Helena-West Helena School District #2 of Phillips County, Arkansas; Rudolph Howard, Interim Superintendent in his individual and official capacity; and Lisa Baker in her individual and official capacity as Principal of West Side Elementary School of the Helena-West Helena School District v. The Circuit Court of Phillips County, Arkansas
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No.
06-1284
HELENA-WEST HELENA SCHOOL
DISTRICT #2 OF PHILLIPS COUNTY,
ARKANSAS; RUDOLPH HOWARD,
INTERIM SUPERINTENDENT IN HIS
P ER SO N A L A N D H IS O FFIC IA L
CAPACITY; AND LISA BAKER IN HER
IND IVIDU AL AN D OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS PRINCIPAL OF THE
WEST SIDE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL OF
THE HELENA-WEST HELENA SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
PETITIONER,
VS.
THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PHILLIPS
COUNTY, ARKANSAS,
RESPONDENT,
Opinion Delivered 3-15-07
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
OR PROHIBITION
PETITION FOR REHEARING
GRANTED. PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI GRANTED.
SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON GRANT
OF REHEARING.
ROBERT L. BROWN, Associate Justice
The petition for rehearing is granted, and the petition for writ of certiorari is granted.
Petitioners Helena-West Helena School District, Rudolph Howard as interim
superintendent, and Lisa Baker as principal of West Side Elementary School (collectively
referred to as the “School District”), petition for a writ of certiorari or prohibition in
response to the circuit court’s order granting the request of Jimmy Brown, Jr. and Coretta
Brown (the “Browns”) for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”). The School District
argues that the circuit court had no subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the Browns’ claims
because the expulsion order was not final and because the Browns failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies.
On October 24, 2006, the Browns filed a complaint as parents and next of kin of their
children, Y.B. and J.B., who were students at West Side Elementary School in West Helena
in October of 2006. Y.B. was in the sixth grade and J.B. was in the fourth grade. The
complaint described an altercation between Y.B. and J.B. and the principal of the school,
Lisa Baker. The Browns alleged in their complaint that when Lisa Baker’s son, Mack Baker,
called J.B. a “nigger,” Principal Baker intervened to uphold the conduct of her son and that
she physically attacked J.B.. The Browns declared that Principal Baker verbally and
physically attacked J.B..
They concede, however, that J.B. struck Principal Baker.
According to the complaint, Y.B. came to the assistance of her younger brother and requested
that she be allowed to call her parents. That request was denied by Principal Baker, they
alleged. The Browns also alleged that Principal Baker placed Y.B. and J.B. outdoors without
any protection and had them arrested. According to the Browns, Principal Baker’s actions
were due to racism and bias. The Browns based their legal theories on the case of Lake View
School District No. 25 v. Huckabee, 351 Ark. 31, 91 S.W.3d 472 (2002), and on violation of
the Arkansas Civil Rights Act.
-2-
06-1284
Principal Baker wrote a summary of the incident leading to the school’s expulsion of
J.B. and Y.B. on October 19, 2006. She states the incident occurred on October 19, 2006.1
She wrote in her summary that at around 7:20 a.m., she asked J.B. and Y.B. not to stand in
the front lobby of the school, but that they could go to breakfast or to the computer lab or
they could sit in the hall. They replied that they were waiting on someone, to which she
responded, “[y]ou must go on, we don’t wait on anyone.” She wrote that both students
headed toward the cafeteria, where they both encountered problems. Principal Baker had
them to come to the office. She noted that they came back in the hall toward the office and
turned around yelling profanities. At that time, J.B. went out the back door of the sixth grade
hall, and Y.B. decided to go to the office. Y.B. told Principal Baker, “you better beat me
then, because if Brittany is there I’m going to get her.” When they got to the office Principal
Baker asked Mrs. Hunt to get the tape recorder off her desk. Y.B. told Principal Baker that
she was going to break the recorder. At about that time, J.B. arrived in the office and yelled,
screamed, and cursed at Principal Baker.
