Doretha Locket v. Arkansas Childrens Hospital and Risk Management Resources
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
WENDELL L. GRIFFEN, JUDGE
DIVISION IV
CA06-783
February 28, 2007
DORETHA LOCKET
APPELLANT
AN APPEAL FROM THE WORKERS’
COMPENSATION COMMISSION
[F411619]
V.
ARKANSAS CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL
RISK MANAGEMENT RESOURCES
APPELLEES
AFFIRMED
Doretha Locket appeals from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission,
which found that she failed to prove that the symptoms of her carpel tunnel syndrome were
causally related to her employment. She challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the finding. We affirm.
Appellant worked as a deli worker for Nutritional Services at Arkansas Children’s
Hospital for twelve years, preparing and selling sandwiches and wraps. Her job required her
to open cans, make and wrap sandwiches, and scoop food. While she occasionally asked
for help, she would work unassisted all but about one day a week. Appellant suffered a
compensable injury to her hand on May 27, 2003, when it was caught between a door and
a rolling cart. She presented to Concentra, her employer’s medical provider, where she was
diagnosed with a contusion of the wrist and hand. She underwent physical therapy, which
appellant testified helped her condition.
Appellant presented to Dr. Robin Perry on October 7, 2003, complaining of
numbness in her left hand, with worse pain in the tips of her fingers. The note shows that
appellant took medication that she had from a previous right carpal tunnel injury without
relief. Dr. Perry assessed appellant with carpal tunnel syndrome and prescribed a wrist brace
and medication. She returned to Dr. Perry on May 25, 2004, complaining of pain and
numbness in her right hand. Dr. Perry prescribed more medication and ordered her to
remain off-work through June 13, 2004.1 Appellant then presented to Dr. Scott Carle on
May 26, 2004. He noted that appellant’s PCP, Dr. Edward Weber, recommended a nerve
conduction test; however, he also wrote:
There is no underlying pathology or ongoing active medical condition that is
attributed to an occupational illness or injury, which would preclude this individual
from returning to full and unrestricted work if he/she so chooses.
Appellant returned to Concentra on May 28, 2004, after a nerve conduction test was
performed. She was diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome; however, Dr. William
Warren released appellant from Concentra’s care and advised her “to see PCP regarding a
non-work related condition.”
Appellant presented to Dr. Weber on June 9, 2004. On examination, he noted a
positive Phalen’s and Tinel’s sign and tenderness over appellant’s flexor carpi radialis
tendon. He scheduled carpal tunnel release surgery for June 17, 2004. Appellant then
presented to Dr. R.J. Rutherford on August 27, 2004, where she still complained of pain and
numbness despite the surgery.
After another nerve conduction test, Dr. Rutherford
recommended revision carpal tunnel surgery with exploration and possible repair of the
recurrent motor nerve. Appellant was later referred to Dr. Michael Moore, who wrote on
September 14, 2004:
. . . Her clinical history, physical examination, and the recent nerve condition and
EMG study suggest a possible injury to the motor branch of the median nerve. In
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The record also shows that appellant complained of numbness in her right hand to Dr.
Perry on May 4, 2004. However, that doctor’s visit was unrelated to her carpal tunnel
syndrome.
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addition, Ms. Lockett [sic] has persistent numbness in the thumb.
I had a long discussion with Ms. Lockett [sic] regarding her medical [condition] and
treatment options. It was my opinion that exploration and repair of the motor branch
of the median nerve would not significantly improve her right hand pain symptoms.
In addition, repair may not be technically possible. I suspect the ends of the motor
nerve have retracted into the median nerve and thenar muscle. Dissection of the
motor branch in the median nerve carries a risk of further injury to the nerve. At this
time, it is my opinion Ms. Lockett [sic] should begin treatment for the reflex
sympathetic dystrophy. She will be seen in the Therapy Unit where she will begin
scar massage, scar phoresis, and desensitization. She will also begin stress-loading
therapy exercises. Finally, the sensation in her right hand will be evaluated with a
Semmes-Weinstein monofilament sensory examination. Ms. Lockett [sic]
understands if she does not respond to conservative treatment, exploration of the
median nerve may be indicated.
