Brad Eric Crawford v. State of Arkansas
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
WENDELL L. GRIFFEN, JUDGE
DIVISION III
CACR07446
BRAD ERIC CRAWFORD
APPELLANT
December 5, 2007
AN APPEAL FROM MISSISSIPPI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[CR2005233; CR1999399]
V.
HON. RALPH EDWIN WILSON, JR.,
JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
Brad Crawford appeals from the revocation of his suspended sentence, arguing that
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his suspended sentence because his period of
suspension had not begun. We hold that there was no error because appellant’s period of
suspension began when he was paroled and because his sentence was revoked before the
period of suspension expired. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order.
I. Facts
On October 11, 2000, appellant pled guilty to six counts of delivery of cocaine. He
was sentenced to serve tenandonehalf years in the Arkansas Department of Correction on
each charge, with the sentences to run concurrently. Additionally, a tenyear suspended
sentence was imposed on each count to follow appellant’s prison term.
Although the date is not clear from the record, appellant was freed on parole and
began serving the suspended portions of his sentences. On August 24, 2005, while on parole
and while under the terms of his suspended sentences, appellant was charged with the first
degree murder and firstdegree battery of Tommy Watson, Jr., which occurred on June 23,
2005. Also on August 24, 2005, the State filed a motion to revoke the suspended portion of
appellant’s sentences for cocaine delivery.
The murder charge and revocation charge were tried concurrently. A jury convicted
appellant of firstdegree murder, and he was ordered to serve fiftynine years in prison on
that charge. Based on the evidence presented at the murder trial, the trial court immediately
thereafter revoked appellant’s suspended sentence due to his violation of state law. The
court sentenced appellant to serve eight years in prison on each of the six possession counts,
totaling fortyeight years, to run concurrently with the sentence imposed for murder.
II. Jurisdiction to Revoke Suspended Sentence
Appellant’s sole argument is that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his
suspended sentence because his period of suspension would not commence until the date his
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prison sentence would have ended had he not been released on parole. We disagree, and
affirm the revocation of appellant’s suspended sentence.
Appellant’s single citation to authority is Harness v. State, 352 Ark. 335, 101 S.W.3d
235 (2003). However, Harness is inapposite to the facts of the instant case. Like appellant,
the Harness defendant was sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment to be followed by a
suspended sentence. Due to overcrowding, Harness was not immediately imprisoned. When
he was finally ordered to surrender, he did not show. He was subsequently apprehended in
another state and was returned to Arkansas. The trial court thereafter revoked Harness’s
suspended sentence. The Harness court determined that the trial court lacked the power to
revoke the suspended portion of Harness’s sentence prior to the commencement of his period
of suspension. See also Stultz v. State, 92 Ark. App. 204, 212 S.W.3d 42 (2005).
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Appellant erroneously asserts that his period of suspension would begin in 2020.
Appellant was sentenced in October 2000 to serve tenandonehalf years in prison. If he
had served the full sentence, he would have been released in 2011 and his period of
suspension would have commenced upon release.
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By contrast, here there is no doubt that appellant’s period of suspension began when
he was paroled. See Ark. Code Ann. § 1693101(1) (Repl. 2006) (defining “parole” as the
release of the prisoner into the community by the Parole Board prior to the expiration of his
prison term). If a court sentences a defendant to a term of imprisonment and suspends the
imposition of sentence as to an additional term of imprisonment, the period of suspension
commences on the day the defendant is lawfully set at liberty from imprisonment. See Ark.
Code Ann. § 54307(c) (Repl. 2006); Vann v. State, 16 Ark. App. 199, 698 S.W.2d 814
(1985) (stating that the defendant's fiveyear suspended period of imprisonment commenced
to run on the date on which the defendant was paroled from penitentiary). Thus, appellant’s
period of suspension began when he was released on parole, even though he remained a
parolee under the supervision of the Arkansas Department of Correction. See, e.g., Billings
v. State, 53 Ark. App. 219, 921 S.W.2d 607 (1996) (affirming the revocation of the
defendant’s parole and suspended sentence relating to the same offenses).
Finally, the trial court’s revocation was valid because it occurred before the tenyear
period of suspension expired. See Ark. Code Ann. § 54309(d) (Repl. 2006). As the State
notes, even if appellant’s period of suspension began on October 11, 2000, the same day the
original judgment was entered against him, the judgment based on the revocation was entered
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on October 4, 2006, well before the tenyear period of suspension expired.
Affirmed.
HART and GLADWIN, JJ., agree.
2
We note that the judgment and conviction order that was entered following revocation
indicates that appellant was on probation when the offenses warranting revocation were
committed. We further note that the judgment and conviction order for the murder
conviction indicates that appellant was on parole and probation when the murder was
committed. However, the parties agree that appellant was on parole when the offenses
were committed, and it is clear that appellant was not on probation at that time because
he had served a term of imprisonment. See Ark. Code Ann. § 1693101(2) (Repl. 2006)
(defining probation).
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