Principal Baker noted that everything then moved to the foyer outside the office. She
wrote that Mr. Means arrived and that Ms. Fears and Mrs. Thrower were trying to get other
children out of this area.2 Principal Baker said that J.B. attacked the visitor sign-in sheet, and
1
In their complaint, the Browns assert that these events occurred on October 18, 2006.
2
While it is unclear from the partial record in this case what positions Mrs. Hunt, Mr.
Means, Ms. Fears, and Mrs. Thrower hold, it seems apparent that all of these people are
employees of the School District.
-3-
06-1284
Y.B. was trying to take the tape recorder out of her hand. Principal Baker wrote that she told
Y.B. she was not going to take it out of her hand, when Y.B. put her hand on her nose (open
palm to her nose). At this time, J.B. slapped the left side of Principal Baker’s face, and Mr.
Means tried to grab him. Principal Baker told Mr. Means to let J.B. go, and J.B. yelled and
cursed all the way down the sixth grade hall and kicked the panic bar to get the door open.
She added that Y.B. followed J.B. out the door.
Also on October 19, 2006, Principal Baker sent two notices of recommended
expulsion from West Side Elementary School to J.B. and Y.B.’s father. In the notice
regarding J.B., Principal Baker charged him with defiance of authority, abusive language,
and staff assault. In the notice regarding Y.B., she charged her with defiance of authority and
abusive language toward a school employee. Principal Baker recommended that both
students be expelled for one year. The notices also informed the parents that the students
would have a right to a hearing to be scheduled by the school superintendent and School
Board.
On October 20, 2006, Rudolph Howard, the school Superintendent, wrote letters to
J.B. and Y.B.’s mother regarding each of her children. Superintendent Howard informed
Coretta Brown that the school was recommending that her children be expelled for one year
and that due-process hearings were scheduled for each of her children and her before the
-4-
06-1284
School Board on October 24, 2006 at 9:00 a.m.3 He also noted in both letters that he called
her on October 20, 2006, at 11:40 a.m., to confirm the appointment and that she hung up the
telephone on him the first time and rudely told him to “talk to my lawyer.” He added that
when he called back a second time, since he did not know who her lawyer was, she hung up
on him again. Superintendent Howard’s letters further informed Mrs. Brown that her
children would have an opportunity to tell their side of the story and present witnesses at the
hearing. His letters noted that at the end of the hearings, the School District would state its
final position on whether it wished to modify the school’s recommendation or continue its
quest for expulsion of each of her children. According to the Superintendent’s letters, if the
School District decided to pursue expulsion further, the Browns could appeal to him as
Superintendent.
Rather than participating in the due-process hearing on October 24, 2006, the Browns
filed their complaint in circuit court on that date, as described above. On October 26, 2006,
the Browns moved for a TRO to stop the expulsion of the Brown children on the basis that
the School District was violating their right to attend public school in accordance with Article
Fourteen of the Arkansas Constitution. The Browns alleged that the expulsion was harsh,
unreasonable, and not rationally related to any conceivable violation of policies governing
conduct within the School District. They argued, in addition, that the actions of the School
3
The letter regarding J.B. stated that a due-process hearing was scheduled for Coretta
and Jimmy at 9:00 a.m. on October 24, 2006. The letter concerning Y.B. informed Coretta
that a due-process hearing was scheduled for Y.B. and her at 10:00 a.m. on October 24, 2006.
-5-
06-1284
District violated due process and would exclude the Brown children from school, thereby
causing irreparable harm to their educational endeavors now and for the rest of their
adolescent lives. The Browns requested a TRO until the court could make a determination
of the rights pled and that the court further find that the children had suffered irrevocable
harm and they had no other adequate remedy at law if the court did not enjoin the School
District.
