Stevie Turner v. State of Arkansas
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
DIVISION II
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
R OBERT J. G LADWIN, Judge
CACR05-645
J UNE 28, 2006
APPEAL FROM THE FAULKNER
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CR-2004-2402]
STEVIE TURNER
APPELLANT
HON. MICHAEL MAGGIO,
JUDGE
V.
AFFIRMED;
MOTION GRANTED
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
The Faulkner County Circuit Court found appellant Stevie Turner guilty of aggravated
robbery, breaking or entering, and terroristic threatening, and the trial court sentenced him
to serve an aggregate term of ten years’ imprisonment. Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), and Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(j), appellant’s counsel has filed a motion to
withdraw on the ground that there is no merit to an appeal.
Counsel’s motion was
accompanied by a brief discussing all matters in the record that might arguably support an
appeal and a statement of the reason why each adverse ruling in this case is not a meritorious
ground for reversal. Appellant elected to file pro se points for reversal, to which the State
has responded. We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm appellant’s convictions.
At a bench trial, Kevin Hare testified that around 10:00 p.m. on September 3, 2004,
he and his two small children went to his wife’s workplace. They had gone inside and come
back outside with Hare’s wife when their three-year-old son ran to get into Hare’s truck.
Hare went to retrieve his son and saw something move on the driver’s side of the vehicle.
He went around to that side, and appellant jumped out of the truck and began to walk away.
Hare asked appellant what he had taken out of the truck, and appellant replied that he had not
been in the truck. According to Hare, appellant then told him to “back off before I got shot.”
The only thing missing from Hare’s truck was a piece of a child’s toy mini-mag flashlight.
Officer James Stephen Bemies, Jr., with the Conway Police Department, testified that
he apprehended appellant approximately three blocks from Hare’s truck. He retraced
appellant’s path but did not find a gun.
Appellant took the stand in his own defense. He testified that in 1997 he was
convicted of felony theft by receiving for which he received three years’ probation; that his
probation was revoked in 1999 and he was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment with four
years’ suspended imposition of sentence; that in 2002 he was convicted of breaking or
entering and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment; and that he had been convicted of
misdemeanor theft and fleeing. Appellant further testified that he was not inside Hare’s truck
and was not even close to the truck. He had simply cut across a parking lot to get to
“Fred’s,” where he planned to get a ride home. Appellant stated that he did not make any
-2-
threats toward Hare but that he only asked Hare to stop following him. Appellant further
stated that he did not have a gun and that he had not been drinking that night.
On cross-examination, appellant testified that he had been drinking all day but did not
think he was drunk. He stated that, if he did come into contact with Hare’s truck, he must
have thought it was his brother’s truck. Appellant insisted that, although he walked by
Hare’s truck, he did not think he got into the truck. He said he did not know whether he
“blacked out or what.”
Appellant’s counsel moved for a directed verdict at the close of the State’s case-inchief and renewed the motion at the close of all the evidence. Counsel essentially argued that
appellant lacked the culpable mental state to have committed the crimes and pointed out that
it was a credibility issue. In denying appellant’s motions, the trial court found appellant
guilty of the charges based upon his own testimony, which contained inconsistencies.
During sentencing, appellant’s counsel stated that she was going to ask for a
suspended sentence but ultimately agreed with the prosecutor that the trial court could not
suspend a sentence on the aggravated-robbery conviction because it was a Class Y felony.
The trial court agreed with the prosecutor’s recommendation that appellant serve the
minimum sentence of ten years.
Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw
Appellant’s counsel argues that the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s
motions for directed verdict. A motion for a directed-verdict or dismissal is a challenge to
-3-
the sufficiency of the evidence. Green v. State, 79 Ark. App. 297, 87 S.W.3d 814 (2002).
We affirm the trial court’s denial of a directed-verdict motion if there is substantial evidence
to support the conviction. Ross v. State, 346 Ark. 225, 57 S.W.3d 152 (2001). Substantial
evidence is evidence of sufficient force that it will compel a conclusion one way or another
and pass beyond suspicion and conjecture. Mulkey v. State, 330 Ark. 113, 952 S.W.2d 149
(1997). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, considering only the
testimony that tends to support the guilty verdict. Smith v. State, 352 Ark. 92, 98 S.W.3d 433
(2003). In bench trials, the trial judge is in a superior position to evaluate the witnesses and
to weigh their credibility.
Johnson v. State, 337 Ark. 196, 987 S.W.2d 694 (1999).
Moreover, the factfinder may resolve questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent
evidence. Sera v. State, 341 Ark. 415, 17 S.W.3d 61 (2000).
A person’s intent or state of mind at the time of an offense is seldom apparent.
Tarentino v. State, 302 Ark. 55, 786 S.W.2d 584 (1990). Because intent cannot ordinarily
be proven by direct evidence, the factfinder is allowed to draw upon his or her common
knowledge and experience to infer intent from the circumstances. See Jones v. State, 72 Ark.
App. 271, 35 S.W.3d 345 (2000). Because of the difficulty in ascertaining a person’s intent,
a presumption exists that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts.
Id.
