Arnell Willis v. Jack Crumbly, St. Francis County Election Commission, Frederick Freeman, Chair, Maceo Hawkins and Chris Oswalt

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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS  No.  07­572  Opinion Delivered  11­15­07  REP. ARNELL WILLIS,  APPELLANT,  VS.  JACK  CRUMBLY;  THE  ST.  FRANCIS  COUNTY  ELECTION  COMMISSION,  FREDERICK FREEMAN, CHAIR; MACEO  HAWKINS  AND  CHRIS  OSWALT,  ALL  IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES AS  MEMBERS  OF  THE  ST.  FRANCIS  COUNTY ELECTION COMMISSION,  APPELLEES,  APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT  O F   ST .   F R A N C I S   C O U N T Y ,  ARKANSAS, NO. CV­2006­6811;  HON.  L. T. SIMES, JUDGE,  REVERSED  AND  REMANDED;  MOTION  TO  DISQUALIFY  COUNSEL  FOR  ELECTION  COMMISSION  D E N I E D ;   M O T I O N   F O R  APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL JUDGE IN  THE  EVENT  OF  REVERSAL  AND  REMAND DENIED.  ROBERT L. BROWN, Associate Justice  Representative Arnell Willis appeals for the second time from a dismissal by the St.  Francis County Circuit Court of his complaint challenging the validity of the runoff election  between Jack Crumbly and him in the Democratic Primary for the Arkansas State Senate  District 16 election.  We reverse the order dismissing the case in favor of Crumbly and the  St. Francis County Election Commission, and we remand for additional proceedings.  The facts leading up to the circuit court’s dismissal are these.  Willis, Crumbly, and  Alvin Simes were candidates in the Democratic Primary election held on May 23, 2006, for  the Arkansas State Senate District 16.  A runoff election between Willis and Crumbly was  held on June 13, 2006, in which Crumbly received seventy­eight more votes than Willis and was certified as the winner.  On July 7, 2006, Willis filed a petition in the St. Francis County  Circuit  Court  against  Crumbly,  the  St.  Francis  County  Election  Commission,  Frederick  Freeman as Chair of the Election Commission, and Maceo Hawkins and Chris Oswalt, all  in their official capacities as members of the Election Commission (hereafter collectively  referred to as “Crumbly”), to oust Crumbly, or, alternatively, to void the runoff election and  hold a special runoff election.  In the petition, Willis, among other things, challenged the validity of certain votes and  alleged voter fraud on behalf of Crumbly’s supporters during the course of the election.  On  motion by Crumbly, the circuit judge dismissed Willis’s complaint, ruling that the office of  state senator is a “state office” and that the case was nonjusticiable because Willis had failed  to join the Secretary of State and the Democratic Party of Arkansas State Committee.  Willis  appealed from the order of dismissal, and in Willis v. Crumbly, 368 Ark. 5, __ S.W.3d __  (2006), we reversed and remanded the case and held  that  the office of state senator is a  district office rather than a state office, that the Secretary of State and the Democratic Party  of Arkansas State Committee were not necessary and indispensable parties, and that venue  was proper in St. Francis County because that was the county where the alleged wrongful  acts occurred.  On remand, the circuit judge set a trial date for December 6, 2006.  At the bench trial,  Willis  presented  a  forensic  expert,  Dawn  Reed,  who  questioned  the  signatures  of  forty  voters.  He also presented testimony of six instances of double voting and one incident of ­2­  07­572  nonresident voting for a total of forty­seven challenged votes.  He sought to go forward and  present evidence of irregularities for certain nursing home voters listed in his petition, but  was foreclosed from doing so.  After Willis presented his evidence at the bench trial, Crumbly moved for dismissal,  1  which the circuit judge granted orally from the bench on December 8, 2006.  A written order  2  granting the defendants’ motion for dismissal was filed on May 24, 2007.  In the order, the  circuit judge ruled that even if taken as true that all of the ballots called into question by  Willis were irregularly cast, and assuming that all of those ballots were cast for Crumbly,  there was still an insufficient number of fraudulent ballots to change the outcome of the  election.  The circuit judge dismissed Willis’s complaint with prejudice and ordered the  results of the June 13, 2006, runoff primary to stand as certified.  I.  