First Arkansas Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State of Arkansas
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
D.P. MARSHALL JR., Judge
DIVISION II
CA06-721
4 April 2007
FIRST ARKANSAS BAIL
BONDS, INC.,
APPELLANT
AN APPEAL FROM THE
PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT
COURT [OT2005-9559]
v.
HONORABLE MARION ANDREW
HUMPHREY, JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS,
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
The circuit court entered a bond forfeiture judgment against First Arkansas Bail Bonds
in May 2005. About four months later, First Arkansas moved the court to set the judgment
aside under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 60. The circuit court ruled that it lacked
jurisdiction and denied the motion. First Arkansas appeals, arguing that the circuit court
abused its discretion. We hold that no abuse of discretion occurred. First Arkansas waited
too long to get relief under Rule 60(a) and presented insufficient grounds for relief under
Rule 60(b) or (c).
This case began when First Arkansas gave a bail bond for Michelle Jackson. She
failed to appear in court a few months later, and the circuit court instigated forfeiture
proceedings against First Arkansas. When the court learned that the defendant’s real name
was Michelle Johnson, it amended the criminal information accordingly.
The court
continued the show-cause hearing several times at First Arkansas’s request. After a hearing
at which a company representative appeared briefly, the court entered a forfeiture judgment
against First Arkansas on 23 May 2005. The judgment referred to the defendant as
“Jackson,” not “Johnson.”
First Arkansas did not receive a copy of the judgment from the clerk until 25 July
2005, about two months after entry. The judgment was accompanied by the clerk’s bill of
costs for the $15,500.00 judgment, with a hand-written note that read “Due Date October 17,
2005.” First Arkansas notes that the payment due date is usually ninety days after the entry
of a bond-forfeiture judgment, and October 17th was approximately ninety days after the
clerk sent the judgment and bill to the company. First Arkansas found Johnson/Jackson in
mid-September. The Pulaski County Detention Center, however, would not take custody of
her because the facility was full. First Arkansas moved to set the judgment aside on 29
September 2005. First Arkansas did not move to reopen its time to appeal from the
judgment.
Rule 60(a) gives the circuit court discretion to correct a mistake or prevent a
miscarriage of justice by modifying or vacating a judgment within ninety days of entry.
First Arkansas did not file its motion to vacate within ninety days. The Rule contains no
provision for extending the ninety-day period. Analogizing to Arkansas Rule of Appellate
Procedure—Civil 4(b)(3), which allows a circuit court to extend the time to appeal from a
judgment for a diligent party who did not have notice of it, First Arkansas argues that the
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circuit court should have extended the time for its Rule 60(a) motion. First Arkansas
contends that the clerk’s failure to send it prompt notice of the entry of judgment, and the
misleading due date for payment on the clerk’s bill, justify this relief.
We affirm the circuit court’s ruling denying Rule 60(a) relief. The State is correct on
this issue: the Rule does not allow any extensions of the ninety-day period. M & M Bonding
Co. v. State, 59 Ark. App. 228, 234, 955 S.W.2d 521, 524 (1997) (construing this provision
when it was part of Rule 60(b) before the 2000 amendment reconfiguring the Rule). First
Arkansas fares no better on the merits of its delayed-notice argument. The clerk had no
obligation to give First Arkansas notice that the circuit court had entered judgment. Cf. Ark.
Code Ann. § 16-84-207(b)(2) (Repl. 2005) (requiring clerk to notify surety when defendant
fails to appear). A representative of First Arkansas attended at least part of the hearing at
which the circuit court announced its intention to enter the judgment, which the court did
later the same day. First Arkansas received the judgment a month before the ninety-day
period expired. Finally, the clerk’s note about the payment due date cannot alter the terms
of the governing Rule. First Arkansas’s delay in filing its motion precluded relief under Rule
60(a).
First Arkansas was not entitled to relief through Rule 60(b) either. True, the May
judgment reflected Johnson/Jackson’s alias instead of her real name. But even if the circuit
court had corrected the judgment in that respect under Rule 60(b), the court’s order would
have been nunc pro tunc; it would not have reopened a new ninety-day period for First
Arkansas to have the judgment vacated under Rule 60(a). Holt Bonding Co. v. State, 353
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Ark. 136, 141, 114 S.W.3d 179, 183 (2003).
Nor was First Arkansas entitled to relief under Rule 60(c). The bond company’s
arguments here were timely, but mistaken. As the State points out, because there was no trial
and this was a statutory forfeiture proceeding, Rule 60(c)(1) may not even apply. In any
event, although First Arkansas did not find Johnson/Jackson until September 2005, her
identity was not newly discovered evidence as the company argues. Both First Arkansas and
the circuit court knew her real name before the court entered the forfeiture judgment. We
also agree with the State that First Arkansas did not carry its burden under Rule 60(c)(3),
which addresses misprisions of the clerk.
Not sending First Arkansas the judgment
immediately after entry was not a mistake by the clerk. And even if the due date on the
clerk’s bill for First Arkansas’s payment was a mistake, it did not rise to the level of a clerk’s
misprision in the judgment which might justify vacating that judgment. Cf. New Holland
Credit Co. v. Hill, 362 Ark. 329, 337, 208 S.W.3d 191, 196–97 (2005).
First Arkansas also contends that the error in Johnson/Jackson’s name rendered the
judgment void and that forfeiture of the bond, all things considered, works an injustice. The
name error, however, does not undermine the judgment for the reasons we’ve already stated.
We have considered the entire record and see no injustice. Johnson/Jackson failed to appear
in November 2004. Approximately six months later, and after continuing the show-cause
hearing several times, the circuit court entered the forfeiture judgment against First Arkansas.
Pulaski County agreed to waive the forfeiture if the bond company located Johnson/Jackson
at any time within three months after the court entered the judgment. Our court rules,
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moreover, provided First Arkansas several avenues of relief. There is no injustice in
requiring First Arkansas to fulfill its obligation as surety for the defendant’s appearance.
Relief under Rule 60 is a matter of informed and guided judicial discretion. We will
reverse only where the circuit court abuses that discretion—by erring on the law, acting
improvidently or thoughtlessly, deciding on some improper basis, or failing to consider
everything it should. Valley v. Phillips County Election Comm’n, 357 Ark. 494, 498, 183
S.W.3d 557, 560 (2004). The circuit court made no mistake of this kind, and therefore did
not abuse its discretion.
Affirmed.
P ITTMAN, C.J., and M ILLER, J., agree.
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