McMullen v. Ark. Elder Outreach of Little Rock, Inc.
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Cite as 2011 Ark. App. 156
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CA10-491
Opinion Delivered
BOBBY McMULLEN and ESTATE OF
WILLIAM E. McMULLEN, DECEASED
APPELLANT
V.
ARKANSAS ELDER OUTREACH OF
LITTLE ROCK, INC., MALVERN
NURSING HOME, and HEALTHCARE
STAFFING ASSOCIATES, INC.
APPELLEES
March 2, 2011
APPEAL FROM THE HOT SPRING
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[No. CV-06-201-2]
HONORABLE PHILLIP H.
SHIRRON, JUDGE
REVERSED
LARRY D. VAUGHT, Chief Judge
Bobby McMullen, as personal representative of the estate of William E. McMullen,
appeals from the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment on his claim for
negligence to Arkansas Elder Outreach of Little Rock.1 The trial court granted summary
judgment based upon appellee’s assertion that it was not subject to suit in tort on the basis of
charitable immunity. On appeal, appellant argues that appellee should not have been allowed
to assert charitable immunity because it failed to affirmatively plead the defense. We agree and
reverse the decision of the trial court.
On August 4, 2006, appellant filed a complaint for negligence on behalf of his father
in which he alleged, among other things, that his father sustained various injuries during his
1
Separate defendant Malvern Nursing Home Partnership, LTD was non-suited by
order filed March 13, 2007.
Cite as 2011 Ark. App. 156
time as a patient in a nursing home owned by appellee. On September 1, 2006, appellee filed
an answer to the complaint. In its answer, appellee alleged that it was a not-for-profit
organization under Arkansas law and that it had been granted non-profit status pursuant to
Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3).
On November 30, 2006, appellee filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that it was entitled
to a dismissal because it was immune from suit and tort liability under the charitableimmunity doctrine. Appellant filed a response in which he requested that the motion be
denied pending discovery related to the defense raised. Although appellant notes that the
defense was not pled in appellee’s answer, he offered no written response that the motion
should be denied on that basis. However, at the hearing on the motion, appellant argued that
the defense was waived because it was not pled in the answer. On May 21, 2007, the trial
court denied the motion to dismiss.
On May 14, 2007, appellee filed a motion for summary judgment, again arguing that
it was entitled to charitable immunity from suit. For almost two years, the case remained
active while the parties completed discovery. Then, on March 19, 2009, appellee filed an
amended motion for summary judgment, arguing the same grounds as it did in the previous
motion. Appellant filed a response to the motion on April 8, 2009. In footnote one, on the
first page of the response, appellant stated that he was not abandoning his initial argument that
appellee waived its right to assert the defense of charitable immunity because it did not plead
it in its answer, which was the sole reference to appellant’s defective-defense argument before
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Cite as 2011 Ark. App. 156
the trial court ruled on the motion to dismiss.2 The trial court considered the motion for
summary judgment based upon the pleadings, without a hearing, and issued a letter order
granting the motion on July 13, 2009.
On August 7, 2009, the appellant filed a motion to reconsider the letter ruling, and on
September 17, 2009, the trial court issued an amended order granting appellee’s motion for
summary judgment.3 The trial court issued an order in which it denied the motion to
reconsider and issued a Rule 54(b) certificate on February 12, 2010. Appellant filed a timely
notice of appeal.
On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in its grant of appellee’s motion
for summary judgment. Summary judgment is to be granted by a trial court only when it is
clear that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Sykes v. Williams, 373 Ark. 236, 283 S.W.3d 209
(2008). Summary judgment should be denied if, under the evidence, reasonable minds might
reach different conclusions from the undisputed facts. Brock v. Townsell, 2009 Ark. 224, at 8,
___ S.W.3d ___, ___. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against
whom the motion was filed, resolving all doubts and inferences against the moving party. Id.
at 8, ___ S.W.3d at ___. Once the moving party has established a prima facie case for
2
As to appellee’s claim that appellant failed to raise this argument before the trial court
in a timely manner, we disagree. Appellant’s argument at the hearing on the motion to dismiss
coupled with his summary-judgment response was sufficient to preserve the defective-defense
argument for appeal. See Jackson v. Ivory, 353 Ark. 847, 862, 120 S.W.3d 587, 596 (2003).