On October 31, 2006, the court entered an order granting the Browns’ request for a
TRO. In its order, the court noted that the children had not yet been expelled from the school
but added that they were currently expelled from classes. In addition to granting the TRO
requiring the children to be placed immediately into appropriate classes, the court also found
that they should be transferred, as per the request in the motion for TRO, to Beechcrest
Elementary School until further directions of the court.
On November 8, 2006, the School District filed its petition for writ of certiorari or
prohibition and record of proceedings with the Circuit Court of Phillips County listed as
appellee. The following day, this court granted a stay of the TRO, ordered any response to
the petition for writ of certiorari/prohibition to be filed by November 20, 2006, and
determined that we would take this petition as a case. We also ordered simultaneous briefs
to be filed on December 21, 2006. The first response to the School District’s petition was
filed on behalf of the Browns as “co-respondents” and was tendered on November 21, 2006,
-6-
06-1284
which was one day late.4 The brief of the petitioner was timely filed on December 21, 2006.
The Browns did not file a brief in this case. Rather, they filed a second response and
objection to issuance of a writ of certiorari on December 28, 2006, and asserted that they
were unable to comply with the court’s directive to file a brief because there was no record
filed.5
In its petition for writ of certiorari or prohibition, the School District makes two
arguments: (1) petitioners are entitled to a writ of certiorari or, in the alternative, a writ of
prohibition; (2) on the face of the record, injunctive relief could not be granted by the circuit
court.
The School District argues that it is entitled to a petition for writ of certiorari because
the expulsion order was not final and because the Browns failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies before the School Board prior to seeking judicial review. The
School District compares this case to Ford v. Arkansas Game & Fish Commission, 335 Ark.
245, 979 S.W.2d 897 (1998), where, as in this case, there had been no final action taken by
the petitioners. Here, the School District asserts that the Browns chose to avoid the
opportunity for a speedy hearing before the School Board to determine the claims involved
in this case and sought judicial intervention before the Board had made a final decision
4
The Browns never formally petitioned to intervene in the School District’s petition
for extraordinary relief. Nevertheless, they are the real parties in interest, and this court
considered their first response in its original petition.
5
A partial record was filed by the School District on November 8, 2006.
-7-
06-1284
concerning the recommendation of expulsion. According to the School District, if this court
allows one to avoid the procedure set out in the statute for suspension or expulsion by
alleging racism and bias, and seeking injunctive relief, then the circuit courts of this state will
be open to decide all discipline matters involving public schools. The School District notes
that the Browns should not be permitted to avoid a hearing and review at this point. Rather,
the Browns must first raise all of their arguments at the School Board level pursuant to Ark.
Code Ann. § 6-18-507 (Repl. 1999) and obtain a final expulsion decision prior to seeking
judicial review.
The School District also distinguishes this case from the case of Springdale Board of
Education v. Bowman, 294 Ark. 66, 740 S.W.2d 909 (1987). In Springdale Board of
Education, it maintains, the School Board had made a final decision prior to the chancellor’s
consideration of the request for injunctive relief. In the instant case, it emphasizes that it has
the right by statute to expel a student under § 16-18-507 so long as it provides due-process
hearings.
In short, the School District encourages this court to look with disfavor on the
procedure employed by the Browns. It argues that the Arkansas statutes are clear—that the
hearing regarding expulsion is to be before the School Board and not the court. According
to the School District, there could not be a more obvious case of unwarranted judicial
interference with the operation of the school system in violation of not only § 6-18-507, but
also the decisions of this court which hold that a court is without subject-matter jurisdiction
-8-
06-1284
to hear a claim until administrative action is final and one has exhausted his or her
administrative remedies. See, e.g., Stanton v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 362 Ark. 96, 207
S.W.3d 456 (2005) (holding that the trial court lacks jurisdiction over a case and the
complaint should, therefore, be dismissed where the plaintiff fails to exhaust his or her
administrative remedies prior to filing a lawsuit in circuit court). In light of this, the School
District asserts that it is entitled to relief by certiorari because the circuit judge acted in
excess of his jurisdiction and thereby committed a gross abuse of discretion.
