Victor Lee Bettis v. Wendy Pauline Bettis

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DIVISIONS III, IV & I  CA06­1417  November 7, 2007  VICTOR LEE BETTIS  APPELLANT  V. APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY  CIRCUIT COURT  [EDV­01­3593]  HON. ALICE SPRINKLE GRAY,  CIRCUIT JUDGE  WENDY PAULINE BETTIS  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  Appellant  Victor  Bettis  appeals  the  trial court’s  order  modifying  the  divorce  decree  that  extended and increased alimony payments to his former wife, appellee Wendy Bettis. We affirm.  Victor and Wendy were divorced in 2002. They have three children—Megan, Jacqueline, and  Evan.  Jacqueline  and  Evan  were  minors  at  the  time  of  the  divorce,  age  sixteen  and  fourteen  respectively.  Jacqueline  suffers  from  cerebral  palsy  and  is  confined  to  a  wheelchair.  Although  Jacqueline requires twenty­four hour a day care, she is currently enrolled at the University of Central  Arkansas and maintains a 3.0 grade­point average.  The divorce decree awarded custody of Jacqueline and Evan to Wendy; awarded Wendy child  support for Jacqueline and Evan; acknowledged that child support for Jacqueline would continue  beyond the age of majority because of her disability; and awarded $1000 per month in alimony to  Wendy until Evan graduated from high school.  In November 2004, the trial court entered an order that,  among other things, stated that child  support would continue for Jacqueline due to her disability; however, the parties agreed that child support  for  Jacqueline  was  abated  as  of  May  1,  2004,  so  that  she  could  receive  government  1  assistance.  According to the testimony at trial, Jacqueline is not entitled to government benefits if  Wendy receives child­support payments for Jacqueline.  On March 20, 2006, Victor filed a motion for termination of alimony and child support. He  alleged that child support payments for Evan should be terminated, because Evan turned eighteen and  was about to graduate from high school. Wendy conceded this issue, and the trial court terminated  these payments. Victor also alleged that alimony should be terminated because the divorce decree  stated  that  alimony will be  terminated  upon Evan’s  graduation from high school.  Wendy filed  a  response and counter­motion seeking the continuation and increase of alimony.  At trial, Wendy testified that she is employed as a teacher at the Cathedral School where she  has worked for twelve years. Her salary for the 2006–07 school year was $33,000. Since the divorce,  her salary has increased $5100. She lives in the home that she and Victor built to accommodate  Jacqueline’s special needs. The testimony was undisputed that Wendy is the primary­care giver for  Jacqueline year round and that Jacqueline needs assistance with every task. Also, while Jacqueline  is  in  college  during  the  school  year,  she  lives  with  Wendy  during  the  weekends,  holidays,  and  summers.  Victor testified that he is employed with Remington Arms where he earns $82,500 a year. He  testified that since the divorce, his salary has increased in excess of $10,000. He admitted that Wendy  is the primary care giver for Jacqueline, but he testified that he provides help when needed. 1  Jacqueline receives college tuition scholarships from the Arkansas Academic  Challenge and Arkansas Rehabilitation, social security disability benefits, Medicare  benefits, and Independent Choices benefits.  2  Lyles Henry testified on behalf of Wendy as an expert witness. He reviewed Victor’s tax  returns and his Affidavit of Financial Means. Mr. Lyles testified that Victor had a net annual income  of $60,022 and expenses of $36,732. Therefore, Mr. Lyles concluded that Victor had the ability to  pay $1000–$2000 per month in alimony.  The trial court subsequently entered an order finding that there had been a substantial change  in circumstances  since  the  entry of the  divorce  decree  justifying  an increase  in  the  duration  and  amount of alimony awarded to Wendy. The trial court stated:  The substantial change in circumstances include the following:  a.  b.  c.  d.  e.  f.  g.  The Defendant’s annual income increased by at least $10,000 since the entry of the  Divorce Decree and the Plaintiff’s annual income increased by at least $5000 since the  entry of the Divorce Decree.  The Defendant received a $30,000 bonus from his employer.  The child support for Jacqueline has been abated. The Plaintiff anticipated at the time  of  the  divorce  that  she  would  be  receiving  child  support  payments  to  assist  in  Jacqueline’s care and to provide her a home. Plaintiff is not receiving child support  payments to assist her in the care of Jacqueline, who is an adult and who is in need of  care because of her disability.  Jacqueline is attending college.  