David Bier and Marcia Bier v. Norma Mills

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David BIER and Marcia Bier v. Norma MILLS  CA06­28  __ S. W.3d ___  Court of Appeals of Arkansas  Opinion delivered June 14 2006  FAMILY LAW  – CHILD CUSTODY  – IT WAS NOT IN THE BEST INTEREST AND WELFARE OF THE  CHILD FOR PATERNAL GRANDPARENTS TO HAVE VISITATION.– Where appellants had temporary  custody of the minor child, but allowed the child to move in with his father despite the fact  that the trial court previously had removed custody from him and placed temporary custody  with them, the trial judge denied visitation to the appellants and temporarily placed legal and  physical custody of the child with his maternal grandmother; although the trial judge relied  on evidence outside the record in this matter, it was not clearly erroneous or an abuse of  discretion for the trial court to determine that visitation between appellants the child, at that  point in time, was not in the best interest and welfare of the child.  Appeal from Washington County Circuit Court; Stacy Zimmerman, Judge; affirmed.  Jack & Holly Martin & Associates, P.A., by:  Ed Tarvin, for appellants.  No response.  ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge.  This is a one­brief appeal from an order entered by the  Washington County Circuit Court denying appellants David and Marcia Bier visitation with  1  respect  to  their  paternal  grandson,  T.T.  (DOB  3/25/96),  who  is  in  the  custody  of  his 1  Marcia Bier is the child’s biological paternal grandmother, who married David in 2001.  ___________________________  GLADWIN, J. ­ 3  BIER v. MILLS  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 2  maternal grandmother, appellee Norma Mills.  Appellants challenge the sufficiency of the  evidence  and  allege  that  the  trial  court’s  decision  that  they  have  no  contact  with  their  grandson was an abuse of discretion.  We affirm.  T.T.’s mother is deceased, and after various problems with his father, the trial court  placed temporary custody of T.T. with appellants in December 2003.  Sometime later in  2004,  appellants,  who  live  in  Iowa,  sent  T.T.  to  live  with  his  father  in  Eureka  Springs,  Arkansas, against the orders of the trial court.  Upon learning of the situation, the trial court  removed T.T. from his father and temporarily placed legal and physical custody of the child  with appellee in November 2004.  On December 14, 2004, the trial court ordered custody to  remain with appellee and further determined that T.T. was to have no contact with his father  and only telephone visitation with appellants to be supervised by his counselor Ross Kelly.  Visitation was sporadic, with appellants only talking to T.T. four times prior to his  admission to Vista Health Services, where he received inpatient treatment from May 31,  2005,  through  August  26,  2005.  He  was  diagnosed  and  treated  for  mood  disorder  not  otherwise specified, intermittent­explosive disorder, oppositional­defiant disorder, attention­  deficit­hyperactivity disorder, asthma, methicillin­resistant­staphylococcus­aureus infection,  tooth abscess, problems with primary support group, problems relating to social environment,  educational problems, and problems related to interaction with the legal system.  He was  discharged back into the custody of appellee with medication management consisting of  Trileptal  and  Ritalin,  as  well  as  follow­up  care  from  Dr.  Richard  Lloyd,  his  attending  physician and psychiatrist, and outpatient counseling with Mr. Banyon Patterson.  Appellants filed a petition to establish grandparent visitation with respect to T.T. on  March  9,  2005.  Appellee  was  named  as  the  respondent  in  the  petition,  and  she  filed  a  response to the petition on March 31, 2005.  On April 25, 2005, the case was transferred  from Circuit Judge Mark Lindsay to Circuit Judge Stacey Zimmerman, who had presided  over the two previous juvenile cases involving T.T.’ s custodial placement.  A hearing was  held on the petition on September 16, 2005.  Appellants and appellee testified, along with  Judith Harvey, the director of social services at Vista Health Services.  At the close of the  hearing, the trial court denied the petition for visitation and further ordered that appellants  have no contact with T.T.  The trial court issued a hand­written order at the conclusion of  the hearing, and the same order was filed of record on September 20, 2005.  Appellants filed  a notice of appeal on October 10, 2005.  We  review  traditional  equity  cases  de  novo  on  the  record  and  will  not  reverse  a  finding  of  fact  by  the  trial  judge  unless  it  is  clearly  against  the  preponderance  of  the  evidence.  Williams v. Williams, 82 Ark. App. 294, 108 S.W.3d 629 (2003).  In reviewing ___________________________  GLADWIN, J. ­ 3  BIER v. MILLS  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 3  the trial judge’s findings, we give due deference to the judge’s superior position to determine  the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be accorded to their testimony.  Id.  A  finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court, on the entire evidence, is left with the  definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.  Skokos v. Skokos, 344 Ark.  420, 40 S.W.3d 768 (2001).  The Arkansas Legislature passed Act 652 of 2003, § 2, effective March 25, 2003, now  codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 9­13­107, which addresses the visitation rights of grandparents  when a child is not in the custody of a parent as follows:  (a) For purposes of this section:  (1) “Child” means a minor under the age of eighteen (18) who is:  (A) The grandchild of the petitioner; or  (B) The great­grandchild of the petitioner; and  (2) “Petitioner” means any individual who may petition for visitation rights  under this section.  (b) A grandparent or great­grandparent may petition the circuit court that granted the  guardianship or custody of a child for reasonable visitation rights with respect to his  or her grandchild or grandchildren or great­grandchild or great­grandchildren under  this section if the child is in the custody or under the guardianship of a person other  than one (1) or both of his or her natural or adoptive parents.  (c)  Visitation  with  the  child  may  be  granted  only  if  the  court  determines  that  visitation with the petitioner is in the best interest and welfare of the child.  (d)(1)  An  order  granting  or  denying  visitation  rights  to  grandparents  and  great­  grandparents under this section shall be in writing and shall state any and all factors  considered by the court in its decision to grant or deny visitation.  (2)(A) If the court grants visitation to the petitioner under this section, then the  visitation shall be exercised in a manner consistent with all orders regarding  custody of or visitation with the child unless the court makes a specific finding ___________________________  GLADWIN, J. ­ 3  BIER v. MILLS  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 4  otherwise.  (B) If the court finds that the petitioner’s visitation should be restricted  or limited in any way, then the court shall include the restrictions or  limitations in the order granting visitation.  (3) An order granting or denying visitation rights under this section is a final  order for purposes of appeal.  (4) After an order granting or denying visitation has been entered under this  section, a party may petition the court for the following:  (A) Contempt proceedings if one (1) party to the order fails to comply  with the order;  (B)  To  address  the  issue  of  visitation  based  on  a  change  in  circumstances; or  (C) To address the need to add or modify restrictions or limitations to  visitation previously awarded under this section.  (Emphasis added.)  As a rule, when the setting of visitation is at issue, we will not reverse  the court absent an abuse of discretion.  Delacey v. Delacey, 85 Ark. App. 419, 155 S.W.3d  701  (2004).  Abuse  of  discretion  is  discretion  applied  thoughtlessly,  without  due  consideration, or improvidently.  Carlew v. Wright, 356 Ark. 208, 148 S.W.3d 237 (2004).  However, a circuit court’s conclusion of law is given no deference on appeal.  Ward v. Doss,  __ Ark. __, __ S.W.3d __ (Mar. 24, 2005).  Appellants contend that the evidence presented in this matter does not support the  decision  of  the  trial  court.  Each  of  the  appellants  testified  that  they  had  maintained  significant contact with T.T. throughout his life, including two extended summer visits with  them at their home in Iowa.  They also pointed out that they had temporary custody of T.T.  from December 2003 through November 2004 and that T.T. was active in school, church,  and sports activities while under their primary care.  Appellants explained that, at some point during October or November 2004, they  allowed T.T. to move in with his father in Eureka Springs, Arkansas, despite the fact that the  trial court previously had removed custody from him and placed temporary custody with ___________________________  GLADWIN, J. ­ 3  BIER v. MILLS  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 5  them.  Appellant David Bier admitted that they “sent everything we had accumulated for  [T.T.] with him,” in response to the trial judge’s question to whether it was a “visit” rather  than placing him with his father on a more permanent basis.  When asked why they made  such a decision, appellant David Bier stated that, “[T.T.] is a type of person that you can –  and there’s been too much of it – you can tell him and tell him and tell him, but until he  actually, physically sees the type of situation that he wanted to go to, it’s not going to do any  good.” This decision occurred without appellants seeking permission from the trial court and  ultimately cost them custody of T.T.  Both appellants testified at the hearing as to their bad  judgment call in allowing T.T. to move in with his father, took responsibility for the poor  decision, professed an understanding of how crucial compliance with a court order is, and  agreed to abide by whatever restrictions and limitations were placed on their visitation time  with T.T. Appellee appeared pro se in the matter, and her participation in the proceeding was  limited,  especially with respect to questioning other witnesses.  Appellee had refused to  consent to a meeting between T.T.’s counselors and appellants just prior to the hearing.  She  testified that she was trying to direct T.T. and that he was at an age that, if not stabilized  within the next two years, he would be lost “to the streets.”  She stated that T.T. did not need  any more confusion in his life and that it was going to take T.T. the rest of his life to be able  to function properly due to being raised with “[n]o restrictions, R­rated movies, sex, openly.”  She clarified that she meant that negative behavior occurred during the time he was living  with  his  parents  rather  than  during  the  time  that  he  was  in  the  custody  of  appellants.  Appellee also testified that she knew T.T. and appellants loved each other and that she would  not have a problem with contact between them, as long as it was approved and supervised  by his physicians and counselors. She even went so far as to say that she believed T.T. needs  contact with appellants at the appropriate time and in an appropriate manner and requested  that appellants might allow six more months of letting T.T. stabilize a little bit more.  