A person commits robbery if, with the purpose of committing a felony or
misdemeanor theft or resisting apprehension immediately thereafter, he employs or threatens
-4-
to immediately employ physical force upon another. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-12-102(a). A
person commits aggravated robbery when he commits robbery, and he is armed with a deadly
weapon or represents by word or conduct that he is so armed. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-12103(a)(1). Here, appellant entered Hare’s truck under circumstances that make it reasonable
to conclude that his purpose in doing so was to commit a theft. Appellant was found inside
the truck by Hare, and appellant attempted to leave the area. When confronted by Hare,
appellant denied having been inside the truck even though Hare saw him, and appellant
threatened to shoot Hare if he continued to pursue him.
A person commits the offense of breaking or entering if, for the purpose of
committing a theft, he enters or breaks into a vehicle. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-39-202. Hare
testified that he saw appellant inside the truck, and one could infer from the circumstances
that appellant’s purpose was to commit a theft inside the truck.
A person commits the offense of terroristic threatening in the first degree if, with the
purpose of terrorizing another person, he threatens to cause death or serious physical injury
to another person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-301(a)(1)(A). Hare testified that appellant told
him to “back off” or he would shoot him. It is reasonable to conclude that appellant’s
purpose was to terrorize Hare in order to get Hare to stop following him.
Although counsel included the fact that the trial court did not suspend imposition of
appellant’s sentence, there was no adverse ruling. Counsel was going to request a suspended
imposition of sentence but realized that appellant’s conviction for aggravated robbery
-5-
foreclosed that possibility. Thereafter, counsel agreed with the prosecutor that, pursuant to
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-301(a)(1)(C), a court shall not suspend imposition of sentence as to
a term of imprisonment for Class Y felonies. Furthermore, for a Class Y felony, the sentence
shall be not less than ten years nor more than forty years, or life. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4401(a)(1). Appellant received the minimum sentence authorized by statute.
Appellant’s Pro Se Points for Reversal
Appellant states that the prosecutor failed to allege the essential elements of the
aggravated- robbery charge that was included in the information only weeks before the trial
and that his counsel allowed him to be tried for the “uncharged” offense. Appellant contends
that the prosecutor obviously did not believe he had the intent to commit theft because it was
only after he had rejected a plea negotiation on the terroristic-threatening charge that the
prosecutor charged him with aggravated robbery. Appellant states, “Sadly, this is a case
where the prosecutor deliberately over charged the appellant with the aggravated robbery.”
Appellant’s claims are merely conclusory statements raised for the first time on appeal, and
thus we will not address them. See Ayers v. State, 334 Ark. 258, 975 S.W.2d 88 (1998).
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding that the evidence was sufficient
to prove each and every element of the crime of aggravated robbery beyond a reasonable
doubt as is required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
-6-
States Constitution, Article 2, §§ 8 and 29 of the Arkansas Constitution, and Ark. Code Ann.
§§ 5-1-111(a)(1) and 5-2-204(b). Even constitutional arguments cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal. See Wetherington v. State, 319 Ark. 37, 889 S.W.2d 34 (1994).
Regarding the elements of the offenses, appellant argues that, at most, the State may
have proved that he was inside Hare’s truck but failed to prove that he took the toy that was
useless without the other parts. It is well settled that no transfer of property needs to take
place to complete the offense of aggravated robbery. Williams v. State, 351 Ark. 215, 91
S.W.3d 54 (2002). Rather, the focus of aggravated robbery is the threat of harm to the
victim; consequently, the offense is complete when physical force is threatened.
Id.
Appellant further argues that the State failed to prove that his intent was to commit a theft
when he entered the truck.
However, appellant’s intent could be inferred from the
circumstances. Jones, supra. Appellant then argues that, “Clearly, since there was no proof
that the appellant committed aggravated robbery or breaking and entering, at most, the
appellant’s act of playing like he had a gun and threatening Mr. Hare, was not for the purpose
to terrorize him, it was because, Mr. Hare was following him, and he wanted him to stop.”
Appellant further argues that he perceived Hare’s statements as a threat to him and that he
“made the threat for his own safety, and not for the purpose to terrorize another person. The
threat to shoot is not always for the purpose to terrorize another person.” We find these
contentions to be without merit.
-7-
Appellant states that at the end of the sentencing phase, the trial court failed to provide
allocution and erroneously informed him that his counsel, Ms. Knight, was not representing
him on appeal. Again, appellant makes no cogent argument supported by citation to
authority. See Satterlee v. State, 289 Ark. 450, 711 S.W.2d 827 (1986). Appellant concludes
that this court should deny counsel’s motion to withdraw and order her to “argue more fully
and professionally” the issues and arguments raised “involuntarily pro se” by him. Appellant
states that it cannot be said that he was afforded effective assistance of counsel. We do not
consider ineffective assistance of counsel as a point on direct appeal unless that issue has
been considered by the trial court. Missildine v. State, 314 Ark. 500, 863 S.W.2d 813 (1993).
If appellant should wish to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, he may do so in
a petition pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37. Id.
Based on our review of the record and the briefs presented, we conclude that there has
been full compliance with Rule 4-3(j) and that the appeal is wholly without merit. Defense
counsel’s motion to be relieved is granted, and appellant’s convictions are affirmed.
Affirmed; motion granted.
R OBBINS and B IRD, JJ., agree.
-8-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