Challenged Ballots 1  Though termed a motion for directed verdict by counsel and the circuit court, because  the trial was a bench trial, the motion was in actuality a motion to dismiss.  See Ark. R. Civ.  P. 50(a) (2007).  We will refer to the motion as a dismissal motion in this opinion.  2  Willis made repeated attempts to secure a written order from the circuit judge so he  could appeal, but the circuit judge did not respond to his requests for nearly six months.  Willis finally filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with this court to compel the circuit  judge to enter a final order.  The circuit judge entered a written order in the interim, and in  a per curiam opinion, this court declared Willis’s petition for writ of mandamus moot.  See  Willis  v.  Crumbly, __ Ark. __, __ S.W.3d __ (June 21, 2007) (per curiam).  This court,  however, said it was concerned with the circuit judge’s failure to issue a final order promptly  and respond to Willis’s requests, and a copy of the per curiam opinion was submitted to the  Arkansas Judicial Disability and Discipline Commission for its consideration.  See id.  ­3­  07­572  Willis  maintains  that  the  circuit  judge  abused  his  discretion  by  sustaining  the  appellees’  objections  and  by  not  allowing  his  testimony  and  evidence  to  be  introduced  regarding the invalidity of certain ballots, which were primarily absentee ballots involving  nursing home residents.  More specifically, he contends that the circuit judge erred in barring  this evidence and in ruling that permitting the evidence would be a substantive amendment  to his complaint made more than twenty days after certification, which is prohibited under  Ark. Code Ann. § 7­5­801(d) (Repl. 2000).  He claims that the circuit judge failed to make  the distinction between:  (1) an amendment to the pleadings to plead a new cause of action;  and (2) a situation where additional facts are offered to support an existing cause of action.  Willis further insists that the circuit judge erred in holding him to a strict­compliance  standard and in precluding him from presenting evidence of additional facts to prove voter  irregularities.  He contends that he alleged a prima facie cause of action by stating in his  petition the number of votes in contention, the total number of votes cast, and the fact that  exclusion of the contested votes would cause a different result.  He further insists that he  alleged these facts sufficiently in his petition to give his opponent reasonable notice that  certain ballots were at issue in this case due to statutory irregularities.  He was entitled, he  maintains, to introduce evidence supporting these allegations.  Crumbly disagrees and contends that by attempting to introduce evidence of facts not  included in his complaint, Willis was essentially amending his complaint.  Crumbly further ­4­  07­572  responds that Willis only offered proof that forty­nine votes should be impeached and that  the circuit judge excluded evidence as to two of these votes, leaving only forty­seven votes  properly challenged.  Crumbly maintains that though Willis proffered two binders of voting  records, which, Willis contends, contain proof of more invalid ballots, he did not argue to  the circuit judge at trial or to this court on appeal which ballots in the binders are invalid or  the reasons why they should be excluded.  We begin by noting that our standard of review regarding evidentiary rulings requires  that a circuit judge be given broad discretion in evidentiary rulings, and this court will not  reverse a circuit judge’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence absent an abuse of discretion.  See McCoy v. Montgomery, ___ Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (June 21, 2007).  Election  contests  are  purely  statutory,  and  “a  strict  observance  of  statutory  requirements is essential to the exercise of jurisdiction by the court, as it is desirable that  election results have a degree of stability and finality.” Tate­Smith v. Cupples, 355 Ark. 230,  237, 134 S.W.3d 535, 538 (2003).  This court has further explained that “the purpose of  election contests is to aid the democratic processes upon which our system of government  is  based  by  providing  a  ready  remedy  whereby  compliance  with  election  laws  may  be  assured to facilitate, not hinder by technical requirements, the quick initiation and disposition  of such contests.” Id. at 237, 134 S.W.3d at 538­39.  