Connie Spanhanks v. Cecil Ray Spanhanks
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
TERRY CRABTREE, JUDGE
DIVISION II
CA 06-244
October 4, 2006
CONNIE SPANHANKS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE PIKE COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. DR2005-41]
V.
HONORABLE TED. C. CAPEHEART,
JUDGE
CECIL RAY SPANHANKS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
The parties in this case, appellant Connie Spanhanks and appellee Cecil Spanhanks, were
married in December of 2001 but separated in April of 2005. No children were born of the
marriage. The division of marital property was the focus of the divorce litigation. Connie raises
six issues in this appeal from an amended decree of divorce. We affirm.
The final hearing in this matter was held on September 19, 2005. At the hearing, it was
revealed that the parties had been living in a mobile home on three acres of land deeded to them
as tenants by the entirety by Cecil’s mother. Connie’s parents had given them $24,500 as a down
payment on the mobile home that was purchased for $43,566, plus taxes of $1,434.31. The mobile
home was titled in Connie and Cecil’s names, and the loan balance as of the day of the hearing was
$18,302. Connie’s parents had also given them $5,000 associated with hook-up costs for the
trailer, and her parents had made other monetary gifts to purchase such things as a riding lawn
mower, a power washer, concrete steps for the mobile home, and a meat grinder. Connie’s parents
had also bought Connie’s son a vehicle that had been titled in Cecil and Connie’s names. All told,
Connie testified that her parents had given them $33,500 in gifts.
Connie further testified that she removed from the marital home the mower, the concrete
steps, the power washer and meat grinder, as well as other items of personal property that either
had been given to her by members of her family or she had owned prior to the marriage. She also
said that Cecil had been driving a 2000 Chevrolet Impala that she had owned before the marriage,
and that she was driving a 2000 Chrysler LHS that was purchased during the marriage. Connie
testified that Cecil had bought farming equipment during the marriage and that he ran a cattle
operation. She said that Cecil had sold some of the cattle and that the income from the operation
had been reported as joint income on their tax return.
In their testimony, Connie and her mother asked the trial court to award Connie, dollar for
dollar, the $33,500 that Connie’s parents had contributed to the marital estate. They said, however,
that Cecil should be credited with $4,448, representing the sum he had paid to retire the debt on
the Chrysler LHS, if Connie were to receive this vehicle in the divorce. Thus, according to Connie
and her mother, Connie should receive $29,052 from Cecil. She requested that the three acres and
mobile home be sold and the proceeds divided, but she said that the $29,052 should come “off the
top.” She also wanted to keep all of the personal property that she had in her possession, saying
“I want my gifts and my half of the marital property.” Introduced into evidence was a sheet of
paper that Connie referred to as a “settlement agreement,” which she claimed reflected her
proposed disposition of the marital property. The “agreement” consists of a handwritten tally of
the monetary gifts made by Connie’s parents, and a list of personal property. In the midst of the
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personal-property list, it says “payoff of Chrysler, 4,432 (you keep Chevy Impala).” Otherwise,
there are no terms stated, and it does not mention either the mobile home or the three acres of land.
At the top of this piece of paper, it is written “I Cecil Spanhanks, Do Agree to the Following Terms
for Settlement of Property.”
Cecil testified that he worked at the Briar Plant of BPB Gypsum and that he had a farming
operation for raising beef cattle. He estimated that he had eighty-six head of cattle and said that
he had sold some cattle in the ordinary course of business for $3,500. Cecil testified that he had
financed the purchase of a new tractor during the marriage and that he still owed money on it. The
purchase price of the tractor was $29,924, reduced by a $10,000 trade-in, and the payoff was
currently $11,457. He had also purchased a fifteen-foot bushog that had a loan balance of $5,423.
Cecil said that it was their practice for Connie to take the state income tax refund, while he kept
the federal tax refund. The past year Connie had received the state refund of $1,429, and he had
received the federal refund in the amount of $4,985.
Cecil testified that he had signed the “agreement” because Connie’s father had threatened
to “hire the dirtiest, crookedest lawyer” that could be found and because he wanted to keep the
house, the three acres, and cattle operation. He said, however, that the gifts from Connie’s parents
had been made to them as a married couple, not just to Connie. He said that he did not believe that
paying Connie’s parents back dollar for dollar all the money they had put into the marital estate
was fair. He asked the trial court to decide what was an equal and fair amount. He testified that
he had offered Connie $20,000 to settle the case. Cecil further testified that the three acres his
mother had deeded them had an assessed value of $2,100.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated to the attorneys:
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I want each of you to submit a proposed decree, stating why if you
want something divided other than fifty, and that’s assuming that
this $25,000 and all this money given, the Court is finding that’s
marital, but that doesn’t mean it can’t be divided one hundred
percent back or any other degree, percentage. Get it to me in two
weeks on the 30 th. You know that if the Court divides it any other
way than fifty fifty, you have to state the reasons set forth in the
statute for division other than fifty fifty. You can’t just say I divide
it this way and that’s the end of it. There has to be a reason stating.