The Defendant  is not  paying  any child support for Jacqueline and therefore has a  higher level of income than he anticipated at the time of the divorce.  Plaintiff provides a substantial amount of care for Jacqueline.  Either of the parties could have chosen to provide the care for their adult daughter,  who  is  in need of substantial care, however, the party who provided the care for  Jacqueline was Plaintiff.  The trial court further stated that it considered the tax effect of Victor’s continued alimony payments.  The court found that Wendy’s weekly income was approximately $512 while Victor’s weekly income  was approximately $1,184.55. The trial court  then awarded alimony to  Wendy in the amount  of  $1150 per month and awarded her $3000 in attorney’s fees and expenses. Victor has appealed from  this order. 3  Victor  first  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  finding  that  there  had  been  a  change  in  circumstances sufficient to continue and increase alimony to Wendy. He argues that Wendy is actually  seeking child support but calling it alimony. A decision whether to award alimony is a matter that lies  within the trial court’s sound discretion, and on appeal we will not reverse a trial court’s decision to  award alimony absent an abuse of that discretion. McKay v. McKay, 340 Ark. 171, 8 S.W.3d 525  (2000); Cole v. Cole, 82 Ark. App. 47, 110 S.W.3d 310 (2003). Alimony is intended to rectify any  economic imbalance in the earning power and standard of living of the parties in light of the particular  facts of the case. Cole, 82 Ark. App. at 58, 110 S.W.3d at 317. The primary factors to be considered  are the financial need of one spouse and the ability of the other spouse to pay. Id.  Modification of an award of alimony must be based on a change of circumstances of the  parties. Herman v. Herman, 335 Ark. 36, 977 S.W.2d 209 (1998). The burden of showing a change  of circumstances is always on the party seeking the change in the amount of alimony. Hass v. Hass,  80 Ark. App. 408, 97 S.W.3d 424 (2003). In the divorce decree, the parties agreed that alimony  would  discontinue  when  Evan  graduated  from  high  school.  Therefore,  the  burden  of  showing  a  change of circumstances to support a continuation and increase of alimony was on Wendy.  We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the divorce decree by  continuing and increasing alimony. First, the evidence supports the trial court’s findings of Victor’s  ability to  pay and Wendy’s need. Wendy’s annual income is $33,000 while Victor’s  is  $82,500.  Wendy’s expert witness testified that Victor had the ability to pay up to $2000 per month in alimony.  At trial, Victor admitted that “I’ve got more than enough [money] to cover my expenses and continue  to pay the alimony.” In contrast, Wendy testified that, “I cannot make my house payment without the  current alimony.” Wendy’s ability to pay the mortgage is significant in light of the undisputed fact that 4  she is the primary care giver for Jacqueline who, along with Wendy, must have a place to live. Even  Victor testified about the importance of Wendy having a home: “I would agree that Jacqueline needs  a place to stay on the weekends. [I] [n]ever denied that [Jacqueline] needs a place to stay on holidays  and in the summer. My ex­wife has been the only one to provide that.”  Furthermore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding a change of  circumstances. Since the entry of the divorce decree, Victor’s income increased by $10,000 while  Wendy’s increased only by $5000.  At the time of the divorce, Victor anticipated paying child support  indefinitely, and because it was abated, he has experienced an unexpected increase in income. When  the parties divorced, Wendy testified that she never anticipated that Jacqueline would be able to  attend college. Moreover, Wendy did not anticipate that Jacqueline’s child support would be abated  so that Jacqueline could receive government benefits. These facts alone demonstrate a significant  change in circumstances since the entry of the divorce decree.  We disagree with Victor, and the dissent, that this case is nothing more than Wendy’s effort  to collect child support by calling it alimony. We further acknowledge the unusual circumstances of  this case: Jacqueline will likely need care and support for the rest of her life, but she cannot be the  beneficiary of child­support payments because of her receipt of government benefits. Nevertheless,  based on the findings of the trial court Wendy is, independent from the child­support issue, entitled  to continued and increased alimony.  