Chaisson v. Ragsdale

Roy CHAISSON v. Annette RAGSDALE

95-945                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered February 12, 1996


1.   Parent & child -- Uniform Interstate Family Support Act's
     purpose is the support of the child and the enforcement of the
     same -- consideration of collateral issues runs counter to the
     act's goal. -- Uniform Interstate Family Support Act actions
     are not intended to open up for renewed scrutiny all issues
     arising out of a foreign divorce; the purpose of UIFSA is
     support of the child and enforcement of the same; other issues
     such as visitation and payment of debts under the divorce
     decree are collateral matters which necessarily burden the
     child support determination and run counter to the goal of
     streamlining these proceedings.

2.   Setoff & counterclaim -- setoff may be pled in any action for
     the recovery of money -- an action for the establishment of
     child support not construed as an action for the recovery of
     money. -- Although the general setoff statute provides that a
     setoff may be pled "in any action for the recovery of money",
     the supreme court does not construe an action for the
     establishment of child support as an action for the recovery
     of money.

4.   Parent & child -- chancellor's authority in considering the
     UIFSA petition limited to child support and enforcement --
     chancellor's order as it pertained to setoff and visitation
     reversed. -- The authority of the chancellor in considering
     the UIFSA petition was limited to establishment of child
     support and its enforcement; resolution of other matters like
     setoff and visitation exceeded that authority in the UIFSA
     context; the order of the chancellor as it pertained to setoff
     and visitation was reversed, and the matter was remanded. 


     Appeal from Ouachita Chancery Court; David Guthrie,
Chancellor; reversed and remanded.
     Greg L. Mitchell, for appellant.
     No response.

     Robert L. Brown, Justice.Associate Justice Robert L. Brown
February 12, 1996 *ADVREP7*






ROY CHAISSON,
                    APPELLANT,

V.

ANNETTE RAGSDALE,
                     APPELLEE,

95-945




APPEAL FROM THE OUACHITA COUNTY
CHANCERY COURT,
NO. E-93-540-3,
HON. DAVID GUTHRIE, JUDGE,




REVERSED AND REMANDED.