On October 26, 2005, the trial court entered the divorce decree that had been prepared by Connie’s
attorney. The decree recited in pertinent part:
Subsequent to the separation of the parties, they entered into
property settlement negotiations, and did make and enter into an
agreement, a copy of which was introduced as Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3,
without objection by the defendant [Cecil]. The defendant testified
this was the “original agreement” of the parties. Under the terms of
that agreement, the plaintiff [Connie] was to have as her sole and
separate property the items lists on P-3, a Chrysler automobile
purchased during the marriage by the parties, upon which was still
owed approximately $4,400.00, which the defendant agreed to pay,
and the defendant was to refund to the plaintiff the sum of $33,500,
being the sum of the gifts given to plaintiff by her parents, that sum
to be reduced by the amount of the pay off made on the Chrysler by
the defendant.
In consideration of plaintiff’s receipt of the aforesaid items and
sums, the plaintiff agreed the defendant should have the
manufactured home, subject to the remaining $20,000.00
indebtedness thereon, 3 acres, cattle operation and equipment, and
the 2001 Chevrolet Impala.
The decree, however, divided the property as follows:
Therefore, while the Court finds that $25,000.00 of the gifts made
to plaintiff by her parents are marital property, the Court further
finds the plaintiff is entitled to a Dollar for Dollar reimbursement
for the sum of Twenty Nine Thousand Fifty Two & no/100's Dollars
($29,052.00) from the defendant, giving the defendant credit for the
pay off he made on the Chrysler automobile, pursuant to the
“original agreement.”
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That the Plaintiff is entitled to be, and she hereby is, granted
ownership, free of any claim from the defendant, of those items of
personal property, including the Chrysler automobile, in her
possession which she took and which were surrendered to her by
the defendant pursuant to the terms of the “original agreement.”
That the defendant is entitled to be, and hereby is, vested with the
ownership of the 80 head of cattle, tractor, bushog and farm
equipment, subject to any indebtedness thereon, and the Chevrolet
Impala.
That the marital home is to be sold at public sale by the Clerk of
the Court acting as Commissioner, in the time and manner specified
by Arkansas law, and the proceeds of said sale are to be distributed
as follows: 1. To the costs of the sale; 2. To paying any remaining
indebtedness on the manufactured home; 2[sic]. $29,052.00 to the
plaintiff as reimbursement for her property received as gifts and
expended for the benefit of the marital relationship; 3. the balance
to be divided between the parties ½ and ½.
On October 31, 2005, Cecil filed a pleading styled “Motion for Reconsideration or
Alternatively For New Trial.” In this motion, Cecil complained that his counsel had never received
a copy of Connie’s proposed decree and that he, therefore, had no opportunity to offer any
objections prior to the time the decree was entered. Cecil further complained that the decree was
unjust and unfair because it provided that Connie’s parents were to be reimbursed dollar for dollar
the gifts they had made, whereas the real property given to the parties by Cecil’s mother had not
been given the same treatment or consideration.
The trial court heard argument of counsel during a hearing held on November 7, 2005. The
court made no ruling at that time, but later the court entered an amended decree on November 22,
2005. In the amended decree, the trial court found that the division of property outlined by the
parties’ settlement negotiations was inequitable. The court further found that the division of
property contained in the original decree was not equitable. As in the original decree, Connie was
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awarded those items of personal property which she had taken, including the Chrysler automobile.
Also as in the original decree, Cecil was awarded the cattle, tractor, farm equipment, and Chevrolet
Impala. The amended decree provided, however, that Cecil was awarded the three acres of land
and the mobile home. Connie was awarded $22,000 for her interest in the home, real property, and
all other marital property. If Cecil failed to pay this amount in thirty days, then the home and real
property were to be sold.
Connie’s first argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss Cecil’s
motion for reconsideration. Connie contends that the trial court should have dismissed the motion
because it contained a certificate of merit, but not a certificate of service as required by Rule 5(e)
of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Connie, however, has not demonstrated any prejudice flowing
from this technical defect. She was in fact served with a copy of the motion five days before the
hearing, or two days after the motion was filed. We do not reverse absent a showing of prejudice.
