City of Pine Bluff, Arkansas; Dutch King, In His Official Capacity as Mayor of the City of Pine Bluff, Arkansas; Irene Holcomb, Jack Foster, Derwood Smith, Dale Dixon, Bill Brumett, Wayne Easterly, Jackie Kirby, and Janice Roberts, In Their Official Capacities as Aldermen of the City of Pine Bluff, Arkansas v. Jack Jones, Jefferson County Judge
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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
CITY OF PINE BLUFF, ARKANSAS;
DUTCH KING, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY OF MAYOR OF THE
CITY OF PINE BLUFF, ARKANSAS;
IRENE HOLCOMB, JACK FOSTER,
DERWOOD SMITH, DALE DIXON,
BILL BRUMETT, WAYNE EASTERLY,
JACKIE KIRBY, AND JANICE
ROBERTS, IN THEIR OFFICIAL
CAPACITIES AS ALDERMEN OF THE
CITY OF PINE BLUFF, ARKANSAS,
Opinion Delivered June 7, 2007
AN APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT
COURT OF JEFFERSON COUNTY,
ARKANSAS, NO. CV-2004-844-3,
HONORABLE JOHN B. PLEGGE,
CIRCUIT JUDGE ON ASSIGNMENT
JACK JONES, JEFFERSON COUNTY
TOM GLAZE, Associate Justice
In this appeal, the appellant, the City of Pine Bluff (“the City”), and the appellee,
Jefferson County (“the County”), ask our court to decide what is meant by the phrase
“prisoners of municipalities,” a term found in Ark. Code Ann. § 12-41-506(a)(1) (Repl.
2003). The lawsuit at issue in this case stemmed from an October 1993 contract between the
County and the City. Under the terms of that contract, the County was to build a thirty-two
bed expansion at the Jefferson County Jail, and the City agreed to lease from the County
twenty-four of those beds, which were to “be available to the City, at all times.” In exchange
for the beds, the City agreed to pay the County $24,090 per month over the twenty-year
term of the lease. The County pledged the money received from the City under the lease to
retire the construction debt on the jail expansion. In March of 2004, however, the City
ceased making its monthly payments.
On October 29, 2004, the County filed suit against the City and its city officials,
alleging that the City had breached its contract with the County. The City responded by
filing a counterclaim and requesting a declaratory judgment on May 20, 2005. The City
claimed that the County had breached the parties’ contract by charging the City for prisoners
who were “prisoners of Jefferson County for whom the city had no financial responsibility.”
In addition, the City alleged that the County had not been permitting the City access to all
of the twenty-four beds the City was guaranteed under the contract.
The opposing parties eventually sought a declaratory judgment from the circuit court
as to the meaning of the phrase “prisoners of municipalities,” as that phrase is used in § 12-41506, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a)(1) In the absence of an agreement on jail costs between a county and
all municipalities having law enforcement agencies in the county, the quorum
court in a county in this state may by ordinance establish a daily fee to be
charged municipalities for keeping prisoners of municipalities in the county jail.
(2) The fee shall be based upon the reasonable expenses which the
county incurs in keeping such prisoners in the county jail.
(b)(1) Municipalities whose prisoners are maintained in the county jail
shall be responsible for paying the fee established by the quorum court in the
(2) When a person is sentenced to a county jail for violating a municipal
ordinance, the municipality shall be responsible for paying the fee established
by an agreement or ordinance of the quorum court in the county.
(3) Municipalities may appropriate funds to assist the county in the
maintenance and operation of the county jail.
Noting that nothing in the 1993 contract defined “city prisoner” or addressed the
question of when a city prisoner conceivably becomes a “county prisoner” under Arkansas
law, the County and City asked the court to craft a definition of the term. The circuit court
held a hearing on the parties’ motions on November 9, 2005, and entered a written order on
June 16, 2006, granting the declaratory judgment and setting out its definition of “prisoners
of municipalities” as follows:
“Prisoners of municipalities” shall include persons housed in the County
Jail by virtue of a pending misdemeanor charge that is pending on a city docket
or a municipal docket of any court whereby the fine revenue that would be
owed by the prisoner, if convicted, would be paid to the city or municipality
and not to the county.
