John H. Rhodes v. State of Arkansas

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
October 2, 2003

JOHN H. RHODES

Petitioner

v.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

Respondent

CR 03-497

PRO SE MOTION FOR RULE ON CLERK TO PROCEED WITH APPEAL OF POSTCONVICTION ORDER [CIRCUIT COURT OF VAN BUREN COUNTY, NO. CR 99-57, HON. DAVID REYNOLDS, JUDGE]

MOTION DENIED

Per Curiam

In 2000, John H. Rhodes was found guilty by a jury of possession of a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance with intent to manufacture, and endangering the welfare of a minor. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to an aggregate sentence of twenty-seven years' imprisonment and fined $1,000. The court of appeals affirmed. Rhodes v. State, CACR 00-1122 (Ark. App. September 19, 2001).

Rhodes subsequently filed in the trial court a timely petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Criminal Procedure Rule 37 seeking to have the judgment vacated. A hearing was held on the petition which concluded with the court's declaration that the petition was without merit and should be denied. On August 23, 2002, petitioner Rhodes filed a notice of appeal. On November 26, 2002, the trial court entered a written order denying the petition; thus, in accordance with Ark. R. App. P.--Crim. 2(b)(1), the notice of appeal was treated as having been filed one day after the order was entered, i.e. November 27, 2002.

When petitioner tendered the appeal record to this court on March 3, 2003, our clerk correctly declined to lodge it because it was not tendered here within ninety days of the date of the notice of appeal as required by Ark. R. App. P.--Civ. 5(a). (It was received ninety-six days after the notice was filed.) Now before us is petitioner's motion for rule on clerk seeking to lodge the record belatedly. Petitioner erroneously states that his notice of appeal was untimely and argues that he could not perfect the appeal because he was not promptly provided a copy of the order so that he could file a timely notice. He also argues that he was hampered by his pro se status and the fact of his incarceration from lodging the record on time.

As stated, the notice of appeal was treated as having been filed on November 27, 2002, and was timely. It was the petitioner's burden to tender the record here within the time period allowed by Ark. R. App. P.--Civ. 5(a). This court has consistently held that all litigants, including those who proceed pro se, must bear responsibility for conforming to the rules of procedure or demonstrating a good cause for not doing so. Bragg v. State, 297 Ark. 348, 760 S.W.2d 878 (1988); Peterson v. State, 289 Ark. 452, 711 S.W.2d 830 (1986); Walker v. State, 283 Ark. 339, 676 S.W.2d 460 (1984); Thompson v. State, 280 Ark. 163, 655 S.W.2d 424 (1983). Neither the fact that the appellant is incarcerated nor the fact that he or she is proceeding pro se entitles the appellant to special consideration on appeal. See Gibson v. State, 298 Ark. 43, 764 S.W.2d 617 (1989). It is not the responsibility of the circuit judge, the circuit clerk, the court reporter, or anyone other than the pro se party desiring to appeal to perfect the appeal. See Sullivan v. State, 301 Ark. 352, 784 S.W.2d 155 (1990); Bragg, supra.

The purpose of the rule setting time limitations on lodging a record is to eliminate unnecessary delay in the docketing of appeals. We have made it abundantly clear that we expect compliance with the rule so that appeals will proceed as expeditiously as possible. Jacobs v. State, 321 Ark. 561, 906 S.W.2d 670 (1995), citing Alexander v. Beaumont, 275 Ark. 357, 629 S.W.2d 300 (1982). It was the duty of the petitioner to tender the record to this court in a timely manner. As he did not do so and has not demonstrated good cause for the failure to do so, the motion for rule on the clerk is denied.

Motion denied.

Thornton, J., not participating.