Salley v. Central Arkansas Transit Authority

Valerie SALLEY v. CENTRAL ARKANSAS TRANSIT
AUTHORITY

96-630                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered December 9, 1996


1.   Statutes -- construction of acts -- all acts are to be
     reconciled if possible. -- All acts passed upon the same
     subject are in pari materia, and must be taken and construed
     together and made to stand if capable of being reconciled.   

2.   Insurance -- general assembly required common carriers to
     obtain liability insurance -- public transit systems come
     within Arkansas's definition of common carrier. --  When it
     passed the 1981 Public Transit System Act (424), the General
     Assembly was aware of prior Act 347, which created the Motor
     Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act and Act 893, which required
     Uninsured Motorist Liability Insurance for common carriers;
     because common carriers must obtain liability insurance
     prescribed under Acts 347 and 893, the General Assembly
     intended that public-transit systems, like appellee, come
     within those same intendments; there is no language in Act 424
     that exempts a public transit system from the motor vehicle
     and liability insurance requirements in Acts 347 and 893, and
     Act 347, as amended by Ark. Code Ann.  27-19-212 (Repl.
     1994), enlarged the term "person" to include "public transit
     authorities"; the General Assembly fully intended to provide
     public-transit systems with immunity from suit in tort, but
     like other political subdivisions or entities, they must
     obtain prescribed liability insurance or be self-insured.

3.   Insurance -- appellee included in definition of common carrier
     -- summary judgment reversed. -- Appellee's argument that it
     is not a common carrier as defined in Ark. Code Ann.  23-16-
     301 and that it is therefore not subject to the requirements
     of liability under Ark. Code Ann.  23-16-302 and Ark. Code
     Ann.  27-19-605 was without merit; as an entity of a
     municipal corporation, appellee is a "person, firm, or
     corporation" as those terms are employed defining "common
     carrier" in  23-16-301(a);  27-19-212 defines the term
     "person" to include "public transit authorities," and the term
     person in  23-16-301(a) should be read to include public-
     transit systems as well; appellee is a common carrier for
     compensation; the grant of summary judgment was reversed. 


     Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court; John Ward, Judge; reversed
and remanded.
     Mays & Crutcher, P.A., by:  Richard L. Mays, for appellant.
     J. Chris Bradley, for appellee.
     Tom Glaze, Justice.
     Appellant Valerie Salley was a passenger in appellee Central
Arkansas Transit Authority's (CAT's) bus when it collided with a
car operated by an uninsured motorist.  Salley subsequently filed
suit against CAT, alleging that she had sustained injuries
resulting from the collision and that CAT, as a common carrier, had
a duty to carry uninsured motorist coverage or to be self-insured. 
CAT filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court
granted, holding CAT is a governmental public transit system, and
as such, the General Assembly specifically delimited its liability
for negligence.  Accordingly, the trial court held CAT was not a
common carrier that had a duty to carry uninsured motorist
coverage.  Salley brings this appeal from the trial court's summary
judgment decision.
     Salley, on appeal, restates her argument below that CAT is a
public corporation established by Pulaski County and the
municipalities of Little Rock, North Little Rock, Sherwood, Cammack
Village, and Maumelle, and as a common carrier, CAT is statutorily
required to carry uninsured motorist coverage or to self-insure its
vehicles for collisions with uninsured motorists.  In particular,
Salley argues that CAT is a common carrier as that term is defined
in Ark. Code Ann.  23-16-301(a) (1987).  That statute provides as
follows:
          As used in this subchapter, unless the context
     otherwise requires, "common carrier," means any person,
     firm, or corporation which undertakes, either directly or
     indirectly, to transport members of the general public as
     passengers for compensation whether over regular or
     irregular routes.
     Salley further submits that, in fitting the definition of
common carrier, CAT, under Ark. Code Ann.  23-16-302 (1987), is
required to carry uninsured motorist liability insurance or become
a self-insurer for the protection of its passengers and operators
who are legally entitled to recover damages from uninsured
motorists.  To determine whether the General Assembly intended 
23-16-301--302 to include public transit systems requires our
analysis of other relevant statutes as well.  As this court has
said on many prior occasions, a universal rule in construing
statutes, and a settled maxim of the common law, is that all acts
passed upon the same subject are in pari materia, and must be taken
and construed together and made to stand if capable of being
reconciled.  Vandiver v. Washington County, 274 Ark. 561, 628 S.W.2d 1 (1980).  
     The relevant historical chronology begins with Act 347 of 1953
[Ark. Code Ann.  27-19-101 et seq.] which established Arkansas's
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility laws.  Pertinent to the issue
before us, Act 347 provided for suspension and security
requirements for drivers of vehicles involved in an accident within
the state, but it made those requirements inapplicable to drivers
or owners of vehicles who have a liability policy or bond or who
are self-insured.  
     The next relevant law bearing on the immunity issue before us
concerns Act 165 of 1969 [now Ark. Code Ann.  21-9-301--303
(Repl. 1996)] which declared all state subdivisions, including
counties and municipal corporations, to be immune from tort
liability.  The Act, however, required all political subdivisions
to carry liability insurance on all their motor vehicles.  And
following Act 165's enactment, the General Assembly passed Act 893
of 1975 [now Ark. Code Ann.  23-16-301--302 (1987)].  These are
the statutory provisions Salley largely relies upon in her appeal. 
As previously mentioned, it was Act 893 that defined "common
carrier" and required such carriers to carry uninsured motorists
liability insurance.
     Finally, the next major legislation we need to consider is
that which created the Public Transit System, Act 424 of 1981 [now
Ark.Code Ann.  14-334-101 et seq. (1987)].  Act 424 is the
authority under which CAT was established.  It generally defines a
public transit system as any transit system created or licensed by
a governmental agency or managed by a private management firm under
contract to the governmental agency owner.  Most important to our
quest for statutory meaning on the immunity from suit-in-tort issue
before us, section 4 of Act 424 provided the following:
          (a)  Each authority, when created, and the members
     thereof, shall constitute a public corporation and, as
     such, shall have perpetual succession, may contract and
     be contracted with, may sue and be sued, and may have and
     use a common seal.
          (b)  The exercise of the powers and performance of
     duties provided for in this chapter by each authority are
     declared to be public and governmental functions,
     exercised for a public purpose and matters of public
     necessity, conferring upon each authority governmental
     immunity from suit in tort.   14-334-104.
     From a fair reading of the foregoing enactments, we first must
presume that, when it passed the 1981 Public Transit System law,
Act 424, the General Assembly was well aware of prior Act 347,
which created the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility law and Act
893, which required Uninsured Motorist Liability Insurance for
common carriers in the amounts prescribed in section 27 of Act 347. 
See Bolden v. Watt, 290 Ark. 343, 719 S.W.2d 428 (1986); see also
Ark. Code Ann.  23-16-302 (Supp. 1995) and 27-19-605 (Repl.
1994).  It is also fair to say that, because common carriers must
obtain liability insurance prescribed under Acts 347 and 893, the
General Assembly intended that public-transit systems, like CAT,
should come within those same intendments, if the systems come
within Arkansas's definition of common carrier.  
     We initially note that we find no language in Act 424 that
exempts a public transit system from the motor vehicle and
liability insurance requirements in Acts 347 and 893.  To the
contrary, we find that section 12 of Act 347, as amended by Act
590,  3 of 1987 [codified as Ark. Code Ann.  27-19-212 (Repl.
1994)] enlarged the term "person" to include "public transit
authorities."  In fact, the main purpose of Act 590 was to enable
any political subdivision, including counties, municipalities, and
public transit authorities, to qualify as a self-insurer.  In sum,
our reading and construction of the relevant acts, set out
hereinabove, convinces us that the General Assembly fully intended
to provide public transit systems with immunity from suit in tort,
but like other political subdivisions or entities, they must obtain
prescribed liability insurance or be self-insured.
     In conclusion, we acknowledge CAT's argument that it is not a
common carrier as defined in  23-16-301 and therefore it is not
subject to the requirements of liability under  23-16-302 and Act
347,  27, now Ark. Code Ann.   27-19-605.  We disagree.  CAT
conceded below that, as an entity of a municipal corporation, it is
a "person, firm, or corporation" as those terms are employed
defining "common carrier" in  23-16-301(a).  However, CAT now
retreats from that concession and argues the word "corporation"
does not mean or include a municipality.  CAT's earlier argument
was correct.  As we pointed out above, Act 590 ( 27-19-212)
defines the term "person" to include "public transit authorities,"
and considering the connecting and relevant subject matters, we are
unaware of any compelling reason why the term person in  23-16-
301(a) should not be read to include public transit systems as
well.  CAT also submits that it fails to come within the definition
because it is not a common carrier for compensation.  Despite CAT's
evidence showing its customers' fares compose only 21% of its
operating income, the fact remains CAT charges and receives
compensation for the services it renders to the public.  For the
reasons stated, we hold CAT comes within the statutory definition
of common carrier.  
     Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgment and
remand for further proceedings.