State v. Webb

STATE of Arkansas  v. Aaron R. WEBB, et al.

CR 95-308                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered January 16, 1996


1.   Prohibition writ of -- when writ may issue. -- A writ of
     prohibition may issue if venue is improperly laid. 

2.   Jurisdiction -- if offense occurred outside the territorial
     jurisdiction of the court, a judgment rendered by the court
     would be void. -- If the allegation of a charging instrument
     were that an offense occurred outside the territorial
     jurisdiction of the court, then a judgment rendered by the
     court would be void. 

3.   Criminal law -- where criminal trials must be held according
     to law. -- The law in this State is that a criminal trial must
     be held in the county in which the crime was committed,
     provided that venue may be changed, at the request of the
     accused, to another county in the judicial district in which
     the "indictment is found"; a circuit court must try a criminal
     case in the county in which the crime was committed unless the
     accused requests the trial be moved to another county which,
     in any case, must be a part of the judicial district served by
     the court.  

4.   Courts -- limitations as to cases tried in circuit versus
     municipal courts -- municipal courts may assert limited
     subject-matter jurisdiction throughout the county in which it
     sits. -- While our circuit courts are limited to trying
     accusations of crimes which occurred in the counties, or
     judicial districts, in which they sit, our municipal courts
     are not limited, either by Constitution or by statute, to
     trying crimes which occurred in the cities in which they sit;
     our Constitution and Code both authorize a municipal court to
     assert limited subject-matter jurisdiction throughout the
     county in which it sits; no limitation is found in the
     Constitution upon the power of the Legislature to vest
     jurisdiction in municipal courts, when established, beyond the
     geographical limits of the municipalities, nor can it be said
     that there exists any policy or sound reason for restricting
     the jurisdiction to such geographical limits.

5.   Jurisdiction -- place where misdemeanor charges must be tried
     -- not limited to the city in which the court sits. -- Whether
     the issue be referred to as one of venue or territorial
     jurisdiction, nothing in our Constitution or Code dealing
     directly with the place in which misdemeanor charges must be
     tried limits it to the city in which the court sits; the
     territorial jurisdiction of municipal courts extends
     throughout the counties in which they sit.

6.   Prohibition, writ of -- when properly issued. -- With the
     possible exception of venue issues, writs of prohibition are
     limited to cases in which a trial court purports to act
     without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction.

7.   Courts -- equal protection argument not reached -- appellant's
     argument easily answered. -- The phrasing of appellees' equal
     protection argument seemed to say that these appellees would
     somehow be prejudiced if they were to be tried in a court they
     could not help elect, that argument is answered easily by
     pointing out that the jurisdiction of the courts in criminal
     cases is based on the territory in which crimes are committed
     and not on the residence or voting privileges of the persons
     who commit the crimes.  

8.   Constitutional law -- legitimate equal protection argument not
     made -- no constitutional basis for finding that municipal
     court lacked jurisdiction of misdemeanors that occurred
     outside the city limits. -- Where none of the parties who
     sought the writ of prohibition alleged that he or she was
     being hailed into a court which was not the nearest to the
     place where the offense occurred, no constitutional basis for
     lack of jurisdiction was alleged; although there may be good
     reasons for objecting to a system which might permit improper
     forum shopping, none of them amounts to a constitutional basis
     for holding a municipal court lacks jurisdiction of
     misdemeanors committed in the county in which it sits but
     beyond the limits of the city in which it is situated.

9.   Trial -- right to trial by jury -- appeals from municipal
     court tried de novo in circuit court. -- One accused of a
     crime in this State has a right to a trial by jury,  Ark.
     Const. art. 2,  7; Ark Code Ann.  107(b)(1) (1987); however,
     there are no jury trials in municipal court; in order that the
     right of trial by jury remains inviolate, all appeals from
     judgment in municipal court shall be de novo to circuit court;
     thus there is thus a "two-tier" system for an accused
     misdemeanant who wishes a jury trial.

