Jodi Miller v. Arkansas Department of Human Services
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
DIVISION I
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
K AREN R. B AKER, Judge
CA06-11
NOVEMBER 1, 2006
APPEAL FROM THE MADISON COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT
[J-04-49]
JODI MILLER
APPELLANT
HONORABLE MARY ANN GUNN, JUDGE
v.
ARKANSAS
SERVICES
DEPT.
OF
HUMAN
AFFIRMED
APPELLEE
Appellant Jodi Miller appeals the termination of her parental rights alleging that the trial
court erred in finding that there was sufficient evidence to terminate her parental rights of appellant.
We find no error and affirm.
Appellant is the mother of S.M., born December 21, 2003, and J.M., born April 3, 2001. On
April 10, 2004, the Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services (DHS) exercised a seventytwo-hour hold on S.M. while she was in Arkansas Children’s Hospital and very soon thereafter
exercised a seventy-two-hour hold on J.M. and removed him from the home of appellant. A Petition
for Emergency Custody alleged S.M. was being treated at Northwest Medical Center of Washington
County for seizure complications, and tests showed chronic and acute subdural hemotomas. The
affidavit included allegations that S.M. had received her injuries because she was shaken by one of
her parents.
A probable cause hearing was held on April 14, 2004. By agreement of the parties, the
original Petition and Order for Emergency Custody was amended to add J.M., and on April 13,
2004, DHS placed a seventy-two-hour hold on J.M.
An adjudication hearing was held on June 16, 2004. The Court adjudicated S.M. and J.M.
dependent-neglected and continued custody with DHS. The goal of the case ordered reunification
with appellant.
A hearing was held on August 17, 2004, and was continued until September 7, 2004, in
Logan County. At the hearing held on September 7, 2004, the case was transferred to Madison
County. A review hearing was held on October 1, 2004. S.M. and J.M. continued in the custody
of DHS. The goal of the case was ordered to be reunification. It was determined at that point that
the children would most likely be moved very soon to a foster home with someone who was also
a relative of theirs.
A permanency planning hearing was held on February 4, 2005. The goal of the case was
changed to termination of parental rights with a goal of adoption. S.M. and J.M. remained in the
custody of DHS.
A petition of terminate was filed on June 2, 2005. Termination hearings were held on June
25, and June 27, 2005. At the conclusion of the hearings the parental rights of appellant were
terminated. An order terminating parental rights and granting DHS the power to consent to adoption
was filed July 29, 2005. A notice of appeal was timely filed.
In rendering its decision from the bench, the trial court found by clear and convincing
evidence that the youngest child, S.M., was injured while in the custody of her parents at the hand
of her father and suffered subdural hematomas and retina damage inflicted over a period of time.
Testimony of Dr. Gibson supported the finding of shaken baby syndrome and excluded other
medical reasons for the acute and chronic subdural hematoma injuries he diagnosed on the child.
-2-
Detective Caley testified that the father, whose termination of rights was not appealed, was caring
for the child when she was injured preceding her hospitalization and the entry of the emergency
custody order. Although the father made no admissions during the initial interview, during an
interview on July 16, he told the detective that he was very frustrated with S.M. because of all the
crying and the vomiting and the behavior and that he held the child by her torso area with both
hands, bouncing her up and down hard enough so that he said her chin hit her chest. The father
stated that he did that for three to five minutes, and that it just made her cry harder.
The evidence supports the judge’s finding that the baby girl, S.M., suffered from shaken
baby syndrome. The father’s confession of roughly bouncing the child while she was crying and
while he was frustrated further supports the conclusion that he was the person responsible for the
harm. Although the mother made no admissions to the detective, she provided different and
contradictory explanations as to how the injuries occurred, including placing blame on the older
sibling, J.M. Testimony of caseworkers stated that both parents were quick to anger at DHS workers
despite the anger management classes.
It is undisputed that the male child, J.M., exhibited signs of abuse by the time he was in later
placement in foster care.
