Ramon Dewey Beal v. State of Arkansas

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, CHIEF JUDGE  DIVISION III  CACR07­178  November 28, 2007  RAMON DEWEY BEAL  APPELLANT  APPEAL  FROM  THE  CRITTENDEN  COUNTY  CIRCUIT  COURT  [NO.  CR­  2005­818]  V. HON.  RALPH WILSON, JR.,  JUDGE  STATE OF ARKANSAS  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  The appellant, Ramon Beal, was tried in the Circuit Court of Crittenden County on  charges of aggravated robbery and burglary arising out of acts that occurred on June 18,  2005.  He  was  found  guilty  of  these  offenses  by  a  jury  and  sentenced  to  terms  of  imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction.  On appeal, he argues that the trial  court  erred  in  denying  his  motion  to  dismiss  on  the  ground  of  former  prosecution.    We  affirm.  Appellant based his argument at trial on the assertion that he previously was charged  in  district  court  with  the  felony  offenses  of  aggravated  robbery  and  residential  burglary  arising out of the same incident and pled guilty to reduced misdemeanor charges of carrying  a weapon and theft by receiving.  Appellant relied below expressly and exclusively on Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5­1­110 and 114 (Repl. 2006).  Pursuant to section 5­1­110(a)(1), a defendant  may not be convicted of an offense if he has previously been convicted of a lesser­included  offense.  The trial judge denied appellant’s motion on the ground that neither of the offenses  of  which  appellant  was  convicted  in  district  court  were  lesser­included  offenses  of  aggravated robbery and residential burglary.  He was correct.  An appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss for violation of the prohibition against  double jeopardy is typically a question of law requiring de novo review.  Winkle v. State, 366  Ark. 318, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006).  Where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation  of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two  offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does  not.  [A] single act may be an offense against two statutes, and if each statute  requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or  conviction  under  either  statute  does  not  exempt  the  defendant  from  prosecution and punishment under the other.  Craig v. State, 314 Ark. 585, 588, 863 S.W.2d 825, 826 (1993) (quoting Blockburger v.  United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)).  The misdemeanor offense of carrying a weapon is committed when a person has a  handgun,  knife,  or  club  on  or  about  his  person  or  vehicle  with  the  intent  to  use  it  as  a  weapon.  Ark. Code Ann. § 5­73­120(a) (Repl. 2005).  The felony offense of aggravated  robbery is committed if a person with the purpose of committing a felony or misdemeanor  theft or resisting apprehension immediately thereafter, employs or threatens to  immediately ­2­  CACR07­178  employ physical force upon another and is armed with a deadly weapon or represents by  word or conduct that he is so armed.  Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5­12­102 and 103 (Repl. 2006).  Because no actual weapon is required to commit aggravated robbery, see, e.g., Edwards v.  State, 360 Ark. 413, 201 S.W.3d 909 (2005), carrying a weapon is not a lesser­included  offense of aggravated robbery.  Likewise, theft by receiving is not a lesser­included offense of residential burglary.  Theft by receiving is committed by receiving, retaining, or disposing of stolen property of  another person, knowing that it was stolen or having good reason to believe it was stolen.  Ark. Code Ann. § 5­36­106(a) (Repl. 2006).  Residential burglary, on the other hand, is  committed when a person enters or remains unlawfully in a residential occupiable structure  of  another  person  with  the  purpose  of  committing  therein  any  offense  punishable  by  imprisonment; the intended additional crime need not be completed and need not be theft.  Ark. Code Ann. § 5­39­201(a)(1)(Repl. 2006).  Appellant’s argument on appeal is also based on the doctrine of res judicata.  This is  outside the scope of the objection at trial, and we will not address it on appeal.  See State v.  Banks, 322 Ark. 344, 909 S.W.2d 634 (1995).  However, even were we to do so, appellant’s  argument would be unavailing.  The State’s dismissal of a case before the trial has begun  does not prevent a subsequent prosecution, and misdemeanor convictions in district court do  not  bar  a  subsequent  felony  prosecution  for  separate  crimes  in  circuit  court,  even  if  the  misdemeanor and felony charges arose out of the same criminal episode.  Branning v. State,  ___ Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Nov. 8, 2007). ­3­  CACR07­178  Affirmed.  GRIFFEN  and MARSHALL, JJ., agree. ­4­  CACR07­178 

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