority does the analysis for the circuit judge, including making findings under  Townsend and reaching conclusions, which is totally at odds with our role as an appellate  court.  We would  be better served remanding the case and requiring the circuit judge to  make the necessary findings.  This could be done by the judge solely based on the record of  the rape­shield hearing that has already taken place and would not cause an inordinate delay.  For this reason, I concur in the result but I disagree with the majority’s reasoning for ­11­  doing so. ­12­ 

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