Granquist v. Randolph

Elizabeth GRANQUIST v. Scott John RANDOLPH

96-854                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered December 9, 1996



1.   Divorce -- appellant attempting to enforce contract for
     support in circuit court -- support of minor child exclusively
     chancery matter. -- Appellant's reliance on the fact that she
     was seeking to enforce a contract rather than a divorce decree
     or a settlement agreement that has been incorporated into a
     divorce decree was groundless; regardless of whether it was
     incorporated into a divorce decree or whether it was a
     contract independent of a divorce decree, the separation
     agreement that appellant sought to enforce still involved
     matters "relating to the support of a minor child" as those
     terms are used in Ark. Code Ann.  9-14-105(a); therefore,
     jurisdiction of the enforcement of the separation ggreement
     was exclusively in chancery court, and, according to Ark. Code
     Ann.  16-13-201(a), the circuit court did not have concurrent
     jurisdiction. 

2.   Constitutional law -- constitutional right to jury trial
     applies only to those cases so triable at common law --
     appellant's argument meritless. -- Appellant's argument that
     she had been denied a constitutional right to a jury trial was
     without merit where both Article 2, Section 7, of the Arkansas
     Constitution and the Seventh Amendment to the United States
     Constitution establish a right to trial by jury only in those
     cases that were so triable at common law, and appellant
     presented no authority or argument that she would have had the
     right to try the case to a jury at common law.  

3.   Appeal & error -- argument made without citation to authority
     -- previous decision will be affirmed. -- Where appellant did
     not cite any authority or make any convincing argument that
     she would have had a right to try this case to a jury at
     common law, and it was not apparent without further research
     that her argument was well taken, the judgment was affirmed.

4.   Jurisdiction -- circuit court did not have subject-matter
     jurisdiction over child-support matter -- order setting aside
     default judgment affirmed. -- Where appellant offered no
     authority, explanation, or convincing argument for the
     validity of her contract, given that parents and guardians
     cannot contract for the support of their minor children
     without express approval of a chancery court, and that
     chancery courts always retain jurisdiction over child-support
     matters as a matter of public policy, the circuit court did
     not have subject-matter jurisdiction of the case; the order
     setting aside the default judgment was affirmed.


