Villines v. Tucker

Floyd G. VILLINES, III, as
County Judge of Pulaski
County, et al. v. Jim Guy
TUCKER, Governor of the State
of Arkansas

95-642          ___ S.W.2d ___

   Supreme Court of Arkansas
  Opinion delivered March 25,
1996


1.   Counties --
     administration of justice
     -- duty to provide for
     necessary services. --
     Arkansas Code Annotated 
     14-14-802(a)(1) (1987),
     an enabling statutory
     provision of Ark. Const.
     amend. 55, imposes a duty
     upon the respective
     counties to provide for
     the necessary services of
     the administration of
     justice.

2.   Counties -- role defined
     -- administration of
     justice -- one of primary
     reasons for existence of
     county. -- Counties are
     civil divisions of the
     state for political and
     judicial purposes and are
     its auxiliaries and
     instrumentalities in the
     administration of its
     government; they are a
     political subdivision of
     the state for the
     administration of justice
     and local government; the
     very word "county"
     signifies a circuit or
     portion of the state
     resulting from a division
     of the state into such
     areas for the better
     government thereof and
     the easier administration
     of justice; nothing in
     Ark. Const. amend. 55
     changes the status of the
     county insofar as its
     primary purposes and
     functions are concerned;
     the administration of
     justice within the county
     is one of the primary
     reasons for its
     existence.

3.   Statutes -- local or
     special acts --
     legislation relating to
     administration of justice
     must meet dictates of
     Ark. Const. amend 14
     prohibiting local or
     special acts. -- Where
     the General Assembly
     enacts legislation
     relating to the
     administration of
     justice, that law must
     meet the dictates of
     Amendment 14 to the
     Arkansas Constitution
     prohibiting local or
     special acts.

4.   Statutes -- local or
     special acts -- statutes
     designed to meet area's
     judicial needs on non-
     discriminatory basis are
     not local or special
     within meaning of Ark.
     Const. amend 14 --
     requirements. -- Statutes
     designed to meet the
     judicial needs of an area
     on a non-discriminatory
     basis are a part of a
     judicial system for the
     entire state and are not
     local or special within
     the meaning of Ark.
     Const. amend. 14, even
     though such statutes may
     apply only to individual
     counties, judicial
     districts, or divisions
     within districts; the
     limited application of
     the statute must be non-
     discriminatory and bear a
     reasonable relation to
     the subject matter of the
     legislation.

5.   Statutes -- local or
     special acts -- General
     Assembly should strive
     for uniform judicial
     system -- factors to be
     considered. -- In its
     enactments, the General
     Assembly should strive
     for a uniform judicial
     system; in meeting this
     objective, however, the
     General Assembly is not
     relegated solely to a
     cost-per-capita test such
     as Pulaski County set
     forth in its argument
     that the General
     Assembly's enactments
     relating to the
     administration of justice
     are discriminatory and
     place an unequal burden
     on the counties; instead,
     in providing for a
     judicial system for the
     entire state, the General
     Assembly should consider
     such matters as
     population, case load,
     transportation, and other
     non-discriminatory
     classifications; a
     densely populated
     metropolitan area
     requires more judges,
     court personnel, and
     different procedures than
     does a thinly populated
     area.

6.   Counties --
     administration of justice
     -- appellant failed to
     prove administration of
     justice in each county
     not uniform across state.
     -- Where appellant
     county's proof tended to
     ignore the factors to be
     considered by the General
     Assembly in providing for
     a judicial system for the
     entire state and
     contained inapposite
     information pertaining to
     municipal revenues
     included in state audit
     reports, appellant
     county's proof that the
     General Assembly's
     enactments relating to
     the administration of
     justice are
     discriminatory was
     lacking; the supreme
     court held that the
     chancellor was correct in
     deciding that appellant
     county failed to prove
     that the administration
     of justice in each county
     is not uniform across the
     state.