For its second argument, the School District contends that on the face of the record,
injunctive relief should not have been granted by the circuit court. It points out that the
circuit court’s order on its face fails to comply with Rule 65 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil
Procedure because the order contains no finding that the Browns were likely to succeed on
the merits and no finding of irreparable harm. The School District advances the argument
that because the statutes of this state permit expulsion, one cannot claim, as a matter of law,
that expulsion (which has not yet been ordered by the School Board) irreparably harms a
student.
Although the Browns, as co-respondents, failed to file a brief in this matter, they did
file two responses to the School District’s request for extraordinary relief. In their first
response to the School District’s request for a petition for writ of certiorari which they filed
on November 21, 2006, the Browns asserted that this court, by granting the stay of the circuit
court’s order, has already destroyed the ability of the Brown children to receive an education
-9-
06-1284
within the public school system of the State of Arkansas in a orderly manner, in violation of
the Lake View cases. The Browns also asserted that a writ of certiorari is inappropriate in
this case, where the standard is an abuse of discretion. Further, they claimed that a writ of
certiorari should not be granted here because there is an adequate remedy at law, which is
an ordinary appeal of the circuit court’s decision.
The Browns further argued in their first response that they were facing irreparable
harm to the educational rights of their children, if they were expelled for a year or more due
to the instant litigation. They urged that there is no chance for any student in the school
system to receive due process when the hearing and appeal are before the School Board and
Superintendent. According to the Browns, it would have been futile for them to attempt to
exhaust their administrative remedies under these circumstances where those accusing the
Brown children of violations were, in fact, the judge and jury of the sanctions to be imposed
against those children.6
This court’s standard of review for a petition for writ of certiorari is as follows:
A writ of certiorari is extraordinary relief. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs.
v. Collier, 351 Ark. 506, 95 S.W.3d 772 (2003). In determining its application
we will not look beyond the face of the record to ascertain the actual merits of
a controversy, or to control discretion, or to review a finding of fact, or to
reverse a trial court’s discretionary authority. Id. There are two requirements
that must be satisfied in order for this court to grant a writ of certiorari. The
first requirement is that there can be no other adequate remedy but for the writ
6
We do not consider the Brown’s second response filed on December 27, 2006,
because it was untimely. By this court’s per curiam order, responses were due by
November 20, 2006, and briefs by December 21, 2006.
-10-
06-1284
of certiorari. Second, a writ of certiorari lies only where (1) it is apparent on
the face of the record that there has been a plain, manifest, clear, and gross
abuse of discretion, or (2) there is a lack of jurisdiction, an act in excess of
jurisdiction on the face of the record, or the proceedings are erroneous on the
face of the record. Id.
Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. Herndon, 365 Ark. 180, 182, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___
(2006).
We initially address the requirement that there be no adequate remedy as an alternative
to a writ of certiorari. See, e.g., Sims v. Circuit Court of Pulaski County, ___ Ark. ___, ___
S.W.3d ___ (Jan. 18, 2007) (holding that a petition for an extraordinary writ should not lie
where an adequate remedy in the form of an appeal is available to the petitioner). In its
original opinion, this court dismissed the School District’s petition for certiorari for the
reason that an alternative, adequate remedy did exist in the form of an appeal. See HelenaWest Helena Sch. Dist. #2 of Phillips County v. Circuit Court of Phillips County, ___ Ark.
___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Jan. 25, 2007). In its petition for rehearing, the School District
counters the assertion that an interlocutory appeal of the TRO is an adequate remedy under
these facts. We agree with the School District.
The School District contends in its rehearing petition that this court has treated a
petition for certiorari as an appeal in the past when the petition is filed before the time for
appeal has expired.7 The School District emphasizes that its certiorari petition was filed
eight days after the entry of the TRO. Moreover, the School District urges that its certiorari
7
The Browns filed no response to the petition for rehearing.
