Gregory Honeycutt v. Judge Phillip Foster, Ouachita County District Court

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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS  No.  07­665  GREGORY HONEYCUTT,  APPELLANT;  VS.  JUDGE  PHILLIP  FOSTER,  OUACHITA  COUNTY DISTRICT COURT,  APPELLEE;  Opinion Delivered NOVEMBER 29, 2007  APPEAL  FROM  THE  OUACHITA  COUNTY  CIRCUIT  COURT,  SECOND  DIVISION; NO. CV­06­267­2;  HON. MICHAEL RICHARD LANDERS,  JUDGE;  APPEAL DISMISSED.  DONALD L. CORBIN, Associate Justice  This appeal arises from the Ouachita County Circuit Court’s order denying Appellant  Gregory  Honeycutt’s  petition  and  amended  petition  for  writ  of  mandamus  directed  at  Appellee Ouachita County District Court Judge Phillip Foster (referred to as the “District  Court”),  as  well  as  the  circuit  court’s  order  granting  Honeycutt’s  motion  to  voluntarily  nonsuit his petition for writ of prohibition and denying his motion for additional ruling and  for new trial/reconsideration/relief from order.  On appeal, Honeycutt raises two arguments  for reversal: the circuit court (1) improperly delayed ruling on the petitions to Honeycutt’s  prejudice; and (2) clearly erred and abused its discretion when it failed to compel the District  Court  to  rule  on  his  second  motion  to  transfer.  Because  this  is  a  case  of  mandamus,  jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1­2(a)(3).  We dismiss the appeal as it is moot.  In 2004, Honeycutt brought a cause of action against Stone Timber Co., Inc., in Union  County District Court.  In August 2004, Stone Timber filed a motion to dismiss the case alleging that venue was improper in Union County because Stone Timber’s residence was  Ouachita County.  On September 27, 2004, the Union County District Court dismissed the  case because venue was improper.  Then, on October 6, 2004, Honeycutt filed a complaint  against Stone Timber in the District Court.  The following has occurred since Honeycutt’s complaint was filed in the District  Court.  On March 24, 2005, Honeycutt filed a motion to transfer his case against  Stone  Timber back to Union County District Court because venue was proper there and that court  erred in dismissing the case.  Honeycutt filed a second motion to transfer, on April 12, 2005,  alleging that the District Court lacked subject­matter jurisdiction and that venue was proper  in Union County Circuit Court.  After filing this second motion, Honeycutt’s attorney sent  multiple  letters to the District Court inquiring about the status of the case against Stone  Timber.  Then, on November 21, 2006, Honeycutt filed a petition for writ of mandamus in  Ouachita County Circuit Court asking the circuit court to direct the District Court to issue  an order on the motions to transfer.  On December 6, 2006, the District Court issued an order  denying Honeycutt’s motion to transfer based upon its finding that venue was appropriate.  The next day, the District Court responded to Honeycutt’s petition in circuit court stating that  it had ruled on the motions to transfer by denying them by its December 6 order.  On December 27, 2006, Honeycutt filed an amended petition for writ of mandamus  in the circuit court claiming that the District Court’s December 6 order failed to address the  jurisdictional issue he raised in his second motion to transfer.  Thus, he sought a writ of ­2­  07­665  mandamus to compel the District Court to fully and completely rule on the matter.  The  District Court again responded that it had ruled on the motions by denying them. On January  25, 2007, Honeycutt filed another amended petition for writ of mandamus and a petition for  writ of prohibition in the circuit court.  The  circuit  court,  on  February  7,  2007,  issued  an  order  of  dismissal  denying  Honeycutt’s petition and amended petition for writ of mandamus because the District Court  had  issued  an  order  denying  Honeycutt’s  motion  to  transfer.    Following  this  order,  the  District Court filed a motion to dismiss, on February 12, 2007, asking the circuit court to  dismiss the amended petition for mandamus and the petition for prohibition.  In April 2007,  Honeycutt filed a motion for summary disposition and a request for findings of fact and  conclusions  of  law,  as  well  as  a  motion  for  additional  ruling  and  for  new  trial/reconsideration/relief from order.  On April 23, 2007, Honeycutt filed a motion to voluntarily nonsuit his petition for  writ of prohibition.  The circuit court, on April 24, 2007, granted the motion to voluntarily  nonsuit,  but  denied  Honeycutt’s  motion  for  additional  ruling  and  for  new  trial/reconsideration/relief from order.  That same day, Honeycutt filed a notice of appeal  from the February 7 and April 24 orders.  A  few  months  later,  on  September  7,  2007,  the  District  Court  issued  an  order  transferring Honeycutt’s case against Stone Timber to the Ouachita County Circuit Court.  Specifically, the District Court found Honeycutt’s second motion to transfer to be without  merit because the District Court had subject­matter jurisdiction over the matter.  