Ima J. Carman v. Director, Employment Security Department and Advanced O & P Techniques

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

DIVISION II

E05-76

April 5, 2006

IMA J. CARMAN AN APPEAL FROM ARKANSAS

APPELLANT BOARD OF REVIEW

[No. 05-BR-144]

V.

DIRECTOR, EMPLOYMENT

SECURITY DEPARTMENT and

ADVANCED O & P TECHNIQUES

APPELLEES AFFIRMED

Wendell L. Griffen, Judge

Ima Carman appeals from the denial of her claim for unemployment benefits. Carman worked as a bookkeeper for Advanced O & P Techniques. Her claim for unemployment benefits arose after she left her job following a disagreement with Kent Rhinehart, the company's owner, concerning a report she was preparing. We affirm the denial of unemployment benefits under our substantial evidence standard of review.

The hearing testimony revealed the following developments. On November 17, 2004, Carman was preparing a report that she knew Rhinehart expected to be finished that day. However, she misunderstood what information Rhinehart needed the report to include, and the parties unsuccessfully attempted to clarify what Rhinehart wanted. Rhinehart and Steve Blacke, another employee, who needed Carman's report to enter the information on the computer, were in Rhinehart's office after hours that evening, when Carman came into Rhinehart's office with a "hostile attitude." Carman became flustered when Rhinehart questioned her about the report, and she left his office. As she walked down the hallway, Rhinehart asked, "Where are you going, Jean?" She responded, "I'm going home," to which he replied, "Well, I think maybe you need to find another job."

Later that same evening, Carman called another employee, Sarah Woods, who testified that Carman informed her that she had quit, that she intended to return to the office the next morning to "tie up loose ends," that she would be "quitting for good," and that Carman asked Woods if she wanted to quit and look for a new job with her.

According to Carman, when the parties were trying to resolve the misunderstanding concerning the report, Rhinehart was not listening to her and was "hollering" at her, so at approximately 6:15 p.m., she went to her office, got her purse, then informed Rhinehart she was going home. She said that Rhinehart told her, "Fine, if you're leaving, then you need to find another job," to which she responded, "It's not a problem." Carman said that she believed that Rhinehart had fired her and that she told Woods that Rhinehart had fired her, not that she had quit. Nonetheless, she went back to the office early the next morning, "redid" the report, and gave the report to Blacke. Carman then left with her personal effects, did not return, and later filed for unemployment benefits.

The Arkansas Employment Security Department awarded benefits and the Arkansas Appeal Tribunal reversed, finding that Carman left her job voluntarily and without good cause connected with the work. The Arkansas Board of Review affirmed the Appeal Tribunal's decision and found that Carman was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-513 (Supp. 2001) because she left her last work voluntarily and without good cause connected with the work.

Good cause connected with work, for the purposes of determining an employee's eligibility for unemployment compensation after quitting, is a cause that would reasonably impel an average, able-bodied, qualified worker to give up his employment. Lewis v. Director, Employment Sec. Dep't, 84 Ark. App. 381, 141 S.W.3d 896 (2004). The Board of Review's findings of fact are conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence. Bradford v. Director, Employment Sec. Dep't, 83 Ark. App. 332, 128 S.W.3d 20 (2003). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. We review the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Board's findings. Id. Even when there is evidence upon which the Board might have reached a different decision, the scope of judicial review is limited to a determination of whether the Board could reasonably reach its decision upon the evidence before it. Id.

Carman argues that she did not quit her job, but merely left the office to avoid further verbal abuse by Rhinehart. She maintains that she is entitled to receive unemployment benefits because she did not engage in any conduct that deliberately violated her employer's rules, did not willfully disregard the standard of behavior the employer had a right to expect of its employees, and did not act in any manner to manifest culpability, wrongful intent, evil design, an intentional or substantial disregard of her employer's interests, or her own duties and obligations. Sadler v. Stiles, 22 Ark. App. 117, 735 S.W.2d 708 (1987); Willis Johnson v. Daniels Co., 269 Ark. 795, 601 S.W.2d 890 (Ark. App. 1980).

We affirm because substantial evidence supports the Board's decision that Carman left her job without good cause connected with her work. Carman's citation to cases involving misconduct is to no avail because she was not discharged. Rather, in the face of the knowledge that Rhinehart expected the report to be completed on November 17, she left the office without completing the report and demonstrated her intent to do so before Rhinehart suggested that she look for another job. In spite of Carman's assertion that she believed she was fired, she returned the next morning, revised the report, then left for good and took her personal effects. Thus, at the latest, Carman quit her job on November 18, the day after the misunderstanding involving the report.

While it could be argued that Carman acted reasonably in leaving on the evening of November 17 if that was necessary to avoid verbal abuse, the Board of Review apparently did not believe Carman's testimony in this regard. Rhinehart's testimony regarding the nature of the misunderstanding was corroborated by Blacke's testimony. On the other hand, Carman's testimony that she was fired was contradicted by Woods's testimony that Carman told Woods she had quit. In addition, the Board found that Carman's testimony regarding the chronology of events was inconsistent, which weakened her credibility regarding disputed issues of fact. Further, the Board found implausible Carman's testimony that she believed she had been fired yet returned to the office the next day to revise the report.

Accordingly, the Board determined that the immediate cause of Carman's separation from her work was not the fact that Rhinehart "hollered" at her, but was the fact that she became upset when she had difficulty understanding what Rhinehart wanted in the report, and quit her job. Thus, the Board's conclusion that this was not a sufficient cause that would reasonably impel an average, able-bodied, qualified worker to give up his or her employment is supported by substantial evidence.

Finally, Carman makes the cursory argument that she did not receive a fair hearing because she desired to submit a letter that Rhinehart sent to her after she quit. However, as she concedes that Rhinehart read the letter into the record, she has no ground for complaining on appeal.

Affirmed.

Pittman, C.J., and Roaf, J., agree.