     Appellant Roy Chaisson appeals from part of an order which (1)
grants appellee Annette Ragsdale a setoff against the child support
award for a debt she paid following the divorce, and (2) grants
visitation rights.  Annette Ragsdale did not file an appellee's
brief.  We reverse that part of the chancellor's order which grants
the setoff and visitation rights.
     On May 2, 1982, Roy Chaisson and Annette Chaisson (now
Ragsdale) were married.  Two children, William Roy Chaisson and
David Scott Chaisson, were born of that marriage.  On October 6,
1988, the couple divorced in New Jersey.  The New Jersey divorce
decree awarded full custody of the two children to Annette
Chaisson, with visitation rights granted to Roy Chaisson.  Under
the decree, Roy Chaisson was to pay $100.00 a week in child support
to Annette Chaisson.  He was further ordered to pay certain debts
of the marriage, including payment of a loan owed to Atlantic
Financial Company.  That debt was later sold to Chase Manhattan
Bank.  Several months after the couple was divorced, Roy Chaisson
filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.  As a result of the bankruptcy, all
of his debts, including the Chase Manhattan debt, were discharged. 
Chase Manhattan later pursued Annette Ragsdale for payment of the
debt.  
     In July 1989, the two Chaisson boys went to visit their father
in Mississippi where he now resides.  Annette Ragsdale had become
disabled due to a dislocated disk in her back, and because of her
disability she and Ron Chaisson agreed that the boys would stay
with their father.  In March of 1990, Roy Chaisson filed a motion
in Mississippi to modify the New Jersey divorce decree and
requested that custody of the two children be placed in him and
that his payment of child support be terminated.  On April 6, 1990,
he was awarded full custody of the two children by the chancery
court in Mississippi, and his payment of child support was halted.
     On November 3, 1993, Roy Chaisson, as a resident of
Mississippi, filed a uniform support petition in Arkansas and
requested that Annette Ragsdale, who had moved to Camden, pay him
child support for their son William.  (The second son, Scott, had
been placed in an institution in Mississippi and was covered by
Social Security.)  Annette Ragsdale answered the petition and
affirmatively pled the defense of setoff.
     Two hearings were held on the matter.  At the first hearing,
Annette Ragsdale testified that after Roy Chaisson took bankruptcy,
Chase Manhattan pursued her for payment of the credit card debt. 
She introduced into evidence the total amount she paid on that debt
of $3,816.51.  At the second hearing, Annette Ragsdale requested
that visitation be set as well as setoff for the debt paid.  The
chancellor awarded child support to Roy Chaisson in the amount of
$37.50 a week.  He further found that Annette Ragsdale was entitled
to a setoff in the amount of $3,815.51 due to her payment of the
Chase Manhattan debt and, in light of that, he held her payments in
abeyance until October 20, 1995.  He further granted her visitation
rights.
     Roy Chaisson raises two points regarding the award of setoff
and visitation on appeal.  Those points can best be combined and
framed this way: did the chancellor exceed his authority under the
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA)?  Roy Chaisson
indicates in his brief that the issue of the chancellor's subject
matter jurisdiction over a debt contained in a New Jersey divorce
decree was not raised at the trial level.  However, the issue of
whether the chancellor had the authority to address setoff and
visitation issues in a UIFSA proceeding was clearly raised. 
Accordingly, we will consider that issue.
     Arkansas enacted UIFSA in 1993, and it is codified at Ark.
Code Ann.  9-17-101 et seq. (Repl. 1993).  It is manifest from the
title of the uniform act, as well as the description of proceedings
that may be brought under it, that the enforcement of interstate
child support awards is the Act's purpose and focal point.  See
Ark. Code Ann.  9-17-301 (Repl. 1993).  The duties and powers of
the responding tribunal relate to the goal of enforcing child
support orders.  See Ark. Code Ann.  9-17-305 (Repl. 1993). 
Indeed, the Act specifically prohibits conditioning support orders
upon compliance with visitation rights.  Ark. Code Ann.  9-17-
305(d) (Repl. 1993).  The commentary to  9-17-305 is even more
specific and states that visitation issues should not be litigated
in the context of UIFSA proceedings.  Comment to Ark. Code Ann. 
9-17-305 (Repl. 1995).
     This court has addressed the issue of whether collateral
matters are appropriate for consideration when the issue before the
chancellor is enforcement of child support under a uniform act. 
See State v. Robinson, 311 Ark. 133, 842 S.W.2d 47 (1992); State v.
Kerfoot, 308 Ark. 289, 823 S.W.2d 895 (1992); Iowa v. Reynolds, 291
Ark. 488, 725 S.W.2d 847 (1987).  In all three cases, the uniform 
act involved was the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act (RURESA), which was the predecessor act to UIFSA.  We
held in each case that consideration of collateral matters, whether
they be visitation rights or affirmative defenses to liability for
child support, was error.
     In both State v. Kerfoot, supra, and State v. Robinson, supra,
we quoted with approval from Todd v. Pochop, 365 N.W.2d 559 (S.D.
1985), which concerned the purpose behind the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act (URESA):
     The very purpose of the URESA requires that it be
     procedurally and substantively streamlined.  Interstate
     enforcement of support obligations will be impaired if
     matters of custody, visitation, or a custodial parent's
     contempt are considered by the responding court.  The
     introduction of such collateral issues will burden the
     URESA mechanism.  Moreover, permitting the resolution of
     other family matters in a URESA petition proceeding may
     deter persons from invoking the URESA.  
Todd, 365 N.W.2d  at 560.
     The same holds true in the case before us.  UIFSA actions are
not intended to open up for renewed scrutiny all issues arising out
of a foreign divorce.  The purpose of UIFSA is support of the child
and enforcement of the same.  Other issues such as visitation and
payment of debts under the divorce decree are collateral matters
which necessarily burden the child support determination and run
counter to the goal of streamlining these proceedings.
     The facts in this case are analogous to those considered by
the Wyoming Supreme Court in 1986.  See Macy v. Macy, 714 P.2d 774
(Wyo. 1986).  In Macy, the husband was required to pay child
support by the divorce decree, and the wife was required to pay
certain marital debts, one of which was a joint credit card debt. 
The wife later filed for bankruptcy and named her ex-husband as a
creditor.  The bankruptcy court discharged all the debts listed in
the petition, including the joint credit card debt.  The trial
court held that the husband was entitled to a setoff against
ordered child support for the amount of the debt that he was
ultimately required to pay after his ex-wife had been discharged. 
The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed and held that the husband was
enjoined from claiming any setoff because the claim of
nondischargeability should have been made by him to the bankruptcy
court, and there was no indication that he had done so.  The
Wyoming Supreme Court stated:
     [I]t should be mentioned that child support is for the
     benefit of the children as plaintiff's obligation to
     contribute to the upbringing of his children.  A support
     payment is the children's money administered in trust by
     defendant for their benefit.  When the plaintiff
     withholds support for the children, he is depriving them.
     ...  Plaintiff and the trial judge seem to have lost
     sight of the real purpose of child support.
Macy, 714 P.2d  at 777.
     The reasoning of the Wyoming Supreme Court concerning setoff
is persuasive and dovetails with our endorsed policy of eliminating
collateral matters in connection with the enforcement of child
support orders under UIFSA.  We are aware that the general setoff
statute provides that a setoff may be pled "in any action for the
recovery of money."  Ark. Code Ann.  16-63-206 (1987).  We do not
construe an action for the establishment of child support as an
action for the recovery of money.
     In sum, we conclude that the authority of the chancellor in
considering the UIFSA petition was limited to establishment of
child support and its enforcement.  Resolution of other matters
like setoff and visitation exceeded that authority in the UIFSA
context.  As we said in State v. Kerfoot, supra, the forum in which
to argue about visitation rights is either where the parties
obtained their divorce or the forum where the custodial parent and
child reside.  The order of the chancellor as it pertains to setoff
and visitation is reversed, and the matter is remanded for orders
consistent with this opinion.
     Reversed and remanded.