“Prisoners of municipalities” further includes persons arrested by
municipal law enforcement officers within the confines of the municipality
upon a statutory violation which is a misdemeanor and for which the fine
money would be paid to the city if they were convicted of that offense and paid
“Prisoners of municipalities” further includes those persons who are
arrested and charged with felonies by municipal police officers until such time
as the prosecuting attorney has filed formal felony charges against those
individuals to proceed against those individuals as felony cases, at which time
those arrestees will then cease to be considered as “prisoners of municipalities,”
but instead will be the financial responsibility of the county from that point
Following the court’s order defining “prisoners of municipalities,” the parties settled
the underlying breach of contract action. However, the County and City alleged that they
continued to disagree over the application of that definition insofar as it applied “to portions
of the parties’ settlement agreement and contract negotiations.” Accordingly, the trial court
entered another order on June 29, 2006, dismissing the case with prejudice. The City filed
a timely notice of appeal on July 24, 2006.
On appeal, the City asks this court to reject the circuit court’s definition of “prisoners
of municipalities” and urges an interpretation that focuses solely on the language in § 12-41506(b)(2) providing that when a person is “sentenced to a county jail for violating a municipal
ordinance, the municipality shall be responsible for paying the fee established by an agreement
or ordinance of the quorum court in the county.” (Emphasis added.) Only in this limited
circumstance — i.e., when a prisoner is sentenced to the county jail for a municipal ordinance
violation “and nothing else”— the City contends, should it be financially responsible for
county jail inmates.
However, we are unable to reach the merits of the City’s arguments on appeal. As
mentioned above, following the trial court’s order granting the declaratory judgment and
setting out a definition of “prisoners of municipalities,” the City and County entered into a
negotiated settlement agreement in February of 2006.
First, under the terms of that
settlement, the City was to begin its payments, in March of 2006, for the allotted twenty-four
beds in the Jefferson County Detention Center under the terms of the 1993 contract. Second,
the City agreed to begin paying $8,000 per month to the Jack Jones Juvenile Justice Center
for the housing of Pine Bluff juvenile detainees in that facility. Third, after payment of the
December 2006 invoice for both the Jefferson County Detention Facility and the Jack Jones
Juvenile Justice Center, all monthly invoices would cease, and the County and City would
enter into a new agreement for the future housing of Pine Bluff detainees in both facilities.
Fourth, as further consideration for the parties’ settlement, the City agreed to pay the
County the sum of $75,000 on March 1, 2006, to be earmarked towards the arrearages owed
to the Jack Jones Juvenile Justice Center. Fifth, the parties agreed that the City owed
Jefferson County the sum of $565,000 for arrearages for past jail invoices not paid, and that
the City would pay that amount in monthly installments of $23,541.66 per month over
twenty-four months, beginning in January of 2007.
The sixth paragraph of the settlement agreement provided that, when the new county
jail opened following its construction, the City would have the use of seventy-five beds for
the housing of “City of Pine Bluff misdemeanor arrestees and convictees, City of Pine Bluff
ordinance arrestees and convictees, and all City misdemeanor warrant arrestees and convictees.
All other arrestees by the City of Pine Bluff will be housed at Jefferson County expense.”
Seventh, the parties agreed that, in addition to those seventy-five beds, the City would
have priority to use the approximately thirty beds that had been allocated for use by other
cities within Jefferson County and the University of Arkansas at Pine Bluff, if those entities
were not then using those beds.
The eighth paragraph provided that, at any time at which the City was not using the
seventy-five beds allotted to it in the new county jail, Jefferson County was free to use the
beds. In the event that the County had placed its detainees in those beds, then the County
would be responsible for accepting any City detainees and accepting financial responsibility
for housing those detainees in the county jail or transporting the detainees to another facility.
The agreement then required representatives of the County and City to “meet after passage
of twelve months from the date the new county jail is open to determine whether the bed
space as between the parties . . . is adequate for the needs of the City of Pine Bluff.”
Moreover, the settlement agreement provided that “a daily fee for detainee housing shall be
agreed upon as soon as reasonably practical upon the opening of the new jail in the unlikely
event that the City was using more beds than allotted[.]”
At oral argument before this court, counsel for the City of Pine Bluff urged that this
settlement only covered “portions of the case,” suggesting that the parties will still have to “go
back to the negotiation table to determine additional bed space and the cost.” Counsel
further stated that there were “continuing negotiations . . . for a short gap of time between
January of  and when the jail opened in the spring of ” and that the parties had
to “go back and negotiate additional bed space within a year of the jail opening.”
Counsel for Jefferson County, however, informed the court that any decision we
might render would “not affect the settlement agreement in this pending case,” but would
only “affect future negotiations between Jefferson County and the City of Pine Bluff.” When
asked whether an opinion from this court setting out a definition different from that of the
trial court would change anything in the settlement agreement, the County’s counsel replied
that it would not, nor would it change any of the monetary calculations in the settlement
agreement. Although the County’s attorney noted that the parties will have to meet again
within one year of the opening of the new jail to determine whether the bed-space allocation
was functioning effectively, he agreed that the “settlement agreement [would] stand” no
matter what this court does. On rebuttal, the attorney for the City of Pine Bluff agreed that
the monetary portions of the settlement would be unaffected by any decision of this court,
and he conceded that everything in the contract would have to be renegotiated after a year.