10.  Trial -- two-tier system of providing a trial by jury for
     accused misdemeanants has withstood constitutional scrutiny --
     case reversed and dismissed. -- The two-tier system of
     providing a trial by jury for accused misdemeanants has
     withstood constitutional scrutiny in both the United States
     Supreme Court, and this Court; the arguments being made in
     this case have been considered previously, and in any event,
     they are of the sort which do not challenge the jurisdiction
     of the municipal courts and which could indeed be raised on
     appeal; the writ of prohibition issued by the circuit court
     was reversed and the case was dismissed. 


     Appeal from Benton Circuit Court; Terry Crabtree, Judge;
reversed and dismissed.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Clint Miller, Deputy Att'y
Gen., Sr. Appellate Advocate for appellant.
     George, Morris, Spivey & Capehart, by:  Tom C. Morris III and
Brent Capehart and Gocio, Dossey & Reeves, by:  Samuel M. Reeves,
for appellees.

     David Newbern, Justice.1/16/96   Justice David Newbern

                                   CR95-308
STATE OF ARKANSAS                  Opinion Delivered:

          Appellant                Appeal from Benton Circuit
                                   Court (CV 94-731-3)
     v.
                                   Honorable Terry Crabtree,
AARON R. WEBB, et al.              Circuit Judge

          Appellees                Reversed and Dismissed









     The Benton County Circuit Court issued a writ of prohibition
to the Rogers and Bentonville Municipal Courts.  The writ prohibits
those courts from trying various charges of statutory misdemeanors
levied by citations issued by police officers to Shadrick W.
Clardy, Edward Kaczorowski, Jane Schmeichel, Aaron R. Webb, Nathan
Painter, and Billie W. Keene.  The State appeals the order issuing
the writ.  We reverse the order and dismiss the case.
     Each of the appellees was arrested for a statutory misdemeanor
alleged to have been committed in Benton County but not within
either the municipality of Bentonville or the municipality of
Rogers, each of which is located in Benton County.  Each of the
appellees was ordered by citation to appear in either the Rogers or
Bentonville Municipal Court.  Upon consideration of each of the
reasons given by the Trial Court and argued on appeal in favor of
the writ, we conclude its issuance was unwarranted.

                            1. Venue
     A writ of prohibition may issue if venue is improperly laid. 
See Prairie Implement Co., Inc. v. Circuit Court of Prairie County,
311 Ark. 200, 844 S.W.2d 299 (1992); Griffin v. State, 297 Ark.
208, 760 S.W.2d 852 (1988).  In the case now before us the Trial
Court held, in effect, that venue would be improperly laid in any
municipal court with respect to any offense alleged to have
occurred outside the municipality served by the court.  Proper
venue is an issue not often litigated in criminal cases, except
when a change of venue is at issue.  The issue involved here,
although it might understandably be referred to as one of venue
because it deals with the place where a trial may be had, is more
properly characterized as an issue of territorial jurisdiction.  
     If the allegation of a charging instrument were that an
offense occurred outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court,
then a judgment rendered by the court would be void.  Waddle v.
Sargent, 313 Ark. 539, 855 S.W.2d 919 (1993);  Williams v. Reutzel,
60 Ark. 155, 29 S.W. 374 (1895); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
 4 (1982).  
     The law in this State is that a criminal trial must be held in
the county in which the crime was committed, provided that venue
may be changed, at the request of the accused, to another county in
the judicial district in which the "indictment is found."  Ark.
Const. art. 2,  10; Waddle v. Sargent, supra.  These authorities
limit a circuit court to trying a criminal case in the county in
which the crime was committed unless the accused requests the trial
be moved to another county which, in any case, must be a part of
the judicial district served by the court.  
     While our circuit courts are thus limited to trying
accusations of crimes which occurred in the counties, or judicial
districts, in which they sit, our municipal courts are not limited,
either by our Constitution or by statute, to trying crimes which
occurred in the cities in which they sit.  To the contrary, our
Constitution and Code both authorize a municipal court to assert
limited subject-matter jurisdiction throughout the county in which
it sits.   Arkansas Code Ann.  16-17-704(a)(2) (Repl. 1994)
provides: "The municipal court shall have original jurisdiction,
coextensive with the county wherein the court is situated over the
following matters: ... over misdemeanors committed within the
county ...."   
          Arkansas Const. art. 7,  43, provides:

          Corporation courts for towns and cities may be invested
     with jurisdiction concurrent with justices of the peace in
     civil and criminal matters, and the General Assembly may
     invest such of them as it may deem expedient with jurisdiction
     of any criminal offenses not punishable by death or
     imprisonment in the penitentiary, with or without indictment,
     as may be provided by law, and, until the General Assembly
     shall otherwise provide, they shall have the jurisdiction now
     provided by law.

