Counseling Services of Eastern Arkansas and the Zenith Insurance Company v. Janett Hughes
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
JUDGE DAVID M. GLOVER
DIVISION II
CA06-242
December 6, 2006
COUNSELING SERVICES OF
EASTERN ARKANSAS & THE
ZENITH INSURANCE COMPANY
APPELLANTS
V.
APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
COMMISSION [F203812]
JANETT HUGHES
APPELLEE
REVERSED
In this workers’ compensation case, the administrative law judge determined that
appellants, Counseling Services of Eastern Arkansas and its insurance carrier, Zenith
Insurance Company, were responsible for all hospital, medical, and related expenses for
treatment of appellee Janett Hughes’s admitted, compensable injuries, including, but not
limited to, reimbursement to appropriate health providers who paid for evaluation of
appellee’s headaches, blackouts, and vascular problems, and that appellants remained
responsible for continued, reasonably necessary medical treatment for appellee’s
admitted, compensable injuries. The ALJ further found that appellee was entitled to
additional temporary-total disability for the period beginning May 15, 2003, and
continuing through January 29, 2004, while being evaluated for a determination as to the
cause of her continuing headaches, blackouts, and vascular problems. The Commission
affirmed and adopted the ALJ’s opinion, and appellants now appeal those determinations
to this court.
On appeal, appellants argue that there is no substantial evidence to support the
Commission’s decision (1) that appellee is entitled to the payment of her medical
expenses associated with the treatment of her alleged blackouts, headaches, and vascular
problems, and (2) that appellee is entitled to temporary-total disability benefits from May
15, 2003, until January 29, 2004.
We agree with appellants, and we reverse the
Commission’s award of benefits to appellee.
We note preliminarily that appellants have filed a motion to strike portions of
appellee’s brief, which this court passed to the panel for decision with the submission of
the case. In this motion, appellants point out that in her argument, appellee included a
statement that she had subsequently returned to Dr. Ricca and he had noted further
deterioration in her spine and recommended surgical intervention. Appellee noted that
this information was not a part of the record in this matter.
Appellants have now
requested that this statement be stricken from appellee’s brief. Appellants are correct that
this court should not consider that statement, as it is, even by appellee’s own admission,
not a part of the record before this court, and we grant appellants’ motion to strike that
portion of appellee’s brief.
Standard of Review
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In workers’ compensation cases, this court views the evidence and all reasonable
inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission’s findings
and affirms the decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Geo Specialty Chem. v.
Clingan, 69 Ark. App. 369, 13 S.W.3d 218 (2000). Substantial evidence is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Air
Compressor Equip. v. Sword, 69 Ark. App. 162, 11 S.W.3d 1 (2000). The issue is not
whether we might have reached a different result or whether the evidence would have
supported a contrary finding; if reasonable minds could reach the Commission’s
conclusion, we must affirm its decision. Geo Specialty, supra. It is the Commission’s
province to determine witness credibility and the weight to be given to each witness’s
testimony. Johnson v. Riceland Foods, 47 Ark. App. 71, 884 S.W.2d 626 (1994).
In a workers’ compensation case, it is the claimant’s burden to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence both that her claim is compensable and that there is a
causal connection between the work-related accident and the later disabling injury.
Stephenson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 70 Ark. App. 265, 19 S.W.3d 36 (2000).
The
determination of whether the causal connection exists is a question of fact for the
Commission to determine. Id.
Facts
Appellee, Janett Hughes, was employed by Counseling Services of Eastern
Arkansas as an adult case manager. In this job, she was responsible for approximately
forty clients, and one of her duties was transportation. On March 20, 2002, appellee was
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involved in a motor vehicle accident after dropping one of her clients off for a doctor’s
appointment, and she suffered right knee, back, and neck injuries, which appellants
accepted as compensable.
Appellee ultimately underwent discectomies, as well as a
cervical fusion in September 2002, and a lumbar fusion in November 2002. Appellants
paid temporary-total disability from March 20, 2002, until December 17, 2002, and
temporary-partial disability from December 22, 2002, through January 18, 2003.
Appellee returned to work from December 16, 2002, to January 17, 2003, when she was
again taken off work; appellants paid temporary-total disability from January 28, 2003,
until March 10, 2003. Dr. Gregory Ricca, appellee’s neurosurgeon for both her cervical
and low back problems, stated that appellee reached maximum medical improvement on
March 5, 2003, and released her to return to work on March 10, 2003. In his office notes,
Dr. Ricca discussed appellee’s functional-capacity exam of February 19, 2003, which
indicated that she could perform at least light-duty work and that she had symptom
magnification in testing consistencies, which suggested that she could exceed that amount
of effort if needed. Dr. Ricca stated that appellee’s job demands fell into the sedentary
work range; however, he noted that appellee reported that driving was “quite difficult”
and that she was unable to do that. Dr. Ricca noted that “after a long discussion,” it was
agreed that he would allow her to return to work on March 10, 2003, with light-duty
restrictions, except no excessive driving.
