Donaldson v. Taylor

Jerry DONALDSON, Anthony Graham, Eddie
Lunsford, Ruben Camp, Maurice Green, & the
Fraternal Order of Firemen v. Jerry TAYLOR,
Mayor of the City of Pine Bluff, Arkansas, &
Ray Jacks, Fire Chief

96-72                                              ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered January 27, 1997


1.   Municipal corporations -- calculation of fire fighters'
     holidays -- term "working days" construed. -- In calculating
     fire fighters' holidays, the statutory term "working days" was
     construed by the supreme court to mean an eight-hour day
     rather than a twenty-four-hour shift. 

2.   Municipal corporations -- city had authority to operate and
     manage fire department -- policy change commensurate with that
     authority. -- The City of Pine Bluff has the authority to
     operate and manage its fire department, including its fire
     fighters' hours of duty, holiday compensation, annual
     vacation, and sick leave; commensurate with that authority,
     the City, by ordinance pursuant to Ark. Code Ann.  14-53-108
     (Supp. 1995), chose to change its policy so as to limit sick
     leave to ninety days for those fire fighters employed on
     twenty-four-hour shifts.

3.   Municipal corporations -- city's actions within time
     restrictions of statute -- judgment affirmed. -- The City of
     Pine Bluff's actions were well within the time restrictions of
      14-53-108(a)(2), which limits sick leave to sixty days
     unless, by ordinance, the city authorizes an amount not to
     exceed ninety days; the judgment was affirmed.


     Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court; Fred Davis, Judge;
affirmed.
     Robert A. Newcomb, for appellants.
     Carol Billings, City Attorney, for appellees.

     Tom Glaze, Justice.
     In this case, appellant-firemen, who work twenty-four hour
shifts, argue that, commencing January 1, 1993, the City of Pine
Bluff erroneously changed its policy in calculating their sick
leave.  Their dispute with the City centers on the interpretation
of Ark. Code Ann.  14-53-108 (Supp. 1995), which in relevant part
provides as follows:
          (a)(1)  From and after April 11, 1969, all fire
     fighters employed by cities of the first and second class
     shall accumulate sick leave at the rate of twenty (20)
     working days per year beginning one (1) year after the
     date of employment.
          (2)  If unused, sick leave shall accumulate to a
     maximum of sixty (60) days unless the city, by ordinance,
     authorizes the accumulation of a greater amount, in no
     event to exceed a maximum accumulation of ninety (90)
     days, except for the purpose of computing years of
     service for retirement purposes.
          (b)(1)  In cities having sick leave provisions
     through ordinance, the total sick leave accumulated by
     the individual fire fighter shall be credited to him and
     new days accumulated under the provisions of this section
     until the maximum prescribed in subsection (a) of this
     section is reached.
          (2)  Time off may be charged against accumulated
     sick leave only for the days that a fire fighter is
     scheduled to work.  No sick leave as provided in this
     section shall be charged against any fire fighter during
     any period of sickness, illness, or injury for any days
     which the fire fighter is not scheduled to work.
     In calculating sick leave under  14-53-108(a)(1) and (2), the
City, prior to January 1, 1993, determined that a fireman working
a twenty-four-hour shift who missed his or her entire shift due to
illness was charged only one eight-hour day of sick leave.  After
January 1, 1993, the City redefined a sick day as eight hours, so
that a fireman missing an entire twenty-four-hour shift would be
charged three days (3 x 8 = 24) of his or her accumulated sick
leave.  
     The firemen working twenty-four-hour shifts brought this suit
requesting declaratory relief urging the trial court to hold that
the City's interpretation of  14-53-108 was wrong, and violated
the Pine Bluff Civil Service Commission's rules and regulations
dealing with the firemen's sick-leave policy.  The trial court
denied the appellant-firemen's request for relief, and among other
things, held that the term "working day" as employed in  14-53-108
must be construed to refer to an eight-hour day rather than a
twenty-four hour shift.  In so holding, the trial court further
determined that the City's new sick-leave policy conformed with the
statute's language.  We agree, and therefore, affirm.
     The crux of the firemen's argument is that the trial court
misinterpreted the term "working day" to mean the hours worked
within a twenty-four-hour period, and that the City is clearly
wrong when it charged three days of sick leave when a fireman
misses one twenty-four-hour period.  In further support of this
argument, the firemen also submit that the City's civil service
regulations define "working day" as meaning "tour of duty."   They
suggest that, when using that definition, "working day" as utilized
in  14-53-108 is intended to mean hours worked within a twenty-
four-hour period or a tour of duty.  We disagree.
     First, we point out that the terms "working day" and "tour of
duty" found in Pine Bluff's civil service regulation were
previously found in  14-53-108, but were later omitted when the
statute was amended by Act 842 of 1983.  The General Assembly
enacted Act 842 after this court's decision in City of Fort Smith
v. Brewer, 255 Ark. 813, 502 S.W.2d 643 (1973), where in
calculating firemen's holidays, the statutory term "working days"
was construed by this court to mean an eight-hour day rather than
a twenty-four-hour shift.  See also Kalb v. Village of Oak Lawn,
470 N.E.2d 1268, (Ill. App. 1 Dist. 1984) (where the court held
"days" in a municipal sick-leave ordinance referred to eight-hour
days as applied to fire fighter, where that fire fighter worked a
twenty-four-hour day with forty-eight hours off).
     Second, we also note that the Pine Bluff Civil Service
Commission's regulations as they refer to firemen's sick leave have
little meaning here, since Arkansas law prohibits such commissions
from exercising any control over the normal routine day-to-day
operations of a fire department.  See Ark. Code Ann.  14-51-212
(Supp. 1995).  Clearly the City of Pine Bluff has the authority to
operate and manage its fire department, including its fire
fighter's hours of duty, holiday compensation, annual vacation, and
sick leave.  See Ark. Code Ann.   14-53-101 -108 (1987 and Supp.
1995).  Commensurate with that authority, the City, by ordinance
pursuant to  14-53-108, chose to change its policy so as to limit
sick leave to ninety days for those firemen employed on twenty-
four-hour shifts.
     We should also mention that the City of Pine Bluff's actions
were well within the time restrictions of  14-53-108, but the same
cannot be said of the argument offered by appellants.  Appellants
concede that, if our court should adopt their interpretation of 
14-53-108 and proposed calculation of sick-leave benefits, a
fireman could actually use up to nine months of sick leave. 
Obviously, such a result clearly runs contrary to  14-53-108(a)(2)
which limits sick leave to sixty days unless, by ordinance, the
city authorizes an amount not to exceed ninety days. 
     For the reasons above, we affirm.