-11-
06-1284
petition is broader than a mere appeal from the TRO because it seeks a court order dismissing
the Browns’ complaint with its multiple allegations in its entirety for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction due to the absence of a final expulsion decision and the failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
The School District is right on both counts. First, this court has treated petitions for
writs of certiorari as appeals in the past when the petition is filed within the appeal time. See
Williamson v. Mitchell Auto Co., 181 Ark. 693, 27 S.W.2d 96 (1930) (holding that this court
will treat a petition for writ of certiorari as an appeal where the time for an appeal has not
expired); Miller v. Tatum, 170 Ark. 152, 279 S.W. 1002 (1926) (holding that where the time
for appeal has not yet expired, it is proper for this court to disregard the method by which the
cause was presented to this court and to treat the case as an appeal from the judgment of the
lower court); see also Ark. Pub. Defender Comm’n v. Greene County Circuit Court, 343 Ark.
49, 53 n.1, 32 S.W.3d 470, 473 n.1 (2000) (stating that our jurisdiction is by way of
certiorari or appeal where the petitioner also had standing to bring an appeal and where the
lower court was without jurisdiction to hear a claim or issue a particular remedy).
Secondly, and more importantly, we are convinced that the School District is correct
in pointing out that it desires not merely to prosecute an interlocutory appeal to dissolve the
TRO but rather to challenge the subject-matter jurisdiction of the circuit court to hear any
allegations or prayer for relief in the Browns’ complaint. We agree that those are two
different matters. This court has made it clear that the alternative remedy to extraordinary
-12-
06-1284
relief “must be ‘plain and complete and as practical and efficient to the ends of justice and
its proper administration as the remedy involved.’” Axley v. Hardin. 353 Ark. 529, 536, 110
S.W.3d 766, 770 (2003) (quoting Hanley v. Arkansas State Claims Comm’n, 333 Ark. 159,
970 S.W.2d 198 (1998)). Here, that is not the case. We conclude that the dismissal of the
petition for writ of certiorari due to an alternative, adequate remedy was error. We turn then
to the merits of the petition.
The kernel of the School District’s argument for certiorari is the circuit court did not
have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the Browns’ complaint because the expulsion
decision was not final and the Browns failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before
the School Board prior to seeking judicial intervention. Section 6-18-507 of the Discipline
Subchapter of the Education Code specifically provides for an administrative procedure in
connection with a public school’s recommendation of expulsion, including both a hearing
and an appeal process, and we hold that that was the remedy for the Browns to pursue.
In Bowman, supra, which was cited by both parties, this court considered the question
of whether the trial court had jurisdiction to decide Bowman’s request for injunctive relief.
We concluded that the trial court did have this jurisdiction, since Bowman was entitled to
establish her right to attend school by testing the School Board’s actions in enforcing a
school policy against her. As noted by the School District in this case, however, the School
Board in Bowman had already made the decision to expel the student involved. The instant
-13-
06-1284
case is at odds with those facts, as there has been no final action by the School Board on the
expulsion recommendation.
In Ford, supra, this court recognized the distinction between the question of whether
administrative remedies had been exhausted and the question of whether an administrative
action must be final before it is judicially reviewable. This court quoted the United States
Supreme Court to the effect that while the policies behind the two doctrines are similar, “the
finality requirement is concerned with whether the initial decision[-]maker has arrived at a
definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury; the exhaustion
requirement generally refers to administrative and judicial procedures by which an injured
party may seek review of an adverse decision and obtain a remedy if the decision is found
to be unlawful or otherwise inappropriate.” Ford, 335 Ark. at 253, 979 S.W.2d at 901,
quoting Williamson Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, ___ (1986). We
affirmed an order of dismissal in Ford on the basis that the Game and Fish Commission had
not taken final action on the matter.
