Beare v. State
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 544
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CACR 09-1261
Opinion Delivered
ANTHONY DETEL BEARE
APPELLANT
June 30, 2010
APPEAL FROM THE MISSISSIPPI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CR 2008-315]
V.
HONORABLE DAVID N. LASER,
JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED
M. MICHAEL KINARD, Judge
Anthony Beare appeals from his conviction for battery in the third degree. His
attorney filed a no-merit brief and motion to withdraw, pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738, 744–45 (1967) and Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-3(k) (2010), and appellant did
not file any pro se points for reversal. We affirm the conviction and grant counsel’s motion.
Appellant was originally charged with burglary, terroristic threatening, and thirddegree battery based on an incident that occurred at the residence of Kassaundra Woods on
the night of October 22, 2008. At the jury trial on July 29, 2009, Woods testified that
appellant kicked in the door to her home, demanded that she return a CD player belonging
to him, hit her with a shirt, and threw a plastic bottle at her, which left a knot on her head.
Yvonne Hill, Woods’s roommate at the time of the incident, testified that she heard the door
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 544
being kicked in and saw appellant hitting Woods with a shirt. She also testified that Woods
had a knot on her head.
Lieutenant Eugene Kelly testified that he took Woods’s statement after the incident
and observed a knot that covered Woods’s forehead. He stated that he attempted to take
photographs of the injury, but the injury did not show up in pictures because it blended in
with Woods’s forehead. Lt. Kelly did not have the photographs he had taken. Appellant’s
counsel then moved to strike Lt. Kelly’s testimony and to dismiss the battery charge because
there were no photographs to back up Lt. Kelly’s observations. The trial court denied both
motions, allowing Lt. Kelly’s testimony as to what he saw and reasoning that the jury could
weigh the testimony to make their own determination.
Sergeant Michael Ephlin, the detective assigned to investigate the case, also testified
at the trial. On cross-examination of Sgt. Ephlin, appellant’s counsel pointed out that
appellant had been in jail for several months while awaiting trial. The State objected to
counsel’s comment, and the trial court sustained the objection. After Sgt. Ephlin’s testimony,
the State rested, and appellant moved for directed verdict regarding all charges except the
battery charge. Appellant conceded that there was a prima facie case for battery in the third
degree.
During his case-in-chief, appellant testified in his own defense and admitted to hitting
Woods because she would not return his CD player. However, appellant disputed that she
had a bump on her head after he hit her. During cross-examination, the State questioned
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appellant regarding his prior conviction for residential burglary, a Class B felony. Appellant
testified that he pled guilty and, without prompting, stated that he had received five years’
probation as a result. The State then questioned whether he had served time due to a
probation revocation. Appellant’s counsel objected to the revocation question, but appellant
indicated a willingness to answer. The objection was overruled, and appellant testified that
he had violated his previous probation and been sent to prison.
The jury found appellant guilty of battery in the third degree. During the sentencing
phase, the State sought to introduce several prior convictions, including misdemeanors.
Appellant objected, arguing that the non-felony convictions were inadmissible. The trial
court overruled appellant’s objection, and the jury sentenced appellant to 364 days’
imprisonment and imposed a $500 fine.
Appellant’s counsel filed a timely notice of appeal, followed by a no-merit brief and
motion to withdraw as counsel. When an appellant’s attorney finds that an appeal would be
wholly frivolous, we are bound to review the entire record to ensure the appellant is afforded
his constitutional rights. Campbell v. State, 74 Ark. App. 277, 279, 47 S.W.3d 915, 917
(2001).
To avoid double-jeopardy implications, we address the sufficiency of the evidence
before any other issues. Stegall v. State, 340 Ark. 184, 189, 8 S.W.3d 538, 542 (2000). In this
case, a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence leading to the battery conviction or the
legality of the sentence would be frivolous. A person commits third-degree battery—a Class
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A misdemeanor—if, with the purpose of causing physical injury to another person, the person
causes physical injury to any person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-203(a)(1) (Repl. 2006). The
sentence for a Class A misdemeanor may include imprisonment of up to one year and a fine
of up to $2500. Id. §§ 5-4-104(d)(5)(Supp. 2009), 5-4-201(b)(1) (Supp. 2009), 5-4-401(b)(1)
(Repl. 2006). When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence leading to a conviction, we
consider only the evidence that tends to support the finding of guilt and view it in the light
most favorable to the State. Graham v. State, 365 Ark. 274, 275, 229 S.W.3d 30, 32 (2006).