7.   Statutes -- any
     legislative enactment
     concerning administration
     of justice must ensure
     fairness -- factors or
     classifications must be
     nondiscriminatory and
     nonarbitrary. -- While it
     is generally true that
     the state can
     constitutionally require
     counties to pay the
     expenses associated with
     the administration of
     justice and that the
     counties must appropriate
     money to meet the state's
     requirements, any
     legislative enactment
     concerning the
     administration of justice
     must ensure fairness, and
     the factors or
     classification used by
     the General Assembly must
     be nondiscriminatory and
     free from arbitrariness.

8.   Statutes -- legislation
     presumed constitutional
     and rationally related to
     achieving legitimate
     governmental objective. -
     - Where appellant county
     raised a due-process
     argument for the first
     time on appeal, the
     supreme court disposed of
     the issue summarily by
     stating that it must
     presume legislation is
     constitutional and
     rationally related to
     achieving a legitimate
     governmental objective;
     appellant county's proof
     fell short in showing
     arbitrariness or an
     irrational basis in the
     provision for the
     administration of justice
     throughout the state.


     Appeal from Pulaski
Chancery Court, Sixth Division;
Annabelle C. Imber, Chancellor;
affirmed.
     Nelwyn Davis and Duncan &
Rainwater, by: Mike Rainwater,
for appellants.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y
Gen., by:  Angela S. Jegley,
Senior Asst. Att'y Gen., for
appellee.

     Tom Glaze,
Justice.*ADVREP4*






FLOYD G. VILLINES, III, AS
COUNTY JUDGE OF PULASKI COUNTY,
ET AL.,
                    APPELLANTS,

V.

JIM GUY TUCKER, GOVERNOR OF THE
STATE OF ARKANSAS,
                    APPELLEE.



95-642

Opinion Delivered:  3-25-96

APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY COURT
OF PULASKI COUNTY, ARKANSAS,
SIXTH DIVISION, NO. 93-4216;
HONORABLE ANNABELLE C. IMBER,
CHANCERY JUDGE 