Our Election Code, at Arkansas Code Annotated § 7­5­801 (Repl. 2000), explains the  procedure for contesting an election, and this court has construed that statute to require that ­5­  07­572  an election complaint state a prima facie case and plead sufficient facts to give the defendant  reasonable  information  as  to  the  grounds  of  the  contest.  See,  e.g.,  Tate­Smith,  supra;  Womack  v.  Foster,  340  Ark.  124,  8  S.W.3d  854  (2000).    Furthermore,  this  court  has  explained that “[a]t a minimum, the complaint for affirmative relief must include the number  of votes received by each candidate, so that it appears, after subtracting the alleged invalid  votes, that the claimant has more votes than his opponent.”  Womack, 340 at 151, 8 S.W.3d  at 870.  In McCastlain v. Elmore, 340 Ark. 365, 10 S.W.3d 835 (2000), this court explained  that  a  complaint  in  an  election  contest  that  was  deficient  when  filed  may  not  later  be  amended  to  allege  a  cause  of  action  properly  after  the  twenty­day  filing  period  for  the  complaint  has  expired  under  §  7­5­801(d).    This  court  specifically  said  that  “where  a  complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action in an election contest, it  may not be subsequently amended by pointing to facts outside the complaint after the time  for contesting the election has expired.”  McCastlain, 340 Ark. at 369, 10 S.W.3d at 837  (emphasis in original).  Our McCastlain language makes it clear that a complaint may not be amended to state  a new cause of action after the twenty­day period has expired.  Once a deficient complaint  has been filed, to allow the plaintiff to amend the complaint to properly state a cause of  action would in effect be allowing the plaintiff to state a cause of action for the first time ­6­  07­572  after the expiration of the twenty­day time limit.  See King v. Whitfield, 339 Ark. 176, 5  S.W.3d 21 (1999) (Glaze, J., concurring).  This reasoning, however,  does not apply when the original complaint sufficiently  stated a cause of action when filed, and a new cause of action is not later being alleged.  In  Ptak v. Jameson, 215 Ark. 292, 295, 220 S.W.2d 592, 593­94 (1949), this court said:  We  have  held  that  in  an  election  contest  the  contestant  cannot,  after  the  expiration of the time for filing the contest, amend his complaint so as to set  up a new cause of action, but that he may amend his complaint to make it more  definite and certain as to any charge in the original complaint, and that the  refusal to allow contestant to file an amendment setting up a new ground of  contest was proper when the time for filing an amendment had expired.  See also Winton v. Irby, 189 Ark. 906, 909, 75 S.W.2d 656, 657 (1934) (quoting Robinson  v. Knowlton, 183 Ark. 1127, 1133, 40 S.W.2d 450, 452 (1931)) (An election contestant may,  “even after the time has expired, amend his complaint by making it more definite and certain  as to any charge in his original complaint, and, if a motion to make it more specific is filed,  it would be his duty to make the amendment.”).  We turn then to Willis’s Petition to De­Certify the Election Results.  Willis alleges  that he lost to Crumbly by seventy­eight votes (4721 for Crumbly and 4643 for Willis) and  that he would have won the election but for the fraudulent votes cast for Crumbly.    His  petition is eleven pages in length and contains an Exhibit A, which is ten pages in length and  contains 265 voter names and addresses.  To the side of each name and address in Exhibit  A  are  four  reasons  for  challenging  the  votes  –  Signature,  No  Signature  in  the  book, ­7­  07­572  Miscellaneous Other, and Double Voting.  Exhibit A also notes that 173 ballots were not  found.  The body of the Willis petition states the following regarding Miscellaneous Other  voter irregularities, as well as other deficiencies in the voting process:  B.  At least one nursing home resident “voted” on the signature of  his  wife  –  he  having  been  in  a  nursing  home,  and  incompetent.  The  procedures required by ACA § 7­5­403(b) were not followed, and as a result,  his vote was counted for Crumbly.  The votes of other nursing home residents  who  purportedly  voted  by  absentee  were  counted,  despite  the  fact  that  mandatory statutory procedures governing absentee ballots were not observed.  See all voters listed in Exhibit “A” column marked “miscellaneous other” and  ACA § 7­5­411.  C.  The clerk failed to mail out approximately 60 absentee ballots  that had been requested by absentee voters.  