Velazquez v. Riddle
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 662
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CA 09-1121
Opinion Delivered
MARINA VELAZQUEZ, as Parent and
Next Friend of the Minor Child CRUZ
HERNANDEZ
APPELLANT
OCTOBER 6, 2010
APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
FORT SMITH DISTRICT
[NO. CIV-2007-444]
V.
HONORABLE STEPHEN TABOR,
JUDGE
BRITTON RIDDLE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
JOHN B. ROBBINS, Judge
In this appeal, appellant Marina Velazquez, as parent and next friend of her son Cruz
Hernandez, appeals the trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial and the judgment in favor
of the defense. This personal-injury lawsuit was filed in Sebastian County Circuit Court
following a pedestrian-vehicle accident on a late afternoon in May 2006 in Fort Smith,
Arkansas. Appellant alleged that appellee Britton Riddle was negligent in driving his vehicle
and in striking nine-year-old Cruz as he ran across the street near his home.1 The jury
entered a unanimous defense verdict. Appellant contends a new trial is warranted because
1
The transcript is not consistent in stating Cruz’s age. Age eight and nine are used in
different parts of the testimony and pleadings. Because his age is not critical to the issues at
hand, we use age nine for simplicity.
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 662
(1) the trial court erred in rejecting a proffered nonmodel jury instruction, and (2) one juror
committed misconduct. We disagree and affirm the jury verdict.
A trial court’s refusal to give a proffered jury instruction will not be reversed absent
an abuse of discretion. Thomas v. Olson, 364 Ark. 444, 220 S.W.3d 627 (2005). A party is
entitled to a jury instruction if it is a correct statement of the law and there is some basis in
the evidence to support giving the instruction. Barnes v. Everett, 351 Ark. 479, 95 S.W.3d 740
(2003). Nonmodel jury instructions should only be given when the trial judge finds that the
model instructions do not contain an essential instruction or do not accurately state the law
applicable to the case. Nelson v. Stubblefield, 2009 Ark. 256, 308 S.W.3d 586.
Pending trial, appellant’s attorney filed a motion in limine to prevent any mention of
the boy’s parents “who are not parties individually” as being responsible for, causing, or
contributing to any damages sustained by Cruz.
Another motion in limine followed,
specifically requesting the trial judge to prevent appellee, his attorneys, and any witness, from
attempting to assign fault to the parents “directly or by implication or innuendo.” In arguing
for the motion in limine, appellant’s attorney specifically alleged that there was no evidence
to suggest parental negligence. The trial judge granted the motion.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial judge read twenty-two jury instructions
based upon Arkansas Model Jury Instructions.
The instructions were typical of civil
negligence trials: explaining the role of the judge and attorneys, the concept of ordinary care,
negligence, proximate cause, elements of damage, comparative fault between Cruz and
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 662
Riddle, the duty to anticipate the behavior of children, common law rules of the road, the
rule that minors are not held to the same standard as adults but rather are required to act as
“a reasonably careful minor of his age and intelligence,” the preponderance burden of proof,
and the rule that civil trials require at least nine of twelve jurors to reach a verdict.
Appellant’s attorney proffered a nonmodel jury instruction to tell the jury specifically
that any purported negligence on the part of Cruz’s parent or parents was not to be attributed
to Cruz. Appellant’s attorney argued that the lawsuit was required to be filed by a parent on
behalf of the child, so the proffered jury instruction would clarify that parental negligence, if
any, could not be attributed to Cruz in assigning fault. The judge rejected the instruction,
stating that he would not instruct the jury on parental negligence because appellant’s attorney
had specifically been granted his motion in limine to prevent any evidence of parental fault
from being presented to the jury.
As argued to the trial court, appellant asserts that because the caption of the lawsuit
included Cruz’s mother, there was “a distinct possibility that, unless instructed to the contrary,
the jury could infer the Appellant’s mother was involved in the lawsuit and logically impute
the parents’ negligence to the child unless instructed otherwise.” We hold that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion.
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 662
While the proffered jury instruction might be a correct statement of the law, there was
no evidence to support giving it to the jury.2 Instructions that reference matters on which
no evidence was presented should not be given. See Nelson, supra; Southern Farm Bureau Cas.