AFFIRMED




                  TOM GLAZE, Associate Justice

     The Pulaski County Judge and Quorum Court and fifty-one other
county officials initiated this suit against the Governor, asking
the Pulaski County Chancery Court, Sixth Division, to declare
unconstitutional certain statutes dealing with the funding of the
administration of justice in Arkansas.  As background information,
the state appropriates money for salaries of trial court judges,
prosecuting attorneys, and also partially pays court reporters and
some court bailiffs.  However, the General Assembly requires the
respective counties to fund the other expenses of the trial court
system under Ark. Code Ann.  14-14-802(a)(1) (1987).  These other
expenses include the costs of courthouse space, operating expenses
for the office of the judge and prosecutor, court and prosecuting
attorney personnel, public defender staffs, and court clerk staffs
and operating expenses.  In order to pay these expenses, counties
have been statutorily authorized to assess and collect certain
costs, fees and fines, but in some instances, these revenues have
been insufficient to underwrite all administration-of-justice
expenses.  As a consequence, some counties have had to resort to
the use of general county revenues from property and sales taxes
and state turnback funds to pay the balance of such expenses. 
Because they have been required to utilize county revenues to
subsidize the costs of the trial court system in the state, the
counties claim the court funding mechanism is unconstitutional.  In
their complaint, the counties alleged the funding system was
unconstitutional in the following three ways:
     (1)  It allows the state legislature to usurp county
legislative authority that violates Ark. Const. amend. 55,   1(a)
and 4, and Ark. Const. art. 16,  40; 
     (2) the payment of county locally generated funds for the
state court system constitutes an illegal exaction that violates
Article 16,   11 and 13; and 
     (3) it creates a system of local and special legislation that
violates Amendment 14 to the state constitution.  
After an extensive trial, the trial judge rejected the counties'
constitutional claims.  Only the Pulaski County officials appeal
the chancellor's order.  
     In framing its first point for reversal, Pulaski County
combines the above three legal claims made at trial, and states the
chancellor erred in holding that the General Assembly can require
counties to expend county funds on the state judicial system and in
so holding, she also erred in deciding such expenditures are not
illegal exactions.  Pulaski County's arguments run counter to
Arkansas's settled law.
     First, we point to an enabling statutory provision of
Amendment 55,  14-14-802(a)(1), which imposes the duty upon the
respective counties to provide for the necessary services of the
administration of justice.  While Pulaski County contends this
statute is unconstitutional and contravenes Amendment 55,  1(a)
because it requires the expenditure of county funds for state and
not county purposes, the county is mistaken in characterizing the
administration of justice as being only a state purpose or
responsibility.  In Mears, Co. Judge v. Hall, 263 Ark. 827, 569 S.W.2d 91 (1978), this court clearly explained, as follows, the
role of the respective counties in providing services for the
administration of justice:
          In Burrow v. Batchelor, 193 Ark. 229, 98 S.W.2d 946,
     we held that the salaries of the duly appointed reporter
     and stenographer for the grand jury and of the duly
     appointed and acting court reporter in the Fifteenth
     Judicial Circuit were a part of the necessary expenses of
     the operation of county government of Franklin County,
     which was part of the Fifteenth Judicial District.  This,
     of course, was based upon the fact that the services of
     these reporters were essential to the administration of
     justice.  Counties are civil divisions of the state for
     political and judicial purposes and are its auxiliaries
     and instrumentalities in the administration of its
     government.  Lake v. Tatum,, 175 Ark. 90, 1 S.W.2d 554. 
     They are a political subdivision of the state for the
     administration of justice and local government.  Pulaski
     County v. Reeve, 42 Ark. 54.  The very word "county"
     signifies a circuit or portion of the state resulting
     from a division of the state into such areas for the
     better government thereof and the easier administration
     of justice.  56 Am. Jur. 2d 74, Municipal Corporations,
     etc.  5.  Nothing in Amendment 55 changes the status of
     the county insofar as its primary purposes and functions
     are concerned.  The administration of justice within the
     county is one of the primary reasons for its existence. 
     (Emphasis added.)
See also Mears, County Judge v. Ark. State Hospital, 265 Ark. 844,
581 S.W.2d 339 (1979) (counties are obligated to pay for costs of
the administration of justice where required to do so by the
legislature); Venhaus v. State, 285 Ark. 23, 684 S.W.2d 252 (1985);
Mackey v. McDonald, 255 Ark. 978, 508 S.W.2d 726 (1974).
     By the foregoing authority, this court has made itself clear
that our respective counties are responsible for the administration
of justice.  However, that does not end the inquiry, because when
the General Assembly enacts legislation relating to the
administration of justice, that law must meet the dictates of
Amendment 14 to the Arkansas Constitution prohibiting special and
local acts.  In this respect, Arkansas's earlier cases state the
rule that laws relating to the administration of justice were to be
neither local nor special within the meaning of Amendment 14. 
However, this court in Littleton v. Blanton, 281 Ark. 395, 665 S.W.2d 239 (1984), modified that rule somewhat.  There, the court
announced that statutes relating to the administration of justice
would no longer be held per se to be neither local nor special
within the meaning of Amendment 14.  The Littleton court stated
that, while the General Assembly has the authority to establish
