Scales v. State
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Cite as 2011 Ark. App. 395
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CACR10-1039
Opinion Delivered
RODNEY A. SCALES
APPELLANT
June 1, 2011
APPEAL FROM THE DREW COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. CR-09-157-1]
V.
HONORABLE SAM POPE,
JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
LARRY D. VAUGHT, Chief Judge
Rodney Scales appeals his convictions of possessing a controlled substance with intent
to deliver and felony fleeing. He was sentenced to a total of eighty-four years’ imprisonment
and a $5000 fine. On appeal, Scales argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it
denied his request to exercise a peremptory challenge after the jury had been selected. We
affirm.
During voir dire, the trial court and counsel for the State and Scales questioned the
jury panel. No strikes for cause were submitted by the parties. Next, the parties exchanged
peremptory-challenge lists. At the request of the trial court, counsel for both parties submitted
their peremptory-challenge lists to the clerk.1 The trial court then stated, “We’ve got thirteen
1
The State’s peremptory-challenge list submitted to the clerk included:
1
Lakesha Suber
34
Elizabeth Clemons
Cite as 2011 Ark. App. 395
people who have been selected to serve as jurors. As the Clerk calls your name, please stand.”
After the names were called, the trial court invited them to have a seat in the jury box, and
it excused the jurors whose names were not called.
As those thirteen jurors were being seated, counsel for Scales approached the bench
and asked to see the State’s peremptory-challenge list. Counsel for Scales reviewed the State’s
list and noticed that the “29” next to Cavaniss’s name had been scratched out, and the
number “50” added. Counsel advised the trial court that based on the list that was given to
him by the State, he thought the State was striking juror “29,” whose name was Mark
Shanley and who the defense wanted to strike but did not strike because Shanley’s number
was on the State’s list. The trial court responded, “Well, strikes have been made. I’m not
going to let anybody go back —.”
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13
29
Laura Ferguson
Michael Robbins
Christopher Cavaniss
Scales’s strike list submitted to the clerk included:
2
6
16
30
31
Brady Hayden
Carl Hensley
Paul Smith
Venita Defir
Barbara Woods
Once both lists were in the possession of the clerk, it appears that the clerk discovered that
Christopher Cavaniss was not juror “29” but rather juror “50.” The record reflects that
someone (presumably the clerk), scratched out “29” and wrote “50” beside Cavaniss’s name.
Based on those individuals who were struck by the parties pursuant to their peremptory
challenges and who were excused by the trial court for other reasons not relevant to this
appeal, the clerk compiled a list of twelve jurors and one alternate.
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Cite as 2011 Ark. App. 395
Counsel for Scales nevertheless asked the trial court to use another peremptory strike
on juror “29,” and the trial court denied the request. Counsel for Scales reminded the trial
court that there was an alternate juror seated, but the trial court denied the request again,
stating,
The record will reflect that I let each of the attorneys make strikes. They brought their
peremptory strikes up in writing. They were provided to the Court. I’ll make these
Court’s Exhibit A and B for the purposes of this trial in order to show how they were
made. Now, Mr. Gibson attempted to make one after that was done. I disallowed it.
Just to make the record clear.
The trial court then asked counsel for each party whether they were satisfied with this jury,
and counsel both stated, “yes.” The jury was then sworn in. However, before the first recess,
counsel for Scales approached the bench and argued that he should be entitled to use one of
his remaining peremptory challenges on juror “29” Shanley. Counsel for Scales argued that
“[t]he strikes made by the State were provided to me by name and number. And I, of course,
went by the number. And after I made my strikes, the numbers were altered.” The trial court
responded, “No, sir. They weren’t altered. You just assumed that you had the right number
and your assumption happened to be wrong.” The court stated that Scales’s counsel made a
mistake because he relied upon the numbers on the lists, not the names, and he had the
correct names. Scales’s counsel agreed that he had the names, but replied, “I just want to
make the point that I went by the number instead of the name. Maybe that’s an error.” The
trial court agreed, “Yeah. It was clearly a mistake.”