     Appeal from Pope Circuit Court; John S. Patterson, Judge;
affirmed.
     Sanford & Stiritz, by:  Jon R. Sanford, for appellant.
     William Douglass Skelton, for appellee.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
     Appellant Elizabeth Granquist appeals the order of the Pope
County Circuit Court setting aside a default judgment previously
entered on Appellant's complaint for breach of a separation
agreement between her and Appellee Scott John Randolph.  For
reversal, Appellant contends the order denies her the right to a
jury trial on her claim for breach of contract.  The court of
appeals certified this case to us as one involving the construction
of the Arkansas Constitution.  Our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark.
Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(1), (d)(1).  We find no merit to Appellant's
argument on the record presented and affirm.
     Appellant filed a complaint in circuit court on August 19,
1994, alleging that Appellee had breached a written agreement to
pay her $200.00 per month child support for their minor child,
Brandon Dane Randolph, until the child reached age twenty-one.  The
agreement, which is captioned "SEPARATION AGREEMENT" and dated
November 16, 1983, was attached to the complaint as an exhibit.
According to the complaint, Appellant was granted judgment against
Appellee for all sums due under the Separation Agreement through
December 19, 1988, but Appellee had failed to keep the Separation
Agreement since then and now owes $13,680.00 in child-support
arrearages.  On March 7, 1995, the circuit court entered a default
judgment for Appellant in the amount of $13,680.00 with prejudgment
and postjudgment interest plus costs and attorney's fees. 
Appellee's wages were garnished pursuant to a writ of garnishment. 
     Appellee moved for the circuit court to set aside the default
judgment on the ground that the circuit court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction of child-support matters.  Appellant responded to the
motion with a contention that the circuit court had jurisdiction of
her claim for child support because Appellee's obligation arose
independently from a contract.  The circuit court conducted a
hearing on Appellee's motion to set aside the default judgment and
ruled from the bench that the motion would be denied. 
     Appellee then filed a motion to reconsider his motion to set
aside the default judgment.  By letter ruling, the circuit court
found that although a claim for breach of contract was
traditionally a matter of circuit-court jurisdiction, it did not
have jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Ark. Code Ann.  9-14-
105(a) (Repl. 1993) and Boren v. Boren, 318 Ark. 378, 885 S.W.2d 852 (1994).  
     Appellant then filed a motion for the circuit court to
reconsider its decision and alleged a violation of her right to a
jury trial under both state and federal constitutions.  The trial
court entered an order denying Appellant's motion to reconsider. 
Finally, the circuit court entered an order setting aside the
default judgment, and this appeal followed.
     On appeal, Appellant contends the trial court's setting aside
of the default judgment deprives her of a right to jury trial as
provided in Article 3, Section 2, of the United States Constitution
and Article 2, Section 7, of the Arkansas Constitution. We presume
that it is the Seventh Amendment that Appellant intended to rely on
as the source of her federal right to a jury trial since the
provision cited by Appellant, Article 3, Section 2, deals with
criminal trials.  Appellant argues that these constitutional rights
"clearly take precedence over and should be found to overrule
legislation and state case law inconsistent therewith."  Appellant
contends that section 9-14-105(a) and Boren are unconstitutional as
applied in her case.  We do not agree.
     In concluding that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction
of this case, the circuit court relied on section 9-14-105(a),
which provides that "[t]he chancery courts in the several counties
in this state shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all civil cases
and matters relating to the support of a minor child or support
owed to a person eighteen (18) or older which accrued during that
person's minority."  The circuit court also relied on Boren, 318
Ark. 378, 379, 885 S.W.2d 852, 852, wherein this court held that
"chancery has exclusive jurisdiction of all cases involving matters
of child support."  In Boren, this court recognized that under
section 9-14-105 and Ark. Code Ann.  16-13-201(a) (1987) chancery
courts had been given exclusive jurisdiction of all "`matters
relating to the support of a minor child'" and found that
enforcement of a child-support order was clearly a matter "related
to the support of a minor child."  Id. at 380, 885 S.W.2d  at 853. 
Thus, this court held in Boren that municipal courts and circuit
courts do not have concurrent jurisdiction of child-support
matters.
     Appellant attempts to distinguish Boren from this case on the
facts by pointing out that Boren involved the enforcement of a
divorce decree that awarded child support and had been entered of
record by a chancery court.  Appellant relies heavily on the fact
that she is seeking to enforce a contract rather than a divorce
decree or a settlement agreement that has been incorporated into a
divorce decree.  Regardless of whether it is incorporated into a
divorce decree or whether it is a contract independent of a divorce
decree, the Separation Agreement Appellant seeks to enforce still
involves matters "relating to the support of a minor child" as
those terms are used in section 9-14-105(a).  See, Strasner v.
Strasner, 232 Ark. 478, 482, 338 S.W.2d 679, 681 (1960) (concluding
that "enforcement of a contract for alimony is an action for
alimony, as distinguished from an action on debt, although the
debt, as such, is recognized as subsisting by reason of agreement
between the parties.") (quoting McCue v. McCue, 210 Ark. 826, 197 S.W.2d 938 (1946)).  Therefore, according to that statute,
jurisdiction of the enforcement of the Separation Agreement lies
exclusively in chancery court, and according to section 16-13-
201(a), the circuit court does not have concurrent jurisdiction of
such matters.  To hold otherwise, as Appellant suggests, would be
to place form over substance.
     We find no merit to Appellant's argument that she has been
denied a constitutional right to a jury trial.  Both Article 2,
Section 7 of the Arkansas Constitution and the Seventh Amendment to
the United States Constitution establish a right to trial by jury
only in those cases that were so triable at common law.  Colclasure
v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 290 Ark. 585, 720 S.W.2d 916 (1986),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987) (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974)).  Appellant does not cite any authority or make
any convincing argument that she would have had a right to try this
case to a jury at common law, and it is not apparent to us without
further research that her argument is well taken.  Under such
circumstances, we affirm.  Firstbank of Arkansas v. Keeling, 312
Ark. 441, 850 S.W.2d 310 (1993).  We will not do Appellant's
research for her.  Id.  Moreover, Appellant offers no authority,
explanation, or convincing argument for the validity of her
contract given that parents and guardians cannot contract for the
support of their minor children without express approval of a
chancery court, Davis v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 322
Ark. 352, 908 S.W.2d 649 (1995), and that chancery courts exercise
jealous and watchful care over minors by always retaining
jurisdiction over child-support matters as a matter of public
policy.  Nooner v. Nooner, 278 Ark. 360, 645 S.W.2d 671 (1983);
Collie v. Collie, 242 Ark. 297, 413 S.W.2d 42 (1967).
     The circuit court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction of
this case.  Thus, we affirm the order setting aside the default
judgment.