Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company v. Terry Easter, Roy Johnson, Rhonda Johnson, and Ronald Andrew Taylor
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No.
06-885
SOUTHERN
FARM
BUREAU
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
APPELLANT;
VS.
TERRY EASTER, ROY JOHNSON,
RHONDA JOHNSON, AND RONALD
ANDREW TAYLOR,
APPELLEES;
Opinion Delivered MARCH 1, 2007
APPEAL FROM THE BENTON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT;
NO. CV-99-261-1;
HON. TOMMY J. KEITH, JUDGE;
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
DONALD L. CORBIN, Associate Justice
Appellant Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company (Farm Bureau) appeals
the order of the Benton County Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor of
Appellees Roy Johnson, Rhonda Johnson, and Ronald Andrew Taylor, and finding that Farm
Bureau owed a duty to defend and pay any and all judgments rendered against its insured,
Appellee Terry Easter. On appeal, Farm Bureau raises one argument for reversal: the trial
court erred in finding that the “eluding lawful apprehension or arrest” exclusion contained
in Farm Bureau’s automobile policy is void as against public policy. As this is the second
appeal in this case, our jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(7). We
dismiss the appeal for lack of a final order.
A detailed description of the underlying facts of this case is included in the prior
appeal, Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v. Easter, 345 Ark. 273, 45 S.W.3d
380 (2001) (Easter I). In Easter I, we held:
The order granting summary judgment must be reversed because there
remain genuine issues of material fact relating to each of the exclusionary
clauses, and, consequently, until such issues are resolved, we cannot decide the
validity of the two exclusionary clauses under the public policy consideration
of requiring liability insurance for the benefit of the public, as well as for the
benefit of the named insured.
Id. at 279, 45 S.W.3d at 384. Following our ruling, on June 25, 2002, Farm Bureau filed an
amended complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that it did not owe (1) a
duty to pay, nor a duty to defend, the separate actions brought by the Johnsons and Taylor
against Easter; and (2) a duty to Easter to pay any punitive damages, in either case, because
the insurance policy validly excludes payments for punitive or exemplary damages.
In response to Farm Bureau’s amended complaint, on July 11, 2002, the Johnsons
filed an answer and asserted a counterclaim against Farm Bureau. In this counterclaim, the
Johnsons argued that Farm Bureau, pursuant to the insurance policy issued to Easter, was
required to pay medical expenses and disability income benefits to the Johnsons.
In 2003, a multitude of motions were filed by Farm Bureau, the Johnsons, and Taylor,
including Farm Bureau’s motion to dismiss the counterclaim and the Johnsons’ motion to
strike Farm Bureau’s answer to the counterclaim. On September 9, 2004, the trial court held
a hearing on all pending motions. In its November 12, 2004, order, the trial court, inter alia,
denied both the Johnsons’ motion to strike Farm Bureau’s answer and Farm Bureau’s motion
-2-
06-885
to dismiss the counterclaim. This order also set a jury trial to determine the issue of whether
Easter was fleeing or eluding apprehension at the time of the accident.
On November 17, 2005, a jury trial was held and the jury returned a verdict finding
that Easter was seeking to elude lawful apprehension or arrest by a law enforcement official
at the time of the accident. This verdict was entered into record by the trial court on
January 4, 2006.
On March 9, 2006, the trial court conducted a hearing on Farm Bureau’s, the
Johnsons’, and Taylor’s renewed motions for summary judgment. After the hearing, on
May 4, 2006, the trial court entered an order granting the Johnsons’ and Taylor’s separate
motions for summary judgment, finding that Farm Bureau owed a duty to defend and pay any
all judgments rendered against Easter, up to the limit of liability and no-fault coverages
dealing with injuries incurred by Taylor and the Johnsons as a result of the automobile
accident on November 12, 1998. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court found that the
eluding-apprehension exclusion within Farm Bureau’s insurance policy violates public policy
as codified in the mandatory liability insurance and no-fault provisions of Arkansas law.
Additionally, the trial court dismissed without prejudice Farm Bureau’s claim concerning the
validity of the punitive damages exclusion within the policy of insurance issued to Easter
because the issue was not yet ripe for determination. No order was ever entered with regard
to the cause of action brought by the Johnsons in their counterclaim against Farm Bureau.
-3-
06-885
Rule 2(a)(1) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure–Civil provides that an
appeal may be taken only from a final judgment or decree entered by the trial court. Rule
54(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure deals with the finality of orders in connection
with judgments upon multiple claims or involving multiple parties and states in relevant part:
(1) Certification of Final Judgment. When more than one claim for
relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim,
or third party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct
the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims
or parties only upon an express determination, supported by specific factual
findings, that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for
the entry of judgment. . . .
....
(2) Lack of Certification. Absent the executed certificate required by
paragraph (1) of this subdivision, any judgment, order, or other form of
decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or
the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the
action as to any of the claims or parties, and the judgment, order, or other form
of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all of the parties.
Thus, our court has held that under Rule 54(b), an order is not final that adjudicates fewer
than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties. See Sims v.
Fletcher, ___ Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Nov. 30, 2006); Seay v. C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage
Co., 366 Ark. 527, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006). More specifically, this court has held that an
order that fails to address a counterclaim is not a final, appealable order. See Sims, ___ Ark.
___, ___ S.W.3d ___.
-4-
06-885
Here, a review of the record reveals that the trial court never ruled upon the Johnsons’
counterclaim. Accordingly, we are barred from considering this appeal under Rule 54(b) due
to the lack of a final order, and we dismiss the present appeal without prejudice.1
Dismissed without prejudice.
1
Although this issue was not raised by either party, the question of whether an order
is final and appealable is a jurisdictional question that we will raise on our own. See Seay,
366 Ark. 527, ___ S.W.3d ___.
-5-
06-885
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
