Freeman E. Green v. Cooper Standard Automotive, Inc.

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  DIVISION III  CA05-674 March 15, 2006 FREEMAN E. GREEN APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION [NOS. F200267, F208445] APPELLANT V. COOPER STANDARD AUTOMOTIVE, INC. AFFIRMED APPELLEE JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, Chief Judge  The appellant in this workers’ compensation case was employed by appellee, where  he sustained three compensable knee injuries.  After the third surgery he was diagnosed with  “athlete’s  knee”  and  total  replacement  of  both  knees  was  recommended.    The  employer  refused to pay for this surgery, asserting that it was not necessitated by his compensable  injuries.  After a hearing, the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission found  that  appellant had failed to prove that the need for the requested treatment resulted from his  compensable injury.  On appeal, the appellant argues that there is no substantial evidence to  support that finding.  We affirm.  In  determining  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence  to  sustain  the  findings  of  the  Commission,  we  review  the  evidence  in  the  light  most  favorable  to  the  Commission's  findings and affirm if the findings are supported by substantial evidence.  City of Blytheville  v. McCormick, 56 Ark. App. 149, 939 S.W.2d 855 (1997).  Substantial evidence is such ­1­  CA05­674 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.  Id.  The question is not whether the evidence would have supported findings contrary to the  ones  made  by  the  Commission;  there  may  be  substantial  evidence  to  support  the  Commission's decision even though we might have reached a different conclusion if we sat  as the trier of fact or heard the case de novo.  Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Disheroon, 26 Ark. App.  145, 761 S.W.2d 617 (1988).  In making our review, we recognize that it is the function of  the Commission to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their  testimony.  Whaley v. Hardee's, 51 Ark. App. 166, 912 S.W.2d 14 (1995).  The Commission  has the duty of weighing medical evidence and, if the evidence is conflicting, its resolution  is a question of fact for the Commission.  Id.  The Commission is not required to believe the  testimony of the claimant or any other witness but may accept and translate into findings of  fact only those portions of the testimony it deems worthy of belief.  Id.  Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commission's findings, the record shows  that appellant played organized basketball on the high school and college levels and for one  year  professionally.  Subsequently  he  began  working  for  appellee  Cooper  Standard  Automotive in 1992.  He sustained a work­related injury to the ligament of his right knee in  1999,  which  was  repaired  surgically  by  Dr.  Mullhollan.    Appellant  was  released  from  medical restrictions and returned to work for appellee performing the same job.  Appellant  sustained  a  second  work­related  injury  in  December  2001;  after  conservative  treatment  proved ineffective, Dr. Bryant surgically repaired a meniscal tear in January 2002.  Shortly  thereafter, appellant returned to work for appellee, still performing the same job.  However,  on June 23, 2002, appellant sustained another compensable injury when he slipped on an oily  spot  and  twisted  his  right  knee.  He  was  diagnosed  with  a  horizontal  tear  of  the  medial ­2­  CA05­674  ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  DIVISION III  meniscus, underwent an orthoscopic medial menisectomy performed by Dr. Bryant on July  17, 2002, and again returned to work.  Appellant subsequently complained of bilateral knee pain and returned in November  2002  to  Dr.  Bryant,  who  opined  that  appellant  suffered  from  “athlete’s  knee”  with  longstanding  cartilage  damage  of  many  years’  duration,  and  that  he  could  anticipate  difficulty in performing manual labor because of the pre­existing condition of his knees.  Appellant then saw Dr. Mullhollan, who opined that total knee replacement was indicated  but that this was not due to a job­related illness.  Appellant was then referred to Dr. Bowen.  Dr.  Bowen’s  opinion  differed  on  the  issue  of  causation;  he  stated  that  he  believed  that  appellant’s need for further treatment was caused by his prior compensable injuries.  Appellant argues that the Commission erred because Dr. Bowen’s opinion is entitled  to more weight than that of Drs. Mullhollan and Bryant.  We do not agree.  The medical  opinions relied upon by the Commission were not intrinsically incredible; it was noted that  the condition requiring the replacement surgery was arthritic, while appellant’s work­related  injuries were tears to the ligaments.  Furthermore, both Drs. Mullhollan and Bryant had  previously performed surgery on appellant and had had the opportunity to observe both his  compensable injuries and the healing process first­hand.  We have said for over twenty years  that, when the Commission chooses to accept the testimony of one physician over another  where the evidence is conflicting, we are “powerless to reverse the decision.” Fletcher v.  Farm Bureau Insurance Co., 10 Ark. App. 84, 661 S.W.2d 431 (1983).  That is the situation  in the present case, and we therefore affirm.  Affirmed. ­3­  CA05­674  GLOVER  and ROAF, JJ., agree. ­4­  CA05­674 

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