However, ­3­  07­665  because the circuit court had concurrent jurisdiction with the District Court on this matter,  “upon  its  own  motion,  sua  sponte,  and  out  of  an  abundance  of  caution,”  the  case  was  transferred to the Ouachita County Circuit Court.  A notice of transfer was filed with the  circuit court on September 12, 2007.  As stated above, Honeycutt raises two arguments for reversal.  First, he argues that  the circuit court improperly delayed ruling on the petitions to his prejudice.  In support of  this argument, Honeycutt claims that the circuit court violated Ark. Code Ann. § 16­115­103  (Repl. 2006) and his rights to due process by not ruling on his petition for writ of mandamus,  amended petitions for mandamus, and petition for writ of prohibition “for months.”  Second,  Honeycutt argues that the circuit court clearly erred and abused its discretion when it failed  to compel the District Court to rule on the second motion to transfer. Specifically, Honeycutt  argues  that  his  petition  and  amended  petitions  for  writ  of  mandamus  were  improperly  dismissed,  without  requiring  the  District  Court  to  rule  on  the  second  motion,  when  the  District Court had only ruled on Honeycutt’s first motion to transfer.  The standard of review on a denial of a writ of mandamus is whether the circuit court  abused its discretion.  Republican Party of Garland County v. Johnson, 358 Ark. 443, 193  S.W.3d 248 (2004).  However, as a threshold matter, this court must determine whether the  issues before it are moot.  As a general rule, appellate courts of this state will not review  issues that are moot.  Ball v. Phillips County Election Comm’n, 364 Ark. 574, 222 S.W.3d  205 (2006).  To do so would be to render advisory opinions, which this court will not do.  Id.  A case becomes moot when any judgment rendered would have no practical legal effect ­4­  07­665  upon a then­existing legal controversy.  Id.  This court has recognized two exceptions to the  mootness doctrine.  Id.  The first exception involves issues that are capable of repetition, but  that evade review.  Id.  The second exception concerns issues that raise considerations of  substantial public interest which, if addressed, would prevent future litigation.  Id.  In the present case, the issues raised by Honeycutt are moot.  Honeycutt’s petition for  writ of mandamus asked the circuit court to compel the District Court to rule on his motions  for transfer filed in his case against Stone Timber.  On December 6, 2006, the District Court  issued an order denying Honeycutt’s motion to transfer on the issue of venue.  On January  25, 2007, Honeycutt filed an amended petition for writ of mandamus as well as a petition for  writ  of  prohibition.  On  February  7,  2007,  the  circuit  court  denied  Honeycutt’s  petition  because it found that the District Court had acted in the matter such that a writ of mandamus  would  not  be  proper.  Honeycutt  then  filed  a  motion  to  nonsuit  his  petition  for  writ  of  prohibition, and a motion for additional ruling and for new trial/reconsideration/relief from  order.  The circuit court granted the motion to voluntarily nonsuit and denied Honeycutt’s  motion for additional ruling and for new trial/reconsideration/relief from order.  Honeycutt  appealed both of the circuit court’s orders on April 24, 2007.  Then, on September 7, 2007,  the District Court issued an order finding Honeycutt’s motion to transfer on the issue of  jurisdiction  to  be  without  merit,  but  transferring  the  case  to  the  circuit  court  under  an  abundance of caution because that court had concurrent jurisdiction.  Because the District  Court has acted in this matter, Honeycutt has received the relief he requested, and both issues  raised on appeal are moot.  See Barnett v. Howard, 363 Ark. 150, 211 S.W.3d 490 (2005) ­5­  07­665  (holding that, due to the county court’s acting in the manner requested by the petition for writ  of mandamus, the petition was moot).  Furthermore,  despite  Honeycutt’s  argument  to  the  contrary,  neither  of  the  two  exceptions apply.  Honeycutt concedes that the District Court has ruled on both motions;  however,  he  claims  that  what  he  had  to  do  to  force  the  District  Court  to  do  its  duty  is  unconscionable.  Thus, Honeycutt concludes that it is evident that this situation could be  repeated and that the denial of his requested relief “would send the message that lower courts  can sit on motions until just before they are compelled to do so would do little to maintaining  respect for the judiciary.”  This argument is unpersuasive as this case clearly does not fall  within  the  purview  of  those  cases  recognized  by  this  court  as  those  that  are  capable  of  repetition yet evade review.  Neither does this case involve an issue of substantial public  interest that, if addressed, would prevent future litigation.  As such, any review of this case  would constitute an advisory opinion.  It is well established that this court will not render  advisory  opinions.  Ball,  364  Ark.  574,  222  S.W.3d  205.    Accordingly,  this  appeal  is  dismissed. ­6­  07­665 

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