Victor also argues that the trial court erred in awarding $3000 in attorney’s fees and expenses  in favor of Wendy. Arkansas Code Annotated section 9­12­309(b) (Repl. 2002) provides that a court  may allow either party additional attorney’s fees for the enforcement of alimony. Victor contends that  his motion to terminate alimony and Wendy’s counter motion to continue and increase alimony does 5  not  fall  within  the  purview  of  that  statute.  We  disagree.  There  was  only  one  issue  in  this  case—whether Wendy was entitled to alimony. We also note that the trial court has great discretion  on the issuance of an attorney’s fee award in alimony cases. McKay, 340 Ark. at 183, 8 S.W.3d at  532. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees  to Wendy, and we affirm the award.  Affirmed.  PITTMAN, C.J., and HART, BIRD and HEFFLEY, JJ., agree.  GLADWIN, GRIFFEN, GLOVER  and MILLER, JJ., dissent.  ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge, dissenting. Today the majority expands the definition of alimony  to  include  child  support.    Because  I  believe  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  finding  a  change  of  circumstances and that there was insufficient evidence to continue the payment of alimony beyond  the period specified in the divorce decree, I would reverse.  The evidence presented in this case centers on the parties’ middle child, Jacqueline, who has  cerebral palsy and is completely dependent on others to give her assistance in eating and personal  care.  She is cognitively alert, but is only able to use part of the right side of her body enough to drive  a  power  wheelchair  and  to  use  a  computer  with  one  finger.  She  is  now  twenty  years  old  and  attending the University of Central Arkansas, where she has a 3.0 grade­point average.  She lives on  campus  and  is  able  to  pay  personal  caregivers  from  a  Medicaid­sponsored  program  called  Independent Choices.  Appellant was instrumental in discovering this particular funding and was also  able to help her obtain social­security payments.  Jacqueline returns home on weekends, and appellee  is in charge of caring for Jacqueline’s personal needs during her visits.  Jacqueline has also arranged  for a personal caregiver to assist her periodically on the weekends.  Depending on the number of 6  hours used by outside caregivers, appellee is sometimes paid by the Medicaid program for her care  of Jacqueline.  In 2004, appellant sought modifications of the divorce decree and both parties filed contempt  motions against the other.  Among other things, the trial court found, that because of Jacqueline’s  physical disabilities, child support would continue beyond her eighteenth birthday.  However, the  parties agreed that appellant’s child­support obligation for Jacqueline would abate as of May 1, 2004,  due to the government assistance she began receiving.  Further they agreed that either party could  petition the  court  for  reinstatement  of child  support  if  Jacqueline  were  ever  denied  government  assistance.  On March 20, 2006, appellant filed a motion to terminate child support and alimony effective  upon the youngest child’s high school graduation as provided in the 2002 divorce decree.  Appellee  filed a counter­petition seeking both a continuation of and an increase in alimony.  After a hearing,  the trial court entered an order finding that, among other things:  8.  The substanial change in circumstances includes the following:  a.  b.  c.  d.  e.  f.  The Defendant’s (appellant) annual income increased by at least $10,000 since the  entry of the Divorce Decree and the Plaintiff’s (appellee) annual income increased by  at least $5,000 since the entry of the Divorce Decree.  The Defendant (appellant) received a $30,000 bonus from his employer.  The child support for Jacqueline has been abated.  The Plaintiff (appellee) anticipated  at the time of the divorce that she would be receiving child support payments to assist  in Jacqueline’s care and to provide her a home.  Plaintiff (appellee) is not receiving  child support payments to assist her in the care of Jacqueline, who is an adult and who  is in need of care because of her disability.  Jacqueline is attending college.  Defendant (appellant) is not paying any child support for Jacqueline and therefore has  a higher level of income than he anticipated at the time of the divorce.  Plaintiff (appellee) provides a substantial amount of care for Jacqueline. ­7­  7  CA06­1417  g.  Either of the parties could have chosen to provide the care for their adult daughter,  who  is in need of substantial care, however, the  party  who provided the care for  Jacqueline was Plaintiff (appellee).  The  trial  court  further  found  that  even  though  appellee  has  a  male  friend  in  the  house  a  substantial amount of time who does not pay expenses, he nonetheless contributes to the home by  assisting appellee with lifting Jacqueline and other tasks.  