3
An amended order was issued because the original order was dated incorrectly.
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Cite as 2011 Ark. App. 156
summary judgment, the opposing party is required to meet proof with proof and demonstrate
the existence of a disputed material fact. Kearney v. City of Little Rock, 2009 Ark. App. 125,
302 S.W.3d 629.
In the present case, the parties are not disputing any facts. The only question presented
is whether the trial court committed error in allowing appellee to assert a charitable-immunity
defense. As this presents solely a question of law, our review is de novo. Pulaski County v. Ark.
Democrat-Gazette, Inc., 371 Ark. 217, 264 S.W.3d 465 (2007). Our supreme court has held
that charitable immunity is an affirmative defense. Felton v. Rebsamen Med. Ctr., 373 Ark. 472,
284 S.W.3d 482 (2008). An affirmative defense must be set forth in the defendant’s responsive
pleading. Ark. R. Civ. P. 8(c) (2010); Poff v. Brown, 374 Ark. 453, 288 S.W.3d 620 (2008).
The burden of pleading and proving an affirmative defense is on the party asserting it. Vent
v. Johnson, 2009 Ark. 92, 303 S.W.3d 46.
Appellee did not affirmatively plead the defense of charitable immunity in its answer.
In addition, appellee failed to amend its answer to include the defense, as suggested by the trial
court at the hearing on the motion to dismiss. However, appellee maintains that its statement
in its answer that it is a not-for-profit organization that has received 501(c)(3) status is
sufficient to raise the defense. Appellee’s argument is founded on our holding in Presley v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2010 Ark. App. 367, at 8, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___. In Presley, the
applicable language in the pleading was that a hospital “was not subject to suit in tort due to
the fact that it . . . has received 501(c)(3) designation from the Internal Revenue Service.”
2010 Ark. App. 367, at 3, ___ S.W.3d at ___. The key distinction between Presley and the
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Cite as 2011 Ark. App. 156
case at bar is that the plaintiff in Presley specifically stated that the hospital “was not subject to
suit in tort.” Id., __ S.W.3d at ___. We found that language to be sufficient to raise the
charitable-immunity defense. Id. at 3–6, ___ S.W.3d at ___. We did not conclude that the
invocation of 501(c)(3) status alone is sufficient. Id., ___ S.W.3d at ___. Such a finding would
be contrary to our supreme court’s holding that a plaintiff’s answer that its organization is not
run for profit is insufficient to raise the defense of charitable immunity. Neal v. Sparks Reg’l
Med. Ctr., 375 Ark. 46, 289 S.W.3d 8 (2008).
Appellee also argues that its motion to dismiss is a “responsive pleading” in which it
could raise an affirmative defense. In support, appellee cites to cases in which the Arkansas
appellate courts treated motions to dismiss as responsive pleadings. However, the key
distinction between those cases and this case is that those cases involved situations in which
the motion to dismiss was submitted in the place of an answer. See, e.g., Amos v. Amos, 282
Ark. 532, 669 S.W.2d 200 (1984).
Here, appellee filed an answer and then filed its motion to dismiss 121 days after the
complaint was filed, long after any responsive pleading would have been due. Again, appellee
never amended its original answer. The raising of the defense in the motion to dismiss is not
sufficient to satisfy the requirement that an affirmative defense be specifically pled. As such,
appellant is correct in asserting that appellee failed to raise the defense in the proper manner,
and the order of the trial court granting summary judgment to appellee is reversed.
Reversed.
R OBBINS and G LOVER, JJ., agree.
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