Ins. Co. v. Daggett, 354 Ark. 112, 118 S.W.3d 525 (2003) and cases cited infra. Instructions
stating only abstract legal propositions should not be given. Southern Farm Bureau, supra. We
affirm the trial court’s discretionary decision to reject appellant’s nonmodel jury instruction
regarding parental negligence. See Decay v. State, 2009 Ark. 566 (holding that nonmodel jury
instructions should not be given unless the model jury instructions do not accurately reflect
the law).
Appellant’s second point on appeal is that a new trial should have been granted due to
juror misconduct demonstrating a reasonable probability of prejudice. Ark. R. Civ. P.
59(a)(2). The reasonable probability of prejudice is not presumed but must be demonstrated
by the movant seeking a new trial. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. White, 302 Ark. 193, 788 S.W.2d
483 (1990); Ark. R. Civ. P. 59(a). We will not reverse the trial court’s denial of a new trial
unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion by the trial court. B & J Byers Trucking, Inc. v.
Robinson, 281 Ark. 442, 665 S.W.2d 258 (1984).
2
Because appellant ordered an abbreviated record on appeal, the testimony and exhibits
at trial are not part of the record before us. We will not presume that appellee introduced
evidence of parental fault in violation of appellant’s motion in limine granted by the trial
court.
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 662
Here, after the jury entered a unanimous defense verdict, appellant’s attorney filed a
motion for new trial alleging that juror Frank Withrow (1) improperly made up his mind
prior to retiring to the jury room, and (2) improperly inspected damage to the defendant’s
vehicle in the courthouse parking lot during trial, thus improperly conducting his own
investigation outside the record. The motion asserted that this information was learned
through appellant’s attorney calling Withrow on the telephone, asking questions, and
recording the conversation.3 A hearing was convened at which Withrow appeared as a
witness.
Withrow stated to the judge that he had made up his mind after all the evidence had
been presented and all the witnesses had testified. The defendant was the last to testify, and
Withrow stated in his recorded comment to the attorney that he had made up his mind after
the defendant testified, which was “all” the evidence. The judge found appellant not to have
shown that Withrow prematurely decided his vote. Moreover, there was no allegation that
Withrow infected the jury with any alleged premature judgment.
In the absence of
demonstrating a reasonable probability of prejudice, we will not reverse.
3
There was much discussion at the hearing on the motion for new trial about the
propriety of appellant’s attorney calling a juror, recording the conversation, and being the
affiant in support of a new trial. Appellant’s attorney retracted his request for new trial as to
any information about what was discussed in deliberations. The judge stated he did not
consider any evidence that would violate Ark. R. Evid. 606(b). We make no comment on
whether the attorney’s actions constitute a violation of the Arkansas Rules of Professional
Conduct or any other legal authority.
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 662
As to the alternative allegation that Withrow improperly conducted his own
investigation against the judge’s direction, Withrow testified that he merely walked by the
defendant’s vehicle because it was on the way back into the courthouse from a smoking break.
Withrow said he never left the sidewalk to examine the vehicle, but he did look.
A
photograph of the dent on the vehicle was already admitted as evidence at trial, there was
testimony about the dent at trial, and the photograph was taken back into the jury
deliberation room. Withrow said he did not feel that he was violating any juror rules, nor did
he see anything on the vehicle that was not already part of the evidence at trial. There was
no allegation that Withrow made any comment to fellow jurors about what he had seen
in the parking lot. The judge found that this outside observation of the defendant’s vehicle,
accidental or not, was simply cumulative to properly admitted evidence presented to all the
jurors. Diemer v. Dischler, 313 Ark. 154, 852 S.W.2d 793 (1993) (one relevant factor in
deciding whether juror misconduct warrants a new trial is whether the juror’s observation
impugned a fact presented by a party). Again, we cannot say that the trial court manifestly
abused its discretion, particularly in the absence of demonstrating a reasonable possibility of
prejudice.
We affirm the judgment and the denial of appellant’s motion for a new trial.
K INARD and B ROWN, JJ., agree.
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