We will affirm the trial court’s ruling if it is supported by substantial evidence. Coggin v. State,
356 Ark. 424, 431, 156 S.W.3d 712, 717 (2004). Substantial evidence is evidence that is of
sufficient force and character to compel a conclusion one way or the other, without
speculation or conjecture. Stephenson v. State, 373 Ark. 134, 136, 282 S.W.3d 772, 775
(2008). In considering the evidence presented below, we will not weigh the evidence or
assess the credibility of witnesses, as those are questions for the finder of fact. Woods v. State,
363 Ark. 272, 275, 213 S.W.3d 627, 630 (2005).
Here, appellant admitted to purposely hitting Woods. Woods and two other witnesses
testified that she had an injury to her forehead—a large knot—following the incident. Those
three statements are of sufficient force and character to compel the conclusion that appellant’s
admitted action caused injury to Woods. The resulting punishment was within the limits
imposed by statute for a Class A misdemeanor.
Of the other issues raised during the trial that resulted in adverse rulings, only four
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 544
were relevant to the battery conviction.
First, appellant’s motion to strike Lt. Kelly’s
testimony regarding the injury he observed was properly denied, despite the lack of
photographic proof, as was the contemporaneous motion to dismiss. A witness may testify
as to his personal knowledge of a matter, and evidence proving personal knowledge may
consist of the witness’s own testimony. Ark. R. Evid. 602 (2010). Lt. Kelly’s testimony as
to the injury he observed on Woods’s forehead was admissible because it was based on his
personal knowledge. Furthermore, a photograph may be merely cumulative when it depicts
an object that has already been described by witness testimony. See Johnson v. State, 2010 Ark.
App. 153, at 16. In Johnson, the trial court admitted photographs of various items located in
the front passenger seat of a vehicle after the officer who took the photographs testified as to
what he had seen in the car. Id. at 13, 16. The defendant argued that there was not a proper
foundation for the photographs, but we held that, even if the foundation was lacking, their
admission was not prejudicial because the photographs were cumulative to what the officer
had already described. Id. at 16. In the present case, the lack of photographs was of no
consequence because any photographs of the injury would have been cumulative to Lt. Kelly’s
testimony. Additionally, the denial of appellant’s motion to dismiss was proper because Lt.
Kelly’s observation of Woods’s injury was but one piece of evidence supporting the State’s
case.
Second, the trial court properly sustained the State’s objection to the statement
regarding appellant being in jail while awaiting trial. Questions during cross-examination
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should not be conjectural, speculative, or argumentative. Maxwell v. State, 284 Ark. 501, 505,
683 S.W.2d 908, 911 (1985). Counsel’s statement was more of an argumentative comment
than a question, and it appeared to be an attempt to draw sympathy for appellant, rather than
a probative inquiry.
There was no error in sustaining the State’s objection to such
commentary.
Third, the trial court did not err by allowing questioning regarding appellant’s prior
probation revocation.
Evidence of previous convictions presented for the purpose of
attacking a witness’s credibility is admissible if the crime was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year. Ark. R. Evid. 609(a). Class B felonies are punishable
by a sentence of five to twenty years. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-401(a)(3) (Repl. 2006). The
State’s line of questioning was specifically geared toward the prior conviction for residential
burglary, and such questioning was permissible under Rule 609(a) because residential burglary
is punishable by more than one year. Because the probation was a result of that conviction,
questions regarding the probation were also permissible. Furthermore, appellant opened the
door to the issue of probation and indicated a willingness to answer questions about the
revocation. Therefore, appellant’s counsel’s objection was properly overruled.
Finally, the introduction of appellant’s prior misdemeanors during the sentencing phase
was appropriate. Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-97-103(2) (Repl. 2006) provides that
prior misdemeanors are admissible in the sentencing phase of a trial. Davis v. State, 330 Ark.
76, 87, 953 S.W.2d 559, 564–65 (1997). Therefore, there was no error in their admission.
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 544
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the conviction and grant counsel’s motion to
withdraw.
Affirmed; motion granted.
P ITTMAN and B ROWN, JJ., agree.
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