D.  She automatically sent out absentee ballots that had not been  3  requested, merely because she had sent them out in the past.  E.  She  or  her  employees  routinely  allowed  bearers  of  absentee  ballots to take absentee ballots from her office without signing for them in the  “bearer book.”  (This violates ACA § 7­5­409[a]).  F.  She  or  her  employees  routinely  allowed  bearers  of  absentee  ballots to take more than two (2) absentee ballots from her office, in violation  4 of law.  3  “Plaintiff does not refer here to absentee ballots automatically sent out to voters who  had requested absentee ballots in the primary election three weeks before; he is referring to  absentee ballots requested more than one year prior to this election.”  Appellant’s Petition  to De­Certify, p. 4, n. 4.  4  “ACA § 7­5­409(f)”  Appellant’s Petition to De­Certify, p. 4, n. 5.  ­8­  07­572  G.  During the early voting process, she did not insist that voters show  picture identification to poll workers, thus allowing impersonators to vote in  the runoff election.  H.  During the voter registration process, she allowed voters to list  more than one residence, which allowed them to vote twice in this election.  I.  She allowed former residents of St. Francis County who have  moved outside the county, or outside the state to vote, without any affirmative  effort being made to determine whether they were also voting in the state or  county of their new residence.  This allowed non­residents in this election to  vote improperly.  (See Exhibit “A,” “Misc other”)  Section 7­5­411, which is specifically referenced in the quoted language from Willis’s  petition, sets the mandatory requirements for absentee ballots,  including absentee voting  methods  for  voters  in  long­term  care  and  residential­care  facilities  and  voters  who  are  physically  disabled.  Section  7­5­409(f),  which  is  also  referenced  in  Willis’s  petition,  describes the procedure for absentee voting, including the procedure for designated bearers.  There are more than one hundred voters named with addresses that are challenged under the  category  of  Miscellaneous  Other  in  Exhibit  A  in  addition  to  the  forty­seven  ballots  challenged at the hearing for signature irregularities and double voting. Willis, therefore, has  given names, addresses, a statutory reference for the challenge, and pointed specifically to  procedural defects surrounding absentee votes by nursing home residents and others.  In  doing so, Willis not only alleged a valid cause of action in his petition, but he set out a prima  facie  case  with  sufficient  facts  to  give  the  defendants  reasonable  information  as  to  the  grounds  of  the  contest.  See  Tate­Smith,  supra.  In  addition,  he  proffered  absentee ­9­  07­572  applications and voter statements in binders purport to show why and how the ballots were  illegal.  The  following  colloquy  at  trial,  however,  illustrates  the  circuit  judge’s  faulty  understanding about amending the petition as opposed to providing proof to make allegations  more definite and certain:  THE  COURT:  It’s  not  complicated  to  me.    Show  it  to  me  in  the  complaint.  If it’s there, you can put it on.  If it is not there, the objection is  sustained.  MR. EASLEY (Counsel for Willis):  I understand, your Honor, may I  proceed.  THE COURT:  You may proceed.  BY MR. EASLEY, continuing:  Q  Tell me where we are.  A  We are on number 15.  Q  16?  A  Are we through with Earnestine Barksdale?  Q  I don’t know.  Let’s see.  A  Number 15.  We have two bearers.  MR. LONG (Counsel for Election Commssion):  Judge, that was my  objection. ­10­  07­572  THE COURT:  Sustained unless it’s in the complaint.  MR.  EASLEY:  It’s  not.    Yes,  your  Honor,  we  have  miscellaneous  other.  MR. LONG:  Judge, miscellaneous other doesn’t get it.  Miscellaneous  other refers back to allegations made in his complaint.  There is no allegation  in his complaint that a vote is invalid because there was a bearer out and the  bearer in.  Miscellaneous other, if he’s just going to grab that ­­  THE COURT:  Gentlemen, it’s not complicated to me.  If the Supreme  Court  wants  to  change  the  law  that  allows  a  person  to  make  a  general  allegation in a trial and describe this miscellaneous other act, however they  want to describe it, that’s up to them to do.  I don’t believe that’s the law.  The  objection is sustained.  