Edward Grays v. Becton Timber Company and American Interstate Insurance Co.
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DIVISION I
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
L ARRY D. V AUGHT, Judge
CA06-166
September 6, 2006
EDWARD GRAYS
APPELLANT
V.
BECTON TIMBER COMPANY and
AMERICAN INTERSTATE
INSURANCE CO.
APPELLEES
APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
COMMISSION
[NO. F200907]
AFFIRMED
Appellant Edward Grays appeals from the decision of the Arkansas Workers’
Compensation Commission finding that he failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that he was entitled to additional medical care and treatment and wage-loss
disability. He argues on appeal that the Commission’s decision was not supported by
substantial evidence. We disagree and affirm.
Grays, a forty-nine-year-old man, had worked for Becton Timber Co. for five years,
mainly as a truck driver. On November 21, 2001, he sustained a neck injury as he exited his
truck while his load was being weighed. Grays described his injury as “a tear in my neck,”
“like [I] pulled something.” He stated that his neck hurt and that he had muscle spasms in his
neck and arms. Appellees accepted his injury as compensable, and paid medical expenses and
temporary-total-disability benefits.
Neurosurgeon Dr. Steven Cathey performed surgery on Grays for a disc herniation at
“the right C5-C6" on June 21, 2002. Grays testified that his pain worsened after the surgery.
However, Dr. Cathey released Grays without work restrictions and assigned him a tenpercent impairment rating in January 2003. Dr. Cathey concluded that Grays did not need
additional surgery, based on a postoperative MRI, and referred Grays to Dr. Brian Nichol for
pain management. Dr. Cathey also suggested Grays get a second opinion regarding whether
additional treatment was necessary. Subsequently, Dr. Barry Baskin evaluated Grays on May
15, 2003. Dr. Barkin found no objective medical evidence to explain Grays’s pain symptoms
and agreed that no further treatment was necessary. Grays has not worked since January 2003
when he was released for work by Dr. Cathey.
Dr. Nichol continued to treat Grays’s pain using epidural steroid injections and
physical therapy. Dr. Nichol’s medical notes suggested that he was treating Grays for
multilevel facets bilaterally from C3-C7. Dr. Nichol’s own notes indicated that Grays’s
September 2001 MRI showed the cervical fusion was a “very good, stable fusion at the C5C6 level with good progression of interbody fusion.” Dr. Nichol went on to note that Grays’s
“axial cervical pain [occurs] after a seizure” and that “his cervical fusion is in excellent
progression.” Dr. Nichol stated that Grays’s complaints of pain “appear most likely to be that
of facet-mediated etiology.” Grays testified that a trial morphine pump furnished by Dr.
Nichol alleviated some of his pain and that he intends to return to Dr. Nichol to obtain a
permanent pump. Grays took a Functional Capacity Evaluation (FCE) on February 16, 2005,
which was considered unreliable based on his inconsistent efforts and refusal to perform all
the tests. Additionally, Grays gave inappropriate pain responses on the FCE, describing his
pain as a “9” and a “10,” although he was instructed that a “9” meant he was “unable to
speak, crying out or moaning uncontrollably, near delirium.” His medical history includes
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a knife wound to his right shoulder, hypertension, right knee problems, and a motor-vehicle
accident.
When reviewing a decision of the Commission, we view the evidence and all
reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings of the
Commission, and we affirm that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Searcy
Indus. Laundry Inc. v. Ferren, 82 Ark. App. 69, 110 S.W.3d 306 (2003). Substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion. Id. at 72, 110 S.W.3d at 307. We will not reverse the Commission’s decision
unless we are convinced that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not
have reached the conclusions arrived at by the Commission. Id., 110 S.W.3d at 307. In
making our review, we recognize that it is the function of the Commission to determine the
credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Id., 110 S.W.3d at 307.
Furthermore, the Commission has the duty of weighing medical evidence and, if the evidence
is conflicting, its resolution is a question of fact for the Commission. Id., 110 S.W.3d at 307.
Workers’ compensation law provides that an employer shall provide the medical
services that are reasonably necessary in connection with the injury received by the
employee. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-508(a) (Repl. 2002); Stone v. Dollar Gen. Stores, __ Ark.
App. __, __ S.W.3d __ (June 8, 2005). The employee has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that medical treatment is reasonable and necessary. Id.
The Commission is charged with the duty of determining disability based upon a
consideration of medical evidence and other matters affecting wage loss, such as the
claimant’s age, education, and work experience. Emerson Elec. v. Gaston, 75 Ark. App. 232,
236, 58 S.W.3d 848, 851 (2001). In considering factors that may affect an employee’s future
earning capacity, the court considers the claimant’s motivation to return to work, because a
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lack of interest or a negative attitude impedes our assessment of the claimant’s loss of
earning capacity. Id. at 237–38, 58 S.W.3d at 851–52.
On appeal, Grays argues that the Commission erred in finding that he had failed to
prove entitlement to additional medical treatment and that he was not entitled to wage-loss
disability. We hold that there is substantial evidence to affirm the Commission’s decision on
both issues. First, the Commission had to weigh the medical opinions of Dr. Cathey and Dr.
Baskin—both stating that there was no explanation for Grays’s pain and no reason for
additional medical treatment—against the opinion of Dr. Nichol, a pain management doctor
who, based on his own notes, agreed with the other two doctors that Grays’s surgery was
successful. The Commission reviewed Dr. Nichol’s records and concluded that he was
treating Grays for problems not connected to the November 2001 accident and there was no
basis for those treatments to be compensable. Based on the opinions of Dr. Cathey and Dr.
Baskin—and the Commission’s duty to weigh the medical evidence—we are satisfied that
the Commission’s decision that Grays was unable to show that he was entitled to additional
medical treatment was supported by substantial evidence.
Second, the Commission also declined to award Grays wage-loss benefits based on
the fact that Dr. Cathey released him without work restrictions and that Grays did not
perform to his best ability on the FCE. Grays never attempted to return to work following his
release by Dr. Cathey. Additionally, evidence suggested that he gave poor effort on the FCE
and that he described his pain at levels that were incorrect, even after being given instruction
describing the differing levels. The Commission is charged with determining if Grays was
entitled to wage-loss disability based on his age, work experience, and education, as well as
taking into account Grays’s motivation to return to work. Based on the facts of this case, we
hold that the Commission did not err in denying Grays wage-loss disability because he was
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not motivated to return to work, did not perform to the best of his ability on the FCE, was
relatively young and in good health, and had received the permission from two different
doctors to return to work without restrictions.
Affirmed.
H ART and N EAL, JJ., agree.
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