See Hall v. Summit Contractors, Inc., 356 Ark. 609, 158 S.W.3d 185 (2004).
Connie’s next two arguments are related. First, she contends that Cecil’s motion for
reconsideration was a motion for a new trial made under Ark. R. Civ. P. 59 and that the trial court
erred by stating in the amended decree that it was acting pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 60(a) “to
prevent a miscarriage of justice.” Connie further argues that, regardless of whether the motion is
considered as one under either Rule 59 or Rule 60, the trial court erred in amending the decree to
provide that the three acres of land was to be Cecil’s sole and separate property because Cecil did
not previously request that relief. In this regard, Connie points out that a motion pursuant to either
rule cannot be used to consider arguments that were not raised prior to the entry of judgment. See
Pyron v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 363 Ark. 521, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2005) (trial court
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does not abuse its discretion in denying a Rule 60 motion where the argument made in the motion
was not raised prior to the entry of judgment); Whisnant v. Whisnant, 68 Ark. App. 298, 6 S.W.3d
808 (1999) (Rule 59 cannot be used to raise arguments not made to the trial court before the entry
of judgment).
Motions are to be liberally construed, and courts should not be blinded by titles but should
look to the substance of the motions to ascertain what they seek. Slaton v. Slaton, 330 Ark. 287,
956 S.W.2d 150 (1997). Cecil’s motion in this instance asserted that the decree was contrary to
the law and the evidence presented at the divorce hearing, and it asserted that the decree was unjust
and unfair because the gift of land made by his mother was not given the same treatment as the gifts
bestowed on the parties by Connie’s parents. Even if we agreed with Connie’s argument that the
trial court mischaracterized Cecil’s motion, no reversible error occurred. Connie does not question
the trial court’s authority to act pursuant to Rule 59, which provides in subsection (a) that in cases
tried without a jury the trial court may amend its findings of fact and conclusions of law or make
new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment. Instead, the crux of her
argument is that the trial court erred in awarding Cecil the land because he had not previously
requested that relief. See Whisnant v. Whisnant, supra. However, Connie did not make this
argument to the trial court, and we do not address issues that are raised for the first time on appeal.
Posey v. Bernard’s Healthcare, Inc., ___ Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Feb. 2, 2006).
Connie’s fourth argument is that there is no evidence to overcome the presumption that
Cecil’s mother had made a gift of the three acres that was deeded to them as tenants by the entirety.
Connie also contends that the trial court erred in finding that Cecil had paid the debt on the
Chrysler with money derived from the sale of cattle. We find no merit in these contentions. This
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case was presented to the trial court in an unusual posture in that no regard was given to the law
governing the division of marital property. We are mindful that it was Connie who asked the trial
court to disregard the marital nature of the gifts that were made by her parents. It was also Connie
who represented to the trial court that the “agreement” they had entered into, as shown by the
recitals in the original decree, provided that she was to be reimbursed for the gifts her parents had
made and that Cecil was to have the three acres. However, the original decree did not award Cecil
the property; instead, it was ordered to be sold. It was also Connie who agreed in her testimony
that Cecil was to be reimbursed for the money he spent to retire the debt on the Chrysler
automobile. In our view, the trial court’s award of the three acres to Cecil and the credit given for
his payment of the debt on the Chrysler are akin to invited error. An appellant may not complain
of an alleged erroneous action of the trial court if she has consented to or acquiesced in that action.
Harness v. Arkansas Public Service Comm’n, 60 Ark. App. 265, 962 S.W.2d 374 (1998).
Connie’s fifth point is that the trial court erred because the amended decree does not state
any reasons for an unequal division of the marital property as required by Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12315 (Repl. 2002). Connie concedes, however, that it cannot be determined from the record that
there was an unequal division because numerous valuations are absent from the record. The
burden of proving error on appeal is on the appellant. Young v. Young, 316 Ark. 456, 872 S.W.2d
856 (1994). It is appellant’s burden to bring up a record sufficient to demonstrate error. Id. When
an appellant fails to demonstrate error, we affirm. Id.
Connie’s final point is that the trial court erred by failing to enforce the “settlement
agreement” as set out in the original decree. It was, however, within the sound discretion of the
trial court to approve, disapprove, or modify the agreement. Rutherford v. Rutherford, 81 Ark.
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App. 122, 98 S.W.3d 842 (2003). The trial court found that the “agreement” was not equitable.
We note also that, contrary to Connie’s argument, the original decree did not abide by the
“agreement” inasmuch as it did not provide that Cecil was to have the mobile home and the land.
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision.
Affirmed.
H ART and G LOVER , JJ., agree.
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