It is apparent that any opinion we might render would have no effect on the settlement
agreement negotiated between the parties. We have long held that courts do not sit for the
purpose of determining speculative and abstract questions of law or laying down rules for
future conduct. See Dodson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 365 Ark. 458, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006); Tsann
Kuen Enterprises Co. v. Campbell, 355 Ark. 110, 129 S.W.3d 822 (2003); Harris v. City of Little
Rock, 344 Ark. 95, 40 S.W.3d 214 (2001). Generally, a case becomes moot when any
judgment rendered would have no practical legal effect upon a then existing legal controversy.
See Weaver v. City of West Helena, 367 Ark. 159, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006); Cotten v. Fooks, 346
Ark. 130, 55 S.W.3d 290 (2001). When a party demonstrates only that it would like a legal
opinion, but does not show that there is an ongoing controversy, we will dismiss the appeal.
See Cummings v. City of Fayetteville, 294 Ark. 151, 152, 741 S.W.2d 638, 638 (1987). Here,
due to the settlement agreement, there is no existing legal controversy; accordingly, any
decision we might render would merely be an advisory opinion. This we will not do.
B ROWN and IMBER, JJ., concur.
H ANNAH, C.J., dissents.
R OBERT L. B ROWN, JUSTICE, CONCURRING. I concur in the result largely because
I do not share the conviction of the majority that a definition of “prisoners of municipalities”
from this court will be wholly irrelevant to the current settlement agreement.
disagreement over the scope of the settlement does leave me unwilling to conclude that any
genuine controversy remains. However, I am equally unsure that an opinion from this court
will have “no practical effect.”
Counsel for the City said at oral argument that a settlement agreement had been struck
for use of “base beds” but that a decision by this court was needed to determine cost and
usage of beds above that base figure this year, or during the term of the current settlement
agreement. He thus contended that an opinion by this court would have some relevance.
Counsel for the County seemed to disagree, although at one point he said at oral argument
that he hoped the two parties had an agreement. In response to questioning he also said that
he believes and hopes that the settlement agreement will stand no matter what this court does.
The end result, though, was that after the oral argument, I was unsure how any
decision by this court on what constitutes “prisoners of municipalities” would affect the
current agreement between the City and the County. It was the City’s obligation to make
the viability of this issue on appeal crystal clear, and the City did not carry this burden.
Hence, I concur.
IMBER, J., joins this concurring opinion.
JIM H ANNAH, C HIEF JUSTICE, DISSENTING. I respectfully dissent. The majority errs
in dismissing the appeal. The circuit court properly issued declaratory judgment on the
definition of “prisoners of municipalities” under Ark. Code Ann. 12-41-506(a)(1) (Repl.
2003). This case began as a breach of contract action when Jefferson County filed the action
on October 29, 2004; however, the City of Pine Bluff filed a counterclaim seeking declaratory
judgment. When the parties settled their dispute over the 1993 contract, they remained in
a contractual relationship, under a statutory obligation with respect to paying for prisoners,
and needed a definition of the term “prisoners of municipalities,” under Ark. Code Ann. §
12-41-506(a)(1). The circuit court noted this in the June 29, 2006, Order appealed from.
Even after the parties settled their 1993 contract issues, the question of the meaning of
“prisoners of municipalities” remained. Whether under contract, under statute, or otherwise,
the County and the City must still decide who was to pay for each prisoner, and the
definition of “prisoners of municipalities” is needed by the parties. Declaratory judgment was
a proper action to determine this question:
Declaratory judgments are used to determine the rights and liabilities of
respective parties. The purpose of a declaratory judgment is to prevent
“uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal
relations.” Ark. Code Ann. § 16-111-102 (Repl. 1987). Under this Act, “[a]ny
person interested under a . . . written contract . . . or his rights, status, or other
legal relations are affected by a . . . contract . . . may have determined any
question of construction or validity arising under the . . . contract . . . and
obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.” Ark.
Code Ann. § 16-111-104 (Repl. 1987).
Stilley v. James, 345 Ark. 362, 372, 48 S.W.3d 521, 528 (2001). Further, a declaratory
judgment action is to be liberally construed in resolving uncertainty in rights, status, and legal
relations. Wilmans v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 355 Ark. 668, 144 S.W.3d 245 (2004). The
circuit court properly decided the issue of the meaning of the term “prisoners of
municipalities” in a declaratory judgment action, and the court should review that decision