Nathan H. Mejia v. State of Arkansas
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DIVISION IV
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Karen R. Baker, Judge
CACR06-442
NOVEMBER 29, 2006
NATHAN H. MEJIA
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[CR2003-1179]
v.
HONORABLE JAMES
MARSCHEWSKI, JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
ROGER
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
Appellant Nathan Mejia pled guilty to second-degree battery in Sebastian County. The
imposition of his sentence was suspended for five years, and beginning June 1, 2004, he was ordered
to pay a $25-per-month probation fee and $900 in fines and costs at the rate of $50 per month. An
amended petition to revoke appellant’s suspended sentence was filed on September 10, 2005,
alleging that he committed theft by receiving on June 4, 2004, and failed to report to his probation
officer, to attend sex-offender counseling, and to appear in court. After a hearing, the trial court
revoked appellant’s suspended sentence and sentenced him to three years in prison.
On appeal, appellant argues that the State failed to establish by the preponderance of the
evidence that he violated the terms of his suspended sentence. For the reasons below, appellant’s
argument is without merit, and the trial court is affirmed.
To revoke probation or a suspension, the trial court must find by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant inexcusably violated a condition of that probation or suspension. Ark.
Code Ann. § 5-4-309(d) (Supp. 2003). The State bears the burden of proof, but need only prove that
the defendant committed one violation of the conditions. Richardson v. State, 85 Ark. App. 347,
157 S.W.3d 536 (2004). Evidence that is insufficient for a criminal conviction may be sufficient
for the revocation of probation or suspended sentence. Id. Failure to pay fines and costs will support
a revocation, see Palmer v. State, 60 Ark. App. 97, 959 S.W.2d 420 (1998), as will a failure to
report to probation and ordered treatment, see Stinnett v. State, 63 Ark. App. 72, 973 S.W.2d 826
(1998). When appealing a revocation, the appellant has the burden of showing that the trial court’s
findings are clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Richardson, supra.
In the case before us, the trial court revoked appellant’s suspended sentence finding that
appellant committed theft by receiving and failed to pay assessed fines and fees in violation of the
conditions of his suspended sentence. The trial court ruled that appellant had made no payments
since the beginning of his suspended sentence, that he appeared able to work, and that there was no
excuse for his failure to pay. Appellant admits that he failed to pay the fines and costs as required
by the conditions of the suspension; however, he asserts that the State failed to prove that his failure
to pay was inexcusable. Despite appellant’s contention, once the State established the nonpayment
pursuant to the conditions of the suspension, the burden shifted to appellant to provide a reasonable
excuse for the violation. See Palmer, supra.
To excuse his violation, appellant testified that he had been arrested and jailed in Arizona,
as well as being confined to a psychiatric facility in Nevada for three months. He offered no excuse
for failing to make payments for June and July of 2004 while in the State of Arkansas and not
confined in a psychiatric or penal institution. We agree with the general premise cited by appellant
that appellant cannot be punished by imprisonment solely because of failure to pay restitution,
absent a determination that failure to pay was willful. See Jordan v. State, 327 Ark. 177, 939
S.W.2d 255 (1997). We also agree with his statement that appellant’s failure to make bona fide
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efforts to seek employment or to borrow money to pay restitution may justify imprisonment. See
id. However, appellant does not explain his statement that the State failed to meet its burden to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the failure to pay was inexcusable because it
presented no evidence to show that the failure to pay was inexcusable. See Reese v. State, 26 Ark.
App. 42, 759 S.W.2d 576 (1988). Appellant not only admits that he was imprisoned in another
jurisdiction to pay out fines in that State, but attempts to justify his failure to pay in this State based
upon his incarceration. He cites no cases for the proposition that the imprisonment of an accused
in another jurisdiction precludes a finding that his failure to pay in this jurisdiction was willful, and
we decline to adopt the premise.
Appellant also argues that the evidence against appellant regarding the theft-by-receiving
charge was circumstantial and that the trial court had to resort to speculation to find that appellant
was in fact committing a crime. Appellant was hired to install carpet in a Howard Johnson’s motel
in Ft. Smith. On June 4, 2004, appellant was found to be in possession of carpet belonging to the
motel without the permission of the project manager, Tony Elkins. Carpeting was discovered in his
van and inside a separate Ft. Smith business, the BurnZee Bar. Appellant’s possession of the goods
not belonging to him is sufficient to establish theft by receiving, e.g., Ricks v. State, 316 Ark. 601,
873 S.W.2d 808 (1994), and sufficient to support the revocation of his suspended sentence. Lamb
v. State, 74 Ark. App. 245, 45 S.W3d 869 (2001).
Appellant testified at trial that it was standard practice to keep the carpet in his van and that
he left the carpet at the bar for the owners of the bar to determine whether they liked it for replacing
their carpet at a future date. At one point he testified that he did not discuss with Mr. Elkins keeping
the carpet in the van, but at another point he claimed that he did tell Mr. Elkins that he was going
to keep the carpet there. The trial court specifically found appellant’s testimony to be not credible.
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On appeal, appellant cites no authority that contradicts the well-established rule that an appellate
court defers to the trial court on questions of witness credibility and conflicting testimony. E.g.
Bradley v. State, 347 Ark. 518, 65 S.W.3d 874 (2002).
Accordingly, we reject appellant’s arguments and affirm.
HART and VAUGHT , JJ., agree.
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