     The General Assembly first conferred county-wide jurisdiction
on municipal courts in Act 87 of 1915,  10, which was promptly
challenged in State v. Woodruff, 120 Ark. 406, 179 S.W. 813 (1915),
as being in violation of the Arkansas Constitution.  We held as
follows:

          No limitation is found in the Constitution upon the power
     of the Legislature to vest jurisdiction in municipal courts,
     when established, beyond the geographical limits of the
     municipalities.  Nor can it be said that there exists any
     policy or sound reason for restricting the jurisdiction to
     such geographical limits.  The authorities cited on the briefs
     of counsel do not sustain the contention that there is such an
     inherent limitation upon the power of municipal courts. 
     Unless the organic law forbids, the Legislature may extend the
     jurisdiction beyond the territorial limits of the
     municipalities.  The authority found in the Constitution is to
     vest jurisdiction in municipal courts "concurrent with the
     jurisdiction of justices of the peace in criminal and civil
     matters," that is to say, concurrent with the jurisdiction
     which it is within the power of the Legislature to confer upon
     justices of the peace.  The Constitution does not by its
     express terms restrict the jurisdiction of justices of the
     peace to the territorial limits of the township in which they
     are elected to serve, therefore the jurisdiction of municipal
     courts finds no such restriction in the Constitution.  At the
     time of the adoption of the Constitution of 1874, corporation
     courts in cities of the first class exercised the same
     jurisdiction under statutes then in force as did justices of
     the peace ... which thus extended the criminal jurisdiction to
     the territorial limits of the county, the same as that
     exercised by justices of the peace.

     In Sexson v. Municipal Court of Springdale, 312 Ark. 261, 849 S.W.2d 468 (1993), a writ of prohibition was issued to prevent
trial by the Springdale Municipal Court, which is situated in
Washington County, of an offense alleged to have occurred in that
part of Springdale which lies in Benton County.
     Whether the issue be referred to as one of venue or
territorial jurisdiction, nothing in our Constitution or Code
dealing directly with the place in which misdemeanor charges must
be tried limits it to the city in which the court sits.
The territorial jurisdiction of municipal courts extends throughout
the counties in which they sit.

                       2. Equal protection
     A reason given for upholding the writ of prohibition is that
to allow a municipal court to hear the case of an offense which
occurred outside the limits of the city in which it is situated
creates two classes of persons, one of which is denied its right to
equal protection of the laws.
     The State contends a general constitutional issue such as
whether the prescription of jurisdiction for municipal courts
violates the right to equal protection of the laws is not a proper
subject for prohibition because the issue could be raised on appeal
after objecting and moving to dismiss on that basis in a trial de
novo in circuit court.  With the possible exception of the venue
issue, writs of prohibition are limited to cases in which a trial
court purports to act without jurisdiction or in excess of its
jurisdiction.  Taylor v. Rogers, 298 Ark. 53, 764 S.W.2d 619
(1989); Municipal Court of Huntsville v. Casoli, 294 Ark. 37, 740 S.W.2d 614 (1987).  
     Given our decision in the Griffin case, we are not so certain
that one who is convicted in a municipal court can get the issue of
equal protection to us on appeal after the mandatory appeal to a
circuit court where the issue may "disappear."  We are sufficiently
uncertain about it that we would be willing to consider the
question now despite the fact that it might be possible to bring it
before us on appeal of a de novo circuit court judgment resulting
from a municipal court appeal.  We cannot give it full
consideration, however, due to the posture of the parties in this
case. 
     The argument of Mr. Webb and the other appellees is stated as
follows in their brief:

     In order to be considered a candidate for municipal judge, one
     must be "an elector of the judicial subdivision wherein the
     court sits."  Ark. code Ann.  16-17-209(a) (Repl. 1994). 
     That is, one who is not a resident of Bentonville, for
     example, may not be a candidate in the election for judge of
     the Bentonville Municipal Court.  Additionally, one who does
     not reside in Bentonville, for example, may not vote in the
     election of Bentonville's municipal judge.  The result of this
     system is that persons not residing in a city having a
     municipal court are effectively denied equal protection and
     due process of law under both the United States and Arkansas
     Constitutions.