courts within the limits prescribed by the Constitution, it should
strive to create a judicial system which would be as uniform as
practical throughout the state.  The court explained the General
Assembly's responsibilities in this regard as follows:
          A densely-populated metropolitan area requires more
     judges, court personnel and different procedures than
     does a thinly-populated area.  The Legislature has
     traditionally met the growing judicial needs of an area
     by statutes which apply only to individual counties,
     judicial districts or even divisions within districts. 
     But these statutes have not been held to be "local or
     special" within the meaning of Amendment 14, since they
     were a part of a judicial system for the entire state and
     were based upon reasonable considerations such as
     population, case load, transportation and other non-
     discriminatory factors or classifications.
Id. at 405.
     In arguing the judicial system is not uniform throughout the
state, Pulaski County points to various court personnel and expense
statutes enacted by the General Assembly that apply only to
specified districts and counties.  However, in deciding whether
statutes relating to the administration of justice are local or
special legislation, the court in Littleton established the
following test:
     We will continue to hold that statutes designed to meet
     the judicial needs of an area on a non-discriminatory
     basis are a part of a judicial system for the entire
     state and are not local or special within the meaning of
     Amendment 14, even though such statutes may apply only to
     individual counties, judicial districts or divisions
     within districts . . . .  The limited application of the
     statute must be non-discriminatory and bear a reasonable
     relation to the subject matter of the legislation. 
     (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 406.
     Recognizing the foregoing rule in Littleton, Pulaski County
expands its argument by contending the General Assembly's
enactments relating to the administration of justice are
discriminatory, and those laws place an unequal burden on the
respective counties.  In support of its argument, the County points
to state audit reports of thirty-one counties that, it asserts,
show the administration of justice is a substantial cost to some
counties, but in others, no costs are underwritten by general
county funds.  As an example, Pulaski County argues this evidence
reflects that in 1991, it was required to spend $3,373,493.38 of
its general funds since the amount of court-related revenues it was
authorized to collect was insufficient to pay for the court-related
services.  On the other hand, Pulaski County claims that, for the
same period, Madison County funded its judicial system without
using county funds because it had accumulated a surplus of court-
related revenues which were more than enough to cover court
services.  In other terms, Pulaski County says it spent more than
$10.00 in per capita costs to deliver services to the judicial
system, but Madison County actually accrued over $10.00 per capita
income after its court services were delivered.  
     Pulaski County's argument fails for at least two reasons. 
One, as previously discussed above, this court in Littleton
emphasized that, in its enactments, the General Assembly should
strive for a uniform judicial system.  In meeting this objective,
however, the General Assembly is not relegated solely to a cost-
per-capita test as Pulaski County puts forth in its argument here. 
Instead, this court in Littleton said that, in providing for a
judicial system for the entire state, the General Assembly should
consider such matters as population, case load, transportation and
other non-discriminatory classifications.  Along this same vein,
the court also opined that a densely-populated metropolitan area
requires more judges, court personnel and different procedures than
does a thinly-populated area.  Id.  281 Ark. at 405, 665 S.W.2d  at
243.  
     The County's proof tends to ignore those factors set out in
Littleton and instead its evidence is limited almost exclusively to
the net costs or per capita amount each county has borne in
providing services for the court system.  A second reason for
rejecting Pulaski County's argument is that, even if we accepted
the County's unequal burden-of-costs analysis, the county's proof
would still be lacking.  For instance, the state audit reports do
not cover circuit court revenues, yet they did include inapposite
information pertaining to municipal revenues.  In sum, we hold the
chancellor was correct in deciding Pulaski County failed to prove
the administration of justice in each county is not uniform across
the state.     
     In conclusion, we address two additional points.  The first
deals with the chancellor's conclusion of law that the state can
constitutionally require counties to pay the expenses associated
with the administration of justice and the counties must
appropriate money to meet the state's requirements.  Again, while
this rule is generally true, we reiterate that any legislative
enactment concerning the administration of justice must ensure
fairness, and the factors or classification used by the General
Assembly must be non-discriminatory and free from arbitrariness. 
Second, we note Pulaski County's mention of equal protection when
discussing its local/special legislation argument, even though the
County never raised any equal protection claim at trial.  Pulaski
County cites Streight v. Ragland, 280 Ark. 206, 655 S.W.2d 459
(1983), as its authority for raising this constitutional argument
for the first time on appeal.  We dispose of this point summarily,
by stating that this court must presume legislation is
constitutional and rationally related to achieving a legitimate
governmental objective.  Id.  As we have already thoroughly
discussed above, the county's proof simply falls short in showing
arbitrariness or an irrational basis in providing for the
administration of justice throughout the state.   
     For the reasons above, we affirm.