Willis was then precluded from presenting testimony from other voters in the Miscellaneous  Other category, even while his petition expressly stated that these were absentee voters in  nursing homes whose votes did not comply with procedures required under  §  7­5­411 or  5  other deficiencies under § 7­5­409.  The circuit judge later dismissed Willis’s  petition on  the basis that Willis was attempting to amend his petition at trial. 5  Willis proffered into evidence two binders, which include actual voting documents  for  the  265  challenged  votes  which,  he  contends,  support  his  claims  regarding  the  Miscellaneous Other category for nursing home voters and other absentee ballots.  ­11­  07­572  We conclude, first, that the circuit judge abused his discretion in ruling that Willis  was attempting to amend his complaint with a new cause of action by offering proof  of  absentee­ballot irregularities under the Miscellaneous Other category.  We hold that Willis  was perfectly within his rights to make his allegations of absentee­ballot irregularities for  nursing home residents, in particular, more definite and certain by offering proof of those  violations.  See Ptak v. Jameson, supra.  In his appeal, Willis does not ask that this court declare him to be the winner of the  run­off election or that the election be voided as unfair.  That would be premature at this  juncture.  He merely seeks the opportunity to present his proof in support of the prima facie  case alleged in his petition.  Our holding allows him to do this.  II.  Amendment 81  Willis  also  claims  that  the  circuit  judge  erred  in  granting  a  dismissal  in  favor  of  Crumbly in part because he could not prove for which candidate the challenged voters voted.  Willis maintains that Amendment 81 to the Arkansas Constitution mandates the secrecy of  individual  votes  and  makes  it  impossible  to  determine  for  whom  each  voter  voted.    He  contends that though he warned the circuit judge that Amendment 81 had changed the law,  6 the circuit judge relied on case law decided prior to the adoption of Amendment 81.  6  Amendment 81 was adopted at the November 2002 general election.  ­12­  07­572  Crumbly responds that Amendment 81 has no relevance to this case.  He argues that  there are two types of election contests – one in which the losing candidate contests the  results of the election and seeks to oust and replace the winning candidate, and one in which  the losing candidate contests the election in general and seeks to have the election declared  void altogether.  He contends that only in the first type of election contest where the losing  candidate seeks to replace the winner does it matter how the challenged voters voted and that  this case is of the second type of election contest.  Crumbly insists that in this case, the  circuit judge merely stated that Willis had failed to submit proof of how each challenged  voter voted to emphasize the point that Willis failed to submit sufficient proof to prevail in  either type of election contest.  Under  Amendment  50,  §  3  to  the  Arkansas  Constitution,  which  has  since  been  repealed, ballots were numbered, and those numbers were recorded by election officers when  the ballots were presented in an election so that the specific vote of each voter could be  traced in the event of an election contest.  Amendment 81 repealed Amendment 50, §  3 in  2002,  thereby  ensuring  the  secrecy  of  individual  votes.    Following  the  adoption  of  Amendment 81, it became impossible to determine for whom a voter in an election voted by  simply tracing the ballots by their numbers.  As a result, a plaintiff in an election contest,  though  he  or  she  is  required  to  allege  that  the  invalid  ballots  were  cast  for  his  or  her  opponent, is no longer able to prove at trial for whom the invalid ballots were actually cast  under the old tracing system. ­13­  07­572  In the instant case, we hold that the circuit judge erred to the extent that he based his  decision  to  grant  Crumbly’s  motion  for  a  dismissal  on  the  failure  of  Willis  to  prove  specifically how each challenged voter voted.  From the record, it appears that the circuit  judge did take Willis’s failure in this regard into consideration.  For example, during Willis’s  case, Crumbly objected and argued that Willis was attempting to amend his complaint by  presenting evidence of facts not stated in the complaint.  In sustaining Crumbly’s objection,  the circuit judge said:  [T]he court believes that this McCastlain v. Elmore [340 Ark. 365, 10 S.W.3d  835 (2000)] is very, very important in this case.  