Appellee testified at the hearing that she returned to work and was on light duty in
the office until March 26, 2003; appellee stated that at that time, Scott Waddell, the
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personnel director, told her that she should be able to go back to her case-management job
on a full-time basis; that she should not have any trouble driving; and that if she did not
start performing her case-management duties the following day, he would fire her.
Appellee said that she performed her case-management job from March 27 until
April 1, 2003. On April 1, appellee testified that she was leaving her last client’s house;
that she was stopped at a stop light; that a car turned in front of her; that she had to stop
quickly; that it hurt her neck; that the next day she started having blackout spells; and that
Dr. James Meredith, her primary-care physician, took her off work until the following
Monday. She said that when she returned to work the following Monday, she completed
an accident report. Appellee said that Dr. Meredith restricted her from driving on May
15, 2003, because of her blackout spells; that she informed her employer of this; that their
response was “if you can’t do your job, don’t bother coming in at all”; and that they told
her light-duty work was no longer available.
On cross-examination, appellee stated that she believed that her injury caused her
to develop headaches, blackouts, heart palpitations, “weird things” with her blood
pressure, loss of feeling in her right leg, bilateral swelling in both feet, and loss of feeling
in her right hand. Appellee explained that her first blackout spell was April 2, 2003,
which was the day after her “near miss” quick stop on April 1. She said that after that
blackout, she was sweating and her heart was palpitating, she could not catch her breath
and that the whole back of her head felt like it was “going to explode out in the front.”
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Upon questioning from the ALJ, appellee stated that appellants quit paying for
treatment after she was released by Dr. Ricca in March 2003. She said that on May 15,
2003, her employer told her that if she could not do her job to not bother coming in;
appellee said that as a result of that conversation, she left her employment because she did
not feel that she could do the work, and that she had not worked since that time.
After the April 1, 2003 incident, appellee saw Dr. Meredith on April 3, and he
noted that appellee presented with a headache, neck pain, and what she thought was a
syncopal episode. Dr. Meredith noted that they reviewed her functional-capacity exam,
and that appellee disputed several things said by the evaluators. Dr. Meredith diagnosed
cervical-disc disease and migraine headaches; advised appellee not to drive; and referred
her to Dr. Glenn Dickson. Dr. Dickson first saw appellee on May 14, 2003, and he
advised appellee that she was unable to work until she was evaluated by a neurologist or
neurosurgeon.
Appellee was referred to Dr. Ron South, a neurologist, who in turn referred her to
Cardiology Associates of Northeast Arkansas and to Dr. Victor Biton of the Arkansas
Epilepsy Program.
Dr. Fraser Richards with Cardiology Associates of Northeast
Arkansas evaluated appellee in June and July 2003; however, the tests performed,
including carotid artery, tilt-table, serial BP/heart rate, EKG, twenty-four hour Holter
monitor, 2-D M-Mode Color Flow Mapping, and cardiac Doppler, all proved negative for
arrhythmia related etiology.
Dr. Biton conducted a twenty-four hour EEG, which
determined that appellee did not suffer from epilepsy. Appellee was then examined and
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evaluated by Dr. Robert Abraham, a neurosurgeon, and Dr. Brian Dickson. None of these
examinations revealed a cause for appellee’s symptoms.
Appellee was next sent to Dr. Reginald Rutherford by appellants, who concluded
that appellee’s predominant problem was a conversion reaction.
Dr. Rutherford
recommended that appellee be seen by Dr. Judy White Johnson for a detailed
psychological evaluation.
Dr. Johnson stated that appellee’s overall pattern was
consistent with a conversion disorder attributable to the March 20, 2002, motor-vehicle
accident. However, in his opinion, the ALJ noted that appellee’s entitlement to benefits
related to any psychological injury was not joined by the parties at the hearing and
therefore, by necessity, had to be specifically reserved.
ALJ’s Opinion
In his opinion the ALJ found that it was “undisputed that after [appellee] returned
to work, she sustained either a recurrence of her compensable injury or an aggravation
thereof when she was required to stop abruptly while driving a vehicle, causing additional
neck pain followed by headaches and syncopal episodes which required her to return to
her primary care physician, Dr. James T. Meredith, who again took [appellee] off work
and made several referrals to determine the cause of [appellee’s] blackouts and
headaches.”
The ALJ found that appellee was credible and that she was entitled to
reimbursement for all hospital, medical, and related expenses for the evaluation of her
headaches, blackouts, and vascular problems. The ALJ further found that appellee was
also entitled to an additional period of temporary-total disability from May 15, 2003,
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when she was first taken off work by Dr. Dickson, until January 29, 2004, when Dr.
Abraham released appellee to return on an as-needed basis, even though he specifically
found that appellee’s “additional problems with headaches and blackouts were unrelated
to her physical injury.” The Commission affirmed and adopted this opinion.