In the case before us, neither final action on the issue by the School Board nor any
effort by the Browns to exhaust their remedies before the School Board is evident. Indeed,
the administrative process before the School Board never began because the Browns avoided
their administrative remedies under § 6-18-507 and rushed into court to obtain the TRO.
Lack of finality and failure to exhaust administrative remedies clearly preclude judicial
-14-
06-1284
review. See Ford, supra; Austin v. Centerpoint Energy Arkala, 365 Ark. 138, ___ S.W.3d
___ (2006); Old Republic Surety Co. v. McGhee, 360 Ark. 562, 203 S.W.3d 94 (2005).
The dissent discards the fact that in the cases it cites the petitioner had also filed a direct
appeal in the same case or a related case, or the time for filing an appeal had passed, or the court’s
jurisdiction was not exceeded, or the case was distinguishable on the facts. The dissent also
disregards the fact that the School District filed its petition for writ of certiorari within the time
frame of an appeal. And, thirdly, the School District validly contends that it sought by petition not
merely to limit itself to dissolving the TRO. Rather, it sought to have the full complaint dismissed,
including the Browns’ claims under our Lake View decision and under the Arkansas Civil Rights
Act. An appeal limited to dissolving the TRO was not adequate for that purpose. The School
District pursued a reasonable course, and one that this court’s jurisprudence has recognized, when
it petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari challenging the circuit court’s hasty entry of a TRO
before the School District had taken final action.
There is one final point. This court historically has been reluctant to insinuate itself
into school operations, including discipline matters, until the school procedures for relief
have run their course. We said as much in Fortman v. Texarkana School District No. 7, 257
Ark. 130, 514 S.W.2d 720 (1974).
We grant the petition and issue the writ of certiorari because the circuit court clearly
exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the TRO before the School Board had made its decision
on expulsion. The case, accordingly, was not ripe for judicial review because there was no
-15-
06-1284
final administrative action to review under § 6-18-507. The circuit court’s action in this
regard was a plain, manifest, clear, and gross abuse of discretion. We set aside the TRO.
Petition for Rehearing Granted.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari Granted.
G LAZE, C ORBIN, and IMBER, JJ., dissent.
T OM G LAZE, J., dissenting. The majority opinion states that this court has treated
petitions for writs of certiorari as appeals in the past when the petition is filed within the appeal
time; it relies on two old cases for this proposition. See Williamson v. Mitchell Auto Co., 181 Ark.
693, 27 S.W.2d 96 (1930) (holding that this court will treat a petition for writ of certiorari as an
appeal where the time for an appeal has not expired); Miller v. Tatum, 170 Ark. 152, 279 S.W.
1002 (1926).
The rule adopted in these two cases makes no sense. Of course, a party has 30 days in
which to file a notice of appeal. Why wouldn’t the party do so, rather than filing a petition for writ
of certiorari within that thirty-day period and ask this court to treat his petition as an appeal? The
rule is misleading and confusing and just plain wrong.
D ONALD L. C ORBIN, J., dissenting. Never in all of my days on the appellate courts of
Arkansas have I seen an opinion that is more results oriented than the majority’s decision to
grant the school district’s petition for rehearing. The majority has effectively turned our law
on extraordinary writs on its ear. Under the majority’s analysis, a party can seek a writ of
-16-
06-1284
certiorari, and even if an extraordinary writ is not warranted, still have the matter heard
because this court will now treat a petition for certiorari as an appeal. The majority notes that
we have in the past treated such petitions as appeals, and we have, most recently in 1930.
What disturbs me the most is the fact that the majority cites to Williamson v. Mitchell
Auto Co., 181 Ark. 693, 27 S.W.2d 96 (1930), and Miller v. Tatum, 170 Ark. 152, 279 S.W.
1002 (1926), in support of its decision, but ignores recent cases where we have refused to
grant certiorari when a party has the remedy of an appeal available to it. See, e.g., Sims v.
