William Frank Jones, Jr. v. Arkansas Department of Correction et al.

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

February 5, 2004

WILLIAM FRANK JONES, JR.

Appellant

v.

ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTION, ET AL.

Appellees

02-412

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, CR 2001-769-3, HONORABLE FRED D. DAVIS III, JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Per Curiam

William Frank Jones, Jr., who is in the custody of the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) by virtue of multiple felony convictions, filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Jefferson County Circuit Court. He alleged that officers and employees of the ADC had inflicted serious physical injuries and pain upon him, and that his requests for protection had been ignored.

Appellees responded by filing a notice of removal in federal district court. Appellant, however, subsequently filed in federal court a motion to strike his §1983 claims. The district court concluded that appellant's request left it without jurisdiction over the case, and it remanded the case to the Jefferson County Circuit Court.

Appellees then moved the circuit court to dismiss the action pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because appellant's request to strike his § 1983 claims left no claims to litigate. Three days later, the circuit court dismissed appellant's complaint with prejudice. Appellant contends that the circuit court erred by dismissing his complaint prior to the expiration of time allowed for him to file his response.

In reviewing a decision on a motion to dismiss under Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), we treat the facts alleged in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the party who filed the complaint. Arkansas Dept. of Environ. Qual. v. Brighton Corp., 352 Ark. 396, 403, 102 S.W.3d 458, 462 (2003). In testing the sufficiency of the complaint on a motion to dismiss, all reasonable inferences must be resolved in favor of the complaint, and the pleadings are to be liberally construed. Id. Our rules require fact pleading, and a complaint must state facts, not mere conclusions, in order to entitle the pleader to relief. Id. This court looks to the underlying facts supporting an alleged cause of action to determine whether the matter has been sufficiently pled. Id. From our review of the record presented by appellant, treating the facts alleged in the petition as true and viewing them in a light most favorable to appellant, we cannot say that the circuit court erred in dismissing the complaint.

Appellees served the motion to dismiss by mail on March 1, 2002, and it was filed on March 4. Thus, as both parties agree, appellant had until March 14, 2002, to file his response. See Ark. R. Civ. P. 6(c)-(d) (2002). The circuit court, however, dismissed the complaint on March 7, 2002. Appellant eventually filed his response, along with a Rule 60 motion to set aside the circuit court's order of dismissal and a motion for reinstatement of his § 1983 claims, on March 20, 2002. Appellant notes that each of these pleading were mailed prior to that date, and the certificates of service on appellant's response shows a mailing date of March 5, 2002.

"A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain . . . a statement in ordinary and concise language of facts showing that the court has jurisdiction of the claim and is the proper venue and that the pleader is entitled to relief." Ark. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (2001). Appellant's filed his complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a deprivation of civil rights by ADC officers and employees operating under color of state law. A § 1983 suit is one brought pursuant to an act of Congress, and it can be enforced in either federal or state courts. See Newton v. Etoch, 332 Ark. 325, 334, 965 S.W.2d 96, 100 (1998). We have noted that while it remains unsettled whether it is obligatory upon state courts to exercise such jurisdiction, the state court option to assume jurisdiction over § 1983 cases is routinely exercised. Virden v. Roper, 302 Ark. 125, 128, 788 S.W.2d 470, 472 (1990).

Here, the circuit court exercised jurisdiction over appellant's § 1983 case. Appellees then filed a petition for removal to federal district court. The federal court asserted jurisdiction; the court's docket shows that both parties filed pleadings after the petition for removal. Most significantly, appellant filed a motion to strike his § 1983 claims. Thereafter, the federal court entered an order remanding the case to state court because it now lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain appellant's claims.

Not surprisingly, upon remand, appellees moved for dismissal in state court because appellant's decision to strike his § 1983 claims left his complaint without any claims to litigate. While the appellees moved for dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the circuit court did not specify its reason for dismissing appellant's complaint. Clearly, as appellant had struck all claims from his complaint, the circuit court lost jurisdiction because of appellant's action just as the federal court did.

This court has defined jurisdiction as "the power to hear and determine the subject-matter in controversy between the parties to the suit; to adjudicate or exercise any judicial power over them." Young v. Smith, 331 Ark. 525, 529, 964 S.W.2d 784, 785-86 (1998)(quoting Lamb & Rhodes v. Howton, 131 Ark. 211, 213, 198 S.W. 521, 522 (1917)). Subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time by either a party or the court, and it is a defect that is never waived by a failure to raise it at a particular point in a proceeding. Id. (citing Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)). When appellant struck all claims from his complaint, no controversy remained between him and the appellees. The circuit court no longer had subject-matter jurisdiction and it could have dismissed appellant's complaint on its own for that reason without any prompting by appellees. Indeed, although the motion for dismissal would have been more appropriately made as a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the distinction is immaterial because the question was the same: whether the appellant had no claim due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Further, appellant failed to file his response in a timely manner. He filed it six days after his response was due. Appellant implicitly suggests that the "Mailbox Rule" made his response timely. It bears a certificate of service showing that it was mailed one day after the appellees's motion was filed. All litigants, including those who proceed pro se, must conform to the rules of procedure or demonstrate good cause for not doing so. See Hamel v. State, 338 Ark. 769, 770-71, 1 S.W.3d 434, 435-36 (1999). Accordingly, appellant was not prejudiced by the entry of the order of dismissal prior to the expiration of time for him to file his response. The circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, and appellant failed to timely file his response. The circuit court did not err in dismissing appellant's complaint.

Affirmed.