The trial court also found that it was not  in Jacqueline’s best interest for the appellee to move from her current residence, and that Jacqueline  has a total inability to  care for herself.  The trial court considered the tax effects of the alimony  payments on both parties, and found that appellant’s income was $1,184.55 per week and appellee’s  income was $512 per week.  The trial court  then awarded alimony to the appellee in the amount of  $1150 per month effective June 1, 2006, and awarded attorney’s fees to appellee in the amount of  $3000.  The  purpose  of  alimony  is  to  rectify  economic  imbalance  in  the  earning  power  and  the  standard of living of the parties to a divorce in light of the particular facts of each case.  Harvey v.  Harvey, 295 Ark. 102, 747 S.W.2d 89 (1988).  Modification of an award of alimony must be based  on a change of circumstances of the parties.  Herman v. Herman, 335 Ark. 36, 977 S.W.2d 209  (1998).  The burden of showing a change in circumstances is always upon the party seeking the  change in the amount of alimony.  Hass v. Hass, 80 Ark. App. 408, 97 S.W.3d 424 (2003).  Changes  in circumstances are not material if they were contemplated at the time of the original award.  Id.  The primary factors to be considered in changing an award of alimony are the needs of one  party and the ability of the other party to pay.  Parker v. Parker, 97 Ark. App. 298, __ S.W.3d __  (2007).  Secondary factors that may also be considered include: (1) the financial circumstances of  both parties; (2) the couple’s past standard of living; (3) the value of jointly owned property; (4) the  amount and nature of the income, both current and anticipated, of both parties; (5) the extent and ­8­  8  CA06­1417  nature of the resources and assets of each of the parties; (6) the amount of each party’s spendable  income; (7) earning ability and capacity of both parties; (8) the property awarded to each party; (9)  the disposition of the homestead or jointly owned property; (10) the condition of health and medical  needs of the parties; (11) the duration of the marriage.  Delacey v. Delacey, 85 Ark. App. 419, 155  S.W.3d 701 (2004).  Each case is to be judged upon its own facts.  Id.  Discretion is vested in the trial  judge, and we will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion.  Id.  The only findings made by the trial court in paragraph eight  concerning the parties is that  appellant’s and appellee’s income both increased and that appellant received a one­time bonus from  his employer.  The other findings use the term “child support” or refer specifically to Jacqueline.  The  finding  under  paragraph  nine  is  that  appellee  has  a  male  friend  in  the  house  who  does  not  pay  expenses.  None of these findings present a change in circumstances that warrants an extension of  appellant’s alimony obligation.  The majority focuses on the fact that appellant has had an increase of income.  The fact that  appellant enjoys a greater income is not a material change in circumstances.  An increase in a payor’s  income alone does not warrant an increase in alimony.  See Parker v. Parker, 97 Ark. App. 298, ___  S.W. 3d ____ (2007).  None  of  the  other  findings  that  were  made  by  the  trial  court  about  Jacqueline  were  unexpected,  and  therefore,  would  not  support  an  increase  in  alimony.    The  child  support  for  Jacqueline was abated by agreement of the parties so that she could obtain government assistance.  The fact that Jacqueline needs additional assistance was also expected, which is why the trial court  extended child support for Jacqueline past her eighteenth birthday.  Neither the fact that Jacqueline  needs  a  handicapped­accessible  house  nor  that  appellee  is  her  primary  caregiver  is  a  change  of ­9­  9  CA06­1417  circumstances.  These factors existed in 2002 at the time of the divorce as well as in 2004 when the  modification was entered.  Further,  the  fact  that  Jacqueline  now  attends  college  does  not  constitute  a  change  in  circumstances.  The fact that she spends the majority of her time living on campus actually reduces  the  appellee’s  daily  burden.    The  abatement  of  child  support  in  exchange  for  the  government  assistance was agreed to by the appellee so it should not be considered a changed circumstance.  If  anything, it supports the notion that the award is for Jacqueline’s benefit, and is not alimony.  All of the factors set out by the court in support of a material change in circumstances are  circumstances concerning  Jacqueline.  These factors support the trial court’s earlier finding that  Jacqueline’s  child  support  should  continue.  However,  the  trial  court  and  the  majority  call  this  increase alimony, even though it is very clearly child support based on Jacqueline’s needs, and not  appellee’s.  