     The argument would seem to be that these appellees would
somehow be prejudiced if they were to be tried in a court they
could not help elect.  That argument is answered easily by pointing
out that the jurisdiction of the courts in criminal cases is based
on the territory in which crimes are committed and not on the
residence or voting privileges of the persons who commit the
crimes.  
     There might be a legitimate equal protection argument to be
raised, but it has not been made here.  The argument might be that
one class is composed of the residents of the city who are
enfranchised to elect the municipal judge; the other is composed of
the other residents of the county who are not so enfranchised. 
Misdemeanors committed in the part of a county lying outside any
city may, in our system, be adjudicated by a court not elected by
the residents of the place where the crime allegedly occurred.  It
might be argued that citizens have a right to elect the person who
tries the cases which arise in the territory in which they reside. 
Such a class of persons is obviously not contemplated in this case
and is not present.  Two of the appellees are residents of
Bentonville, and one is a resident of another state.  
     Such an argument, if made, would be faced with the hurdle of
Holt Civil Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978), in which
the United States Supreme Court held that an Alabama law permitting
cities to impose police regulations, including municipal court
jurisdiction, three miles beyond city limits did not violate the
right of equal protection of the laws accorded to the citizens
residing in the three-mile area.
     Lying beneath the challenge to county-wide jurisdiction of
municipal courts, and mentioned in the appellees' brief, is the
specter of improper forum shopping and perhaps some corruption in
the process of selecting the municipal court in which a misdemeanor
alleged to have occurred outside city limits might be tried.  That
was the allegation in Griffin v. State, supra, and in Pschier v.
State, 297 Ark. 206, 760 S.W.2d 858 (1988).  In those cases it was
alleged that the offenses were committed near one municipality but
the defendants were inexplicably cited to appear in a municipal
court serving a city some distance away from the place in the
county where the offense was committed.  We were unable to reach
that issue because, by the time the cases reached us, they had been
the subjects of de novo trials in a circuit court where the
argument did not apply.    
     In the case now before us, none of the parties who sought the
writ alleged that he or she was being hailed into a court  which
was not the nearest to the place where the offense occurred.  The
State, referring to the dissenting opinion of Justice Hickman in
the Griffin case, concedes that there may be good reasons for
objecting to a system which might permit improper forum shopping,
but that none of them amounts to a constitutional basis for holding
a municipal court lacks jurisdiction of misdemeanors committed in
the county in which it sits but beyond the limits of the city in
which it is situated.

                          3. Jury trial
     One accused of a crime in this State has a right to a trial by
jury,  Ark. Const. art. 2,  7; Ark Code Ann.  107(b)(1) (1987);
Johnston v. City of Pine Bluff, 258 Ark. 346, 525 S.W.2d 76 (1975);
however, "There shall be no jury trials in municipal court.  In
order that the right of trial by jury remains inviolate, all
appeals from judgment in municipal court shall be de novo to
circuit court."  Arkansas Code Ann.  16-17-703 (Repl. 1994). 
There is thus a "two-tier" system for an accused misdemeanant who
wishes a jury trial.  
     In his ruling from the bench, the Trial Court remarked about
the problems of extra costs in a second trial, the extra effort to
which a defendant has to expend to obtain a trial by jury in a
circuit court after conviction in a municipal court, and the
possible embarrassment to be suffered by one who pleads guilty in
a municipal court just to expedite obtaining the right to a jury
trial in a circuit court.     
     The two-tier system of providing a trial by jury for accused
misdemeanants has withstood constitutional scrutiny in both the
United States Supreme Court, Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618
(1976), and this Court. State v. Roberts, 321 Ark. 31, 900 S.W.2d 175 (1995).  The arguments being made in this case have been
considered previously, and in any event, they are of the sort which
do not challenge the jurisdiction of the municipal courts and which
could indeed be raised on appeal.
     Reversed and dismissed.