The factual determination as to the cause of his condition, Reactive
Attachment Disorder, was the issue the court addressed, and the testimony of the therapist, Lynn
Washington, who was working with J.M., supports the trial court’s conclusion that the underlying
cause of his condition was caused by acts of both parents while the child was between the ages of
one and three. Ms. Washington explained that the condition develops between the ages of one and
three, and that while the condition was not helped by moving within the foster care system, his
placements and removals within the system to accommodate the parents’ change in residence
between jurisdictions was not the cause of the disorder.
-3-
The trial court further found that the best interests of the children were served by termination
in that the children were progressing, that the likelihood of adoption was great, and that evidence
of the mother’s ability to implement the parenting and anger management skills presented in
counseling and classes was lacking.
In arguing that the trial court erred, appellant asserts that she complied with the majority of
the case plan’s requirements. Regarding the concerns for J.M.’s behavioral problems, she asserted
that his condition developed while in foster care and not as the result of abuse or mistreatment by
her or her husband. She urges this court to examine the discrepancies in the testimony of
caseworkers and counselors to resolve those discrepancies in her favor.
Our standard of review prevents us from doing so. When the issue is one involving the
termination of parental rights, there is a heavy burden placed upon the party seeking to terminate
the relationship. Johnson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 78 Ark. App. 112, 82 S.W.3d 183 (2002).
Termination of parental rights is an extreme remedy and in derogation of the natural rights of the
parents. Id. Parental rights, however, will not be enforced to the detriment or destruction of the
health and well-being of the child. Id.
Cases involving the termination of parental rights are reviewed de novo on appeal. Dinkins
v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 344 Ark. 207, 40 S.W.3d 286 (2001). The Arkansas Supreme Court
has discussed our standard of review in termination cases, as follows:
Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3) ... requires an order terminating parental
rights be based upon clear and convincing evidence. Our law is well settled that when the
burden of proving a disputed fact in chancery court is by clear and convincing evidence, the
question that must be answered on appeal is whether the [circuit] court's finding that the
disputed fact was proven by clear and convincing evidence was clearly erroneous. Clear and
convincing evidence is that degree of proof that will produce in the fact finder a firm
conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. In resolving the clearly erroneous
question, we must give due regard to the opportunity of the [circuit] court to judge the
credibility of witnesses. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to
-4-
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.
Rodriguez v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 360 Ark. 180, ___, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___ (Dec. 16, 2004)
(citations omitted).
Arkansas Code Annotated subsections 9-27-341(b)(3)(A) & (B) (Supp.2003) provide that
a court may enter an order terminating parental rights if it finds by clear and convincing evidence:
(A) That it is in the best interest of the juvenile, including consideration of the following factors:
(i) The likelihood that the juvenile will be adopted if the termination petition is granted; and
(ii) The potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health and safety of the
child, caused by continuing contact with the parent, parents, or putative parent or parents;
and
(B) Of one (1) or more of the following grounds:
(i)(a) That a juvenile has been adjudicated by the court to be dependent-neglected and has
continued out of the custody of the parent for twelve (12) months and, despite a meaningful
effort by the department to rehabilitate the parent and correct the conditions that caused
removal, those conditions have not been remedied by the parent.
Under the facts of this case, we cannot say the judge’s findings were clearly erroneous. The
father admitted to actions leading to the cause of the hospitalization of S.M. The physician’s
testimony regarding the acute and chronic nature of S.M.’s injuries supports the finding of shaken
baby syndrome. The testimony of the therapist treating J.M. supports the trial court’s conclusion
that the child’s disorder was caused by actions of the parents over the course of the child’s first three
years of life. The caseworker’s testimony regarding the mother’s continued anger issues as well as
a lack of evidence showing progress in the areas of concern supports the trial court’s determination
that the conditions that caused the removal had not been remedied. Discrepancies in the testimony
were for the trial court to resolve. See Rodgriquez, supra.
Accordingly, we find no error and affirm.
-5-
HART and VAUGHT , JJ., agree.
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