As I would find that the trial court was clearly erroneous in finding a change in circumstances,  a reversal on the attorney’s fees issue would also be necessary.  GRIFFEN, GLOVER, and MILLER, J.J., agree.  WENDELL  GRIFFIN,  Judge,  dissenting.I  fully  join  Judge  Gladwin’s  dissenting  opinion.  Nonetheless, I write separately to further expose the obvious factual and legal gaps in the decision  announced by the majority opinion.  I would reverse the trial court’s order because appellee, Wendy Bettis, failed to show  a change of circumstances warranting an increase and extension in alimony. In stating that “there was  only one issue in this case – whether Wendy was entitled to alimony,” the majority precisely pinpoints  the flaw in its own analysis – it repeats and compounds the trial court’s error in treating Wendy’s ­10­  10  CA06­1417  request for increased alimony to pay her mortgage due to her reduction in child support as anything  other than a guise for an increase in child support.  Wendy requests  alimony  –  not  child  support  –  until  her  adult  disabled  daughter,  Jacqueline  Bettis,  is  able  to  live  independently,  but  admitted  that  she  does  not  know  whether  Jacqueline will ever be able to do so.  Hence, the trial court’s order essentially obligates the father,  Victor Bettis, to pay alimony as long as Jacqueline, a college student who lives outside the home most  of the time, resides with Wendy in the current home.  In citing to Wendy’s ability to pay the mortgage  as a “significant” factor in affirming the trial court’s order, the majority vividly demonstrates that its  decision is based on Jacqueline’s needs, not Wendy’s.  In short, the majority converts child support  into alimony.  It is true that Victor has enjoyed a $10,000 annual increase in his salary, whereas  Wendy’s  salary has  increased  by only $5100  during  that  same  period  of  time.    However,  even  considering Victor’s increase in income, there are no factors supporting that an increase in alimony  is warranted.  An increase in a payor’s income, alone, does not warrant an increase in a alimony.  See  Parker v. Parker, 97 Ark. App. 298, ___ S.W. 3d ___ (2007).  Nor does the fact that Victor now  enjoys  a  “greater”  income  because  his  child­support  obligation has  abated,  an increase  that  will  2  necessarily result whenever a payor’s child­support obligation abates.  The majority additionally cites as changed circumstances warranting an increase in  alimony only the following facts:  Wendy did not anticipate that Jacqueline’s child support would be  abated so  that  Jacqueline could receive  government  benefits or that  Jacqueline would be able to  attend college.  The majority goes even farther and boldly states that these facts alone demonstrate 2  Victor received a $30,000 bonus prior to the entry of the 2004 order from which no child  support or alimony was paid, but the trial court addressed the bonus issue in the 2004 decree,  stating that Wendy would receive 15% of any future bonus as child support.  ­11­  11  CA06­1417  a significant change in circumstances warranting an increase in alimony.  This assertion is plainly  belied by the record.  Although  Wendy  now  cites  to  the  abatement  of  Jacqueline’s  child  support  as  a  changed circumstance, her request for increased alimony, in fact, was based on the abatement of  Evan’s child support when he graduated from high school.  Wendy has known since the original  decree was entered in 2002 that  her alimony would cease in 2006 when  Evan was scheduled to  graduate from high school.  Thus, the abatement of Evan’s child support cannot constitute a changed  circumstance that warrants an increase in alimony.  If that is so, every alimony payee can petition for  greater alimony whenever child­support payments cease.  If the majority intends for that to be the  law, it should say so.  Further, the abatement of Jacqueline’s child support does not constitute a changed  circumstance  warranting  an  increase  in  alimony.  The  trial  court  accounted  for  the  special  circumstances  of  Jacqueline’s  physical  condition  in  awarding  child  support  past  her  eighteenth  birthday; the parties did so in setting up a special account to cover Jacqueline’s needs that are not met  by her government benefits.  The original decree and the 2004 decree stated that Jacqueline’s child  support would extend beyond her eighteenth birthday; however, the 2004 order abated Jacqueline’s  child support as of May 1, 2004, and provided that child support could be reinstated if Jacqueline was  denied governmental benefits.  Wendy has never filed a petition to have Jacqueline’s child support  reinstated.  Wendy agreed to abate child support and, Jacqueline’s disabilities notwithstanding, the  majority opinion does not explain how – or why – a party should be allowed to mount a collateral  attack on her own agreement to abate child support to justify an increase in alimony.  