The ALJ found that appellant failed to establish that her carpel tunnel syndrome was
causally related to her employment. After restating the law, she stated:
In this case, the only mere mention made in any medical record in evidence
with regard to claimant’s carpal tunnel syndrome is her visit to her PCP on May 25,
2004, wherein Dr. Perry notes that claimant, “felt this was [an] old workman’s comp
injury.” However, claimant admitted on cross-examination that she does not relate
her carpal tunnel to her May 2003 hand injury. None of the other doctors claimant
saw in regard to her carpal tunnel syndrome even mention her work being a possible
cause, except Dr. Carle, the first doctor she saw after her PCP, who specifically found
that it was not work-related. Clearly, no objective medical findings exist to establish
that a work-related carpal tunnel injury, or aggravation of same, occurred in May of
2004, as claimant alleges.
The Commission affirmed and adopted the opinion of the ALJ.
In reviewing decisions from the Workers’ Compensation Commission, we view the
evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the
Commission’s decision and affirm if that decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Smith v. City of Ft. Smith, 84 Ark. App. 430, 143 S.W.3d 593 (2004). Substantial evidence
is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Williams v. Prostaff Temps., 336 Ark. 510, 988 S.W.2d 1 (1999). The issue is not whether
the reviewing court might have reached a different result from the Commission; if
reasonable minds could reach the result found by the Commission, we must affirm the
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decision. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. v. Baker, 337 Ark. 94, 989 S.W.2d 151 (1999).
Normally, we only review the findings of the Commission and not those of the ALJ. Logan
County v. McDonald, 90 Ark. App. 409, 206 S.W.3d 258 (2005). However, when the
Commission adopts the conclusions of the ALJ, as it is authorized to do, we consider both
the decision of the Commission and the decision of the ALJ. Death & Permanent Total
Disability Trust Fund v. Branum, 82 Ark. App. 338, 107 S.W.3d 876 (2003).
For her sole point on appeal, appellant argues that the Commission erred in finding
that her carpal tunnel syndrome was not causally related to her employment. Carpal tunnel
syndrome is recognized as a gradual-onset injury; hence, it is not necessary that a claimant
prove that her carpal tunnel injury was caused by rapid, repetitive motion. Freeman v.
Con-Agra Frozen Foods, 344 Ark. 296, 40 S.W.3d 760 (2001). A claimant seeking workers’
compensation benefits for carpal tunnel syndrome must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that (1) the injury arose out of and in the course of his or her employment; (2) the
injury caused internal or external physical harm to the body that required medical services
or resulted in disability or death; and (3) the injury was a major cause of the disability or
need for treatment. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(ii) & (E)(ii) (Supp. 2005).
We agree with appellant when she argues that she needed not present objective
medical findings to establish the causal relationship between her injury and employment.
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. VanWagner, 337 Ark. 443, 990 S.W.2d 522 (1999). However,
we do not read the ALJ’s opinion to have imposed that requirement upon her when she
stated, “Clearly, no objective medical findings exist to establish that a work-related carpal
tunnel injury, or aggravation of same, occurred in May of 2004, as claimant alleges.”
Rather, the ALJ was noting the lack of medical evidence to support appellant’s conclusion
that her carpal tunnel syndrome was connected to her employment with the hospital. Indeed,
all of the medical records were either silent with regard to causation or explicitly found that
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appellant’s condition was non-work related. While appellant presented evidence showing
that she has developed carpal tunnel syndrome, the Commission’s finding that her condition
is not causally connected to her employment is supported by substantial evidence.
Affirmed.
PITTMAN, C.J., and VAUGHT, J., agree.
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