It says Arkansas law does not  allow an election contest complaint that was deficient when it is filed, i.e. let  me be sufficient, name me the voters, show me the invalid ballots, show me  they voted for the other candidate, and show me that there is a total sufficient  number to change the outcome of the election.  (Emphasis added.)  Crumbly’s counsel argued, in addition, during his motion for dismissal that “there has  been no proof as to how any of these people voted.”  Finally, the circuit judge, in his written  order granting the Crumbly’s motion for dismissal, stated:  The plaintiff did not put on any proof indicating how the alleged irregular  ballots were tallied or for whom the ballots were cast in the Senate District 16  race. Even if the Court were to agree with the plaintiff that all of the ballots  called into question by the plaintiff were irregularly cast, and even if the Court  assumed  that  each  one  of  those  ballots  were  cas[t]  for  the  defendant,  Jack  Crumbly, there still would not be sufficient irregular ballots cast to change the  outcome of the election.  (Emphasis added.) ­14­  07­572  The circuit judge clearly looked to old case law, which predated Amendment 81, and  required proof of how the challenged voters voted. Without question, Willis should not have  been required to present tracing evidence of how each challenged voter voted when he was  foreclosed from doing so by Amendment 81.  III.  Ballot Illegality  We turn then to the question of how to prove ballot ineligibility.  In Womack, supra,  this court rejected Womack’s argument that ballots should not be invalidated simply because  voters  violated  our  election  laws  by  not  indicating  a  reason  for  voting  absentee  on  the  election­ballot  applications.    In  recognizing  that  there  must  be  strict  compliance  with  statutory provisions regarding the application for and casting of absentee ballots, we noted  that the absentee­ballot applications form provided to each voter was clear and accurate, and  nothing on the form prevented a voter from knowing what information was being requested,  or from properly inserting the requested information on the form.  Id.  In short, we concluded  that where it can be determined that the ballots are illegal on their face, the votes must be  invalidated.  Id.  Adhering to the rational in Womack, Willis, as already stated, attached to his petition  as Exhibit A a list of 265 voters, and he set out categories of alleged irregularities, including  (1) signature problems, (2) no signature in book, (3) miscellaneous other, and (4) double  votes. Willis also proffered two binders that contained 265 names, which identified the voter ­15­  07­572  by name in an effort to establish how and why the ballots were alleged to be illegal.  Both  the attachment to the petition and the binders are self explanatory.  But there is also the question of how to prove for which candidate the illegal votes  were cast.  Because Amendment 81 of the Arkansas Constitution repealed Amendment 50,  § 3 to ensure the secrecy of individual votes, it may appear to the appellees to be impossible  to determine for whom a voter cast his or her ballot as is required by § 7­5­801 et seq. and  Arkansas’s longstanding precedent regarding election contests to purge illegal and fraudulent  ballots.  By approving Amendment 81, the people of Arkansas intended to secure the voter’s  right to a secret ballot by doing away with the tracing method provided under Amendment  50.  And yet, there is nothing in Amendment 81 to protect the secrecy of the ballot for a  person who casts an illegal or fraudulent ballot.  Other states have addressed this precise issue.  In Kiehne v. Atwood, 604 P.2d 123,  127 (1979), the New Mexico Supreme Court explained:  [I]n the case of illegal voters[,] [i]t is universally recognized that the right to  examine  the  voters  in  such  a  case  is  in  affirmance  and  vindication  of  the  essential principle of the elective system, that the will of the majority of the  qualified voters shall determine the right to an elective office, and that the  testimony  of  the  voter,  after  it  has  been  shown  that  he  voted  illegally,  is  competent, and should be received by the court or jury for what it is worth.  (Citation omitted.)  The law protecting the secrecy of the ballot is intended to  apply only to lawful voters, and does not ordinarily apply to or protect illegal  voters, who can be required to testify as to how they voted at an election.  . . . .  Were the courts to close their doors to the reception of evidence as to how an  illegal  voter  has  voted,  it  would  tend  to  promote  fraud  and  encourage  corruption.  (Citation omitted.) ­16­  07­572  7  (citing Montoya v. Ortiz, 715 P. 335, 337­38 (1918)).  In Appeal of Harper, 456 S.E.2d 878,  880 (1995), the North Carolina Court of Appeals further reiterated this point, noting:  In Boyer v. Teague, 106 N.C. 576, 625, 11 S.E. 665, 679 (1890), our Supreme  Court established that “[a]s between contestants for office . . . the testimony  of the elector [i.e., the voter], if pertinent and relevant, is always admissible.”  In fact, the Court held, while an honest voter may not be compelled to disclose  for whom he voted, as such compulsion would intrude upon the sanctity of the  secret ballot system, an illegal voter may be so compelled, save an invoking  of his right against self­incrimination.  Id.  See also 29 C.J.S. Elections § 480 (2007); 26 AM. JUR. 2D  Elections § 426 (2007).  In short, while Amendment 81 protects the secrecy of ballots, its intent is to protect  an  honest  voter,  not  an  illegal  one.    As  a  result,  this  court  is  convinced  that  in  election  contests, where there is evidence of an illegal ballot, the person who illegally voted can be  forced to testify as to whom they voted, and such is permissible under Amendment 81.  We  reverse and remand this case for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.  There are two other matters pending before this court in connection with this appeal.  The first is Willis’s motion for appointment of a special judge in the event of reversal and 7  As the New Mexico Supreme Court noted in Kiehne v. Atwood, supra, the case law  of other states is overwhelming in holding that, although legal voters may not be compelled  to disclose how they voted, illegal voters do  not  enjoy  this same privilege.  See Sims v.  Atwell, 556 S.W.2d 929 (Ky. App. 1977); Singletary v. Kelly, 242 Cal. App. 2d 611 (1966);  Oliphint v. Christy, 299 S.W.2d 933 (1957); Wehrung v. Ideal School District No. 10, 78  N.W.2d  68  (N.D.  1956);  J.T.W.,  Annotation,  Privilege  or  Exemption  of  Voter  Against  Testifying as to Candidate for Whom He Cast His Vote, or as to His Vote on Submitted  Questions, 90 A.L.R. 1362 (1934).  ­17­  07­572  remand.  We deny that motion.  The second matter is also a motion by Willis to disqualify  counsel for the Election Commission.  That motion is also denied.  Reversed and remanded.  Motion for Appointment of Special Judge and Motion to  Disqualify Counsel for the Election Commission are denied.  GLAZE, J., concurs.  TOM GLAZE, Justice, concurring. Although this case has been a long time getting here,  this court has shown its will to decide this election­contest case on its merits rather than  dismissing it on the questionable procedural issues offered by the appellees, Crumbly and  the  St.  Francis  County  Election  Commission.    The  winners  are  the  voters  of  Arkansas,  because they now can be assured that, in future elections, illegal and fraudulent votes can be  purged from election results that are proved to be questionable.  Today’s decision sets out  a clear “road map” by which the integrity of our election system can be assured.  While I fully agree with the  court’s  opinion, I do not agree that the circuit judge  should sit on this case on remand.  For whatever reasons, the Judge failed to expedite this election case even though he  was required to do so by law, and was asked to do so repeatedly by Willis’s counsel.  It has  taken about seven months to reach this stage of the election contest, and the case still must  be remanded for further proceedings with no assurance anything different will occur to get  this matter resolved.  Even though the Judge had this matter pending for the seven­month ­18­  07­572  period,  he  omitted  it  from  his  quarterly  report  which  is  required  by  this  court’s  Administrative Order No. 3.  This court should promptly assign a special judge who has the  8 time and “grit” to bring this case to an end.  8  Willis  also  requests  that  the  prosecuting  attorney,  representing  the  St.  Francis  County  Election Commission, should be disqualified because of a conflict of interest.  If that is a real issue,  a newly assigned special judge can handle it with dispatch.  ­19­  07­572 

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