Expenses for Evaluation of Headaches, Blackouts and Vascular Problems
In Hamilton v. Gregory Trucking, 90 Ark. App. 248, 250-51, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___
(2005) (citations omitted), this court held:
The employer shall promptly provide for an injured employee such medical,
surgical, hospital, chiropractic, optometric, podiatric, and nursing services and
medicine . . . as may be reasonably necessary in connection with the injury
received by the employee. The employee has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that medical treatment is reasonable and necessary.
What constitutes reasonably necessary treatment under the statute is a question of
fact for the Commission.
We hold that reasonable persons could not reach the Commission’s conclusion that
all of the medical testing performed to determine the cause of appellee’s headaches and
blackouts was reasonable and necessary treatment of appellee’s compensable injury,
especially in light of the ALJ’s finding that the source of appellee’s problems was
unrelated to her physical injury.1 While appellee should certainly investigate the reason
for her headaches and blackouts, when these problems cannot be related to her workrelated compensable injury, it is not reasonable and necessary treatment for her
1
We offer no opinion as to the viability of a claim for a psychological problem, as that
issue was specifically reserved by the ALJ.
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compensable injury, and appellants are not responsible for the cost of that medical testing.
Therefore, we reverse the Commission’s award of benefits for the additional medical
testing.
Temporary-Total Disability
The ALJ also awarded appellee additional temporary-total disability benefits. To
be eligible for temporary-total disability, a claimant must be within her healing period and
have a total incapacity to earn wages. Fred’s, Inc. v. Jefferson, 89 Ark. App. 95, 200
S.W.3d 477 (2004). In Poulan Weed Eater v. Marshall, 79 Ark. App. 129, 135, 84
S.W.3d 878, 882 (2002) (citations omitted), this court held:
Temporary total disability is that period within the healing period in which an
employee suffers a total incapacity to earn wages; the healing period is that period
for healing of an accidental injury that continues until the employee is as far
restored as the permanent character of his injury will permit, and that ends when
the underlying condition causing the disability has become stable and nothing in
the way of treatment will improve that condition. The determination of when the
healing period has ended is a factual determination for the Commission and will be
affirmed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. These are matters of
weight and credibility, and thus lie within the exclusive province of the
Commission.
In light of our determination that the extensive additional testing appellee
underwent to determine the cause of her headaches and blackouts was not reasonable and
necessary treatment for appellee’s compensable injury, we also hold that appellee did not
remain in her healing period; therefore, we also reverse the Commission’s award of
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additional temporary-total disability benefits.
The healing period is that period for
healing of an accidental injury that continues until the employee is as far restored as the
permanent character of his injury will permit, and that ends when the underlying
condition causing the disability has become stable and nothing in the way of treatment
will improve that condition. Poulan Weed Eater, supra. Dr. Ricca found that appellee
reached maximum medical improvement in relation to her compensable injury on March
5, 2003, and released appellee to return to work on March 10, 2003.
We also hold that the evidence does not indicate that appellee was totally
incapacitated from earning wages.
Appellee’s functional-capacity exam, although
admittedly given before the April 1 “near miss” accident, indicated that she could perform
sedentary work, and stated that her job as a case manager was within her capabilities.
Appellee voluntarily quit her job because she did not feel that she could perform her
duties, and she has not worked since. It was appellee’s burden of proof to show that she
was totally incapable of earning wages, and she failed to meet this burden. Therefore, we
reverse the Commission’s award of additional temporary-total disability benefits.
We note that in his opinion under the heading of temporary-total disability
benefits, the ALJ states that it is undisputed that appellee sustained either a recurrence or
an aggravation of her compensable injury on April 1, 2003. We further hold that appellee
did not prove either a recurrence or an aggravation. A recurrence is not a new injury;
rather, it is “another period of incapacitation resulting from a previous injury,” and it
occurs “when the second complication is a natural and probable consequence of a prior
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injury.” Crudup v. Regal Ware, Inc., 341 Ark. 804, 809, 20 S.W.3d 900, 903 (2000). An
aggravation is a new injury resulting from an independent incident; an aggravation, being
a new injury with an independent cause, must meet the definition of a compensable injury
in order to establish compensability for the aggravation. Parker v. Atlantic Research
Corp., 87 Ark. App. 145, 189 S.W.3d 449 (2004). It cannot be undisputed that appellee
suffered either an aggravation or a recurrence.
An aggravation requires meeting the
definition of a compensable injury, and in this case, there are no objective findings of an
injury. A recurrence requires proof of another period of incapacitation that is the natural
and probable consequence of a prior injury. Here, the evidence in the record does not
support the finding of a recurrence either, as the ALJ found that appellee’s headaches and
blackouts were not related to her prior compensable injury.
Reversed.
P ITTMAN, C.J., and G RIFFEN, J., agree.
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