Plainly,  Jacqueline  is  not  without  recourse  to  meet  her  special  needs  because  the  parties have been well­aware of her needs since her infancy and have provided a means – other than ­12­  12  CA06­1417  child support or alimony – to meet those needs.  The majority opinion does not mention that the  parties agreed in the 2004 order to establish a joint account for Jacqueline’s expenses “over and  above any governmental assistance she receives,” with Victor paying two­thirds of the expenses, and  Wendy paying one­third.  The initial amount to be paid was $250 per week,  and  either  party is  permitted to petition the trial court to modify the amount.  Notably, this provision is not conditioned  on the receipt of child support or alimony.  The 2004 order further stated, “The parties anticipate  that  they  may  need  to  fund  the  account  beyond  graduation  from  college  due  to  Jacqueline’s  disability.”  Wendy does not assert that this provision is inadequate to meet Jacqueline’s current  needs.  She has never petitioned the court to modify this term of the order.  Instead, she asks for an  3  unwarranted increase in alimony.  It is true that the parties did not anticipate that Jacqueline would be able to attend  college.  However, simply because a circumstance was unanticipated does not justify an increase in  alimony.  Glaringly absent from the majority’s opinion is any explanation linking Jacqueline’s college  attendance to Wendy’s entitlement to increased alimony.  The fact that Jacqueline attends college  does not warrant an increase in alimony because Jacqueline’s financial needs for college are either  paid  by  scholarships  or  by  Jacqueline  herself.    There  was  no  evidence  that  Wendy  incurred  any  expenses as a result of Jacqueline attending college.  In fact, Wendy testified that the only expenses 3  Neither the fact that Jacqueline needs a handicapped­accessible home nor Wendy’s  position as Jacqueline’s primary caretaker constitutes a changed circumstance because those  circumstances existed before the parties divorced.  In fact, Wendy devotes less time to  Jacqueline’s care than when the decree was entered because then, she was required to regularly  assist Jacqueline during week nights when her daughter was in high school.  Now, while  Jacqueline is away at college, Wendy is required to only occasionally assist her daughter during  the week.  Further, Wendy’s boyfriend, who contributes no financial support but assists with  Jacqueline, lives with Wendy “full time.”  In addition, during at least part of the summer, a  caretaker lives with them to assist with Jacqueline’s needs.  ­13­  13  CA06­1417  she incurred relating to Jacqueline were household expenses, which cannot be attributed to the fact  that Jacqueline attends college (and which, in any event, are presumably lessened because Jacqueline  no longer lives with Wendy full­time, as she did when the parties were divorced).  It is inconceivable  that Wendy’s alimony should be increased merely because her adult daughter attends college and fully  pays her own expenses related thereto.  While Wendy does occasionally assist Jacqueline with her  course work, the majority does not explain how that fact entitles Wendy to increased alimony.  I am sympathetic to Jacqueline’s needs and special circumstances.  However, the  means by which those needs should be addressed is not an increase and extension of alimony to her  mother.    While  Wendy  laudably  keeps  Jacqueline  at  home,  she  is  not  legally  entitled  to  receive  alimony for doing so.  Nor is Victor legally obligated to pay alimony to assure that Wendy remains  able  to  pay her  mortgage,  any more  than any other  payor  is  obligated  to  ensure  that  a  payee  is  financially able to afford the marital home once the children reach majority.  The majority opinion provides no guidance at all to trial judges or litigants about how  its decision will be applied in other alimony cases.  Thus, it is impossible to know, let alone reasonably  predict, whether trial judges will be upheld if they grant requests for increased alimony in similar  situations, different situations, or if this case is somehow a special phenomenon in the law.  The  majority opinion cites no decision by the Arkansas Supreme Court that is even remotely analogous  to the unprecedented result in this case.  As much as one may admire the concern expressed for  Jacqueline in the majority opinion, the decision is an unwarranted departure from the well­established  principles our courts have followed for awarding alimony.  Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s order increasing and extending Wendy’s  alimony. ­14­  14  CA06­1417 

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