The  only other concern she expressed at the hearing was that appellants might dredge up the past  with the child, which could be problematic for his continued progress and recovery.  Although not in evidence in this matter, appellee’s response to appellants’ petition for  visitation rights detailed her inability “to locate the child in Iowa [in November 2004] and  [the  fact  that  she]  searched  for  him for  days.”  The  response  also  stated  that  permanent  custody was given to her because T.T.’s father is a known “meth” user and in prison for the  second  time  on  felony  charges,  awaiting  sentencing  related  to  drug,  hot  checks,  and  numerous other charges.  The pleading also described an incident on November 2, 2004,  after the last hearing in juvenile court, where she unsuccessfully tried to contact appellants ___________________________  GLADWIN, J. ­ 3  BIER v. MILLS  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 6  at their motel room and on their cell phone for two days to obtain T.T.’s Ritalin and Trileptal  medication.  She also stated that the no­contact order issued on November 2, 2004, against  appellants, with the exception of telephone visits supervised by T.T.’s counselor, came about  after appellants began calling her home three to five times per day.  She asserted that T.T.  had been traumatized after speaking to appellant Marcia Bier and often had trouble sleeping,  even with his medication.  Finally, she stated in her response that T.T. was doing very well  at his current school, after being there only five weeks, whereas he had been failing while  in school in Iowa and Eureka Springs.  None of these issues were developed through the  testimony at trial, where appellee chose to testify but not to question the other witnesses.  Her testimony suggested that she was far less adamant about keeping appellants from T.T.  by the time the hearing occurred than she was at the time her initial response had been filed.  Judith  Harvey  testified  as  to  T.T.’s  admission,  diagnosis,  inpatient  treatment,  condition upon discharge from Vista Health Services, and recommendations for follow­up  treatment.  She explained that his overall diagnosis upon admission and discharge was the  same, except for the methicillin­resistant­staphylococcus­aureus infection, which had been  addressed with a twenty­eight day program of antibiotic treatment.  She testified that by the  time  he  was  discharged,  T.T.  was  able  to  function  outside  the  inpatient  status  and  had  reached his maximum benefit of treatment during his  three­month stay.  T.T.’s discharge  summary from Vista Health Services was admitted into the record without objection.  The  discharge  summary  also  included  a  psychiatric  summary  that  detailed:    a  history  of  aggression; defiant behavior; verbal and physical threats to his grandmother (appellee) and  peers;  physical  abuse  toward  appellee,  peers,  and  animals.    The  prognosis  “for  ongoing  control of presenting symptoms [was listed  as]  fair  . . . in part dependent upon [T.T.’s]  willingness  and  ability  to  participate  in  treatment,  to  comply  with  treatment  recommendations, and take medication as prescribed . . . [as well as] the willingness and  ability  of  [T.T.’s]  family  to  participate  in  treatment  and  to  comply  with  treatment  recommendations.”  The  trial  judge  questioned  the  witnesses,  and  while  she  explored  the  issue  of  appellants allowing T.T. to move in with his father to some extent, it is clear that she relied  heavily on what had occurred in the other two proceedings related to T.T.’s custody (case  numbers  J2003­885  and  J2005­390)  in  making  her  decision  regarding  visitation  for  appellants.  The trial judge even referred back to specific testimony from appellant Marcia  Bier from the November 2, 2004 hearing regarding disparaging remarks made by T.T. toward  her.  The applicable statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 9­13­107(c), is extremely discretionary in ___________________________  GLADWIN, J. ­ 3  BIER v. MILLS  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 7  its language, stating that visitation with the child may be granted only if the court determines  that visitation with the petitioner is in the best interest and welfare of the child.  That said,  the trial judge interjected a great deal during the hearing and relied on evidence outside the  record in this matter, referring back to very specific details and testimony from the previous  two cases that are not part of the record in this case.  Our supreme court has stated that  “judicial notice may not be taken of the record in a separate case,” see Smith v. State, 307  Ark. 223, 818 S.W.2d 945 (1991), and the trial judge has most certainly done that in this  case.  However,  the  trial  judge  also  indicated  that  there  may  come  a  time  when  T.T.’s  condition stabilizes and that he might need to see appellants, leaving the door open for them  to seek visitation in the future.  Based upon our de novo review of the record in this matter,  we cannot say that it was clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion for the trial court to  determine that visitation between appellants and T.T., at that point in time, was not in the  best interest and welfare of the child.  Accordingly, we affirm.  Affirmed.  ROBBINS  and BIRD, JJ., agree. ___________________________  GLADWIN, J. ­ 3 

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