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Cite as 2011 Ark. App. 395
Shanley was later voted foreman of the jury that convicted Scales. The only point
Scales raises on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the request
of his counsel to exercise a peremptory challenge on juror “29” Shanley after the jury was
selected.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-33-303(b) (Repl. 1999) provides that in criminal
proceedings a challenge to a juror (for cause or peremptory) must be taken before he is sworn
in chief, but the court, for good cause, may permit it to be made at any time before the jury
is completed. Whether a peremptory challenge may be exercised after the juror has been
accepted by both sides is a matter directed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Rorex v.
State, 31 Ark. App. 127, 129, 790 S.W.2d 180, 181 (1990) (citing Daugherty v. State, 3 Ark.
App. 112, 623 S.W.2d 209 (1981)). We reverse only for abuse of that discretion. Rorex, 31
Ark. App. at 129, 790 S.W.2d at 181. Our standard of review is the same regardless of
whether the court permits the challenge or declines to permit it. Id., 790 S.W.2d at 181–82.
The evidence in this case demonstrates that the trial court followed the proper
procedure in selecting the jury. The court questioned the potential jurors and found them
qualified. Counsel for both parties also questioned the potential jurors. The trial court asked
counsel for strikes for cause, and none were requested. Peremptory-challenge lists were
exchanged between counsel and given to the clerk. After striking the names of the jurors on
each peremptory-challenge list, the clerk read the list of the names of the twelve jurors and
one alternate who were to be seated as the jury, and the trial court excused the remaining
jurors.
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Cite as 2011 Ark. App. 395
Scales does not contest the propriety of the selection process. Rather, he maintains that
the trial court, after the jury panel was selected and the remaining jurors were excused, abused
its discretion when it rejected his request to exercise an additional peremptory challenge to
strike juror “29” Shanley. He argues that he relied upon the juror’s numbers on the State’s
list, which he claims were altered after the lists were submitted to the clerk. Because he was
not advised of the change, he was not given the opportunity to amend his list to strike
Shanley.
In Allen v. State, 70 Ark. 337, 342–43, 68 S.W. 28, 31 (1902), our supreme court held
that after a juror has been accepted by both parties, the trial court may for “good cause”
permit the request to use a peremptory challenge. In Allen, the supreme court affirmed the
trial court’s denial of the defendant’s request to use a peremptory challenge on a juror after
that juror had been accepted by both parties because the record failed to show any reason
given for the challenge. 70 Ark. at 342–43, 68 S.W. at 31; Jeffries v. State, 255 Ark. 501, 502,
501 S.W.2d 600, 601 (1973) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to allow the appellant to use a peremptory challenge where it was shown that the trial
court strictly followed statutory procedure).
In the case at bar, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Scales’s request to use a peremptory challenge after the jury was seated. The evidence fails to
establish “good cause” supporting the request. Rather than relying upon the names of the
listed jurors, counsel relied upon the numbers assigned to the jurors and mistakenly assumed
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Cite as 2011 Ark. App. 395
that those numbers were listed correctly. However, counsel had possession of the State’s
peremptory-challenge list, which did not include Shanley’s name. Scales’s counsel also had a
copy of the trial court’s jury list, which had the jurors numbered properly, and upon careful
review, would have disclosed the fact that Cavaniss was not juror “29.”
Assuming arguendo that the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting Scales’s request
to exercise a peremptory challenge on Shanley, our result would remain the same. We will
not reverse for nonprejudicial errors in jury selection. Dillard v. State, 363 Ark. 491, 495, 215
S.W.3d 662, 665 (2005) (citing State v. Vowell, 276 Ark. 258, 634 S.W.2d 118 (1982)).
Beyond stating the fact that Shanley was voted the jury foreman, Scales fails to demonstrate
how having Shanley on the jury prejudiced the verdict. Without evidence of prejudice, we
must affirm.
Affirmed.
P ITTMAN and W YNNE, JJ., agree.
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