Circuit Court of Pulaski County, ___ Ark. ___, ____ S.W.3d ___ (Jan. 18, 2007); Weaver
v. Simes, 365 Ark. 289, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006); Cockrum v. Fox, 359 Ark. 508, 199 S.W.3d
69 (2004); May Constr. Co., Inc. v. Thompson, 341 Ark. 879, 20 S.W.3d 345 (2000); Cooper
Cmtys., Inc. v. Circuit Court of Benton County, 336 Ark. 136, 984 S.W.2d 429 (1999). See
also Conner v. Simes, 355 Ark. 422, 139 S.W.3d 476 (2003) (holding that certiorari was not
a viable option to prohibition where the petitioner had the remedy of an appeal available to
him).8
Moreover, the majority’s opinion is in direct conflict with our prior acknowledgment
that certiorari may not be used as a substitute for appeal. See Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v.
Circuit Court of Sebastian County, 363 Ark. 389, 144 S.W.3d 738 (2005); Conner, 355 Ark.
422, 139 S.W.3d 476; Arnold v. Spears, 343 Ark. 517, 36 S.W.3d 346 (2001); King v. Davis,
8
Just recently this court unanimously denied a “Motion for Expedited Writ of Prohibition
or, in the Alternative, a Writ of Certiorari” where the appellant had also filed a notice of appeal. See
Potter v. Honorable Kim Martin Smith, No. 07-161.
-17-
06-1284
324 Ark. 253, 920 S.W.2d 488 (1996); Neal v. Wilson, 321 Ark. 70, 900 S.W.2d 177 (1995)
(per curiam); Gran v. Hale, 294 Ark. 563, 745 S.W.2d 129 (1988).
The majority makes much ado about the school district’s assertion that they are not
simply challenging the court’s order granting the temporary restraining order, but are seeking
dismissal of the Browns’ complaint because of a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
According to the district, there has been no final action on the expulsion, and the Browns
have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.
The majority focuses on these
allegations as an explanation as to why this petition for extraordinary relief is being given
special treatment, but a review of our case law on exhaustion of administrative remedies
reveals the majority’s flawed analysis.
In Stanton v. American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co., 362 Ark. 96, 207
S.W.3d 456 (2005), a case cited by the majority, this court determined that a complaint
should have been dismissed where the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction due to
the appellant’s failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. What is important to note
about Stanton, is that it was a direct appeal from a decision by the circuit court. In other
words, it was not a case where the appellee sought an extraordinary writ due to a failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. Likewise, the case of Ford v. Arkansas Game & Fish
Commission, 335 Ark. 245, 979 S.W.2d 897 (1998), relied on by both the school district and
the majority, is a direct appeal of an order dismissing the appellant’s suit because of a failure
to exhaust administrative remedies, and not a case involving an extraordinary writ. In fact,
-18-
06-1284
the majority does not cite to one case where this court has treated a petition for certiorari as
an appeal and held that the lower court lacked jurisdiction because of a party’s failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. Now, however, the proverbial floodgate is open to other
litigants who may choose to circumvent the normal appellate process in favor of the more
expeditious extraordinary writ.
In the present case, the school district never argued to the circuit court that the Browns
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies or that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction;
thus, the school district never gave the circuit court an opportunity to act accordingly.
Instead, the district raced to this court seeking our intervention, and the majority is all too
happy to oblige, seemingly intent on making sure that the Browns’ children are not allowed
to attend school anywhere in the district. While I certainly do not condone the inappropriate
and disruptive behavior of J.B. or Y.B., I also cannot ignore the fact that the principal’s son
referred to J.B. with a hateful racial slur.
There is simply nothing about this case that warrants the majority’s decision to ignore
our well-established precedent that an extraordinary writ will not lie where another adequate
remedy at law exists. This case is simply about the majority wanting to reach a certain result
and doing so at the expense of our long-standing jurisprudence.
For this reason, I
respectfully dissent.
IMBER, J., joins in this dissent.
-19-
06-1284
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
