Craig Anthony Hall v. State of Arkansas

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  DIVISION I  CACR05­1107  March 15, 2006  CRAIG ANTHONY HALL  APPELLANT  V. APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [CR 04­670]  HON. EDWARD T. SMITHERMAN,  CIRCUIT JUDGE  STATE OF ARKANSAS  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED LARRY D. VAUGHT, Judge  Appellant Craig Anthony Hall pled guilty to one count of rape and was sentenced to  forty years’ imprisonment. He argues on appeal that, during the sentencing phase of the trial,  the trial court erred in preventing Hall from cross examining the victim about her alleged  marijuana use and in allowing the victim to testify that Hall raped her prior to the time period  alleged in the information. We disagree and affirm.  Before  hearing  evidence  at  the  sentencing  phase  of  Hall’s  trial,  the  State  filed  a  motion in limine to prevent Hall from questioning the victim, a fifteen­year­old girl, about  her alleged marijuana use approximately one week before she reported the rape. The State  argued that because Hall had admitted to the rape of a minor, whether the victim had used  marijuana was irrelevant to the sentencing. The trial court granted the State’s motion.  Hall then objected to the State’s intention to question the victim regarding sexual  encounters between her and Hall that occurred prior to the dates alleged in the information.  The State countered that it had charged Hall with one count of rape for a course of conduct  rather than separate counts, and therefore, the victim could testify regarding the first rape when  she  was  ten  years  old  (an  event  that  occurred  prior  to  the  dates  listed  in  the  information) up through the last assault when she was fourteen. The court overruled Hall’s  objection.  During the penalty phase, the victim testified that after Hall married her mother, he  began  raping her.  She  described  the  first  encounter  explicitly  as  sexual  intercourse.  She  stated that he continued to have sexual intercourse with her once or twice every few months  until she was fourteen. Hall forced her to perform oral sex on him and threatened to take  away her cellular phone or compact­disc player if she did not comply.  We review the decision of the trial court to admit evidence during the sentencing  phase under an abuse of discretion standard. Buckley v. State, 349 Ark. 53, 76 S.W.3d 825  (2002).  All  relevant  evidence  on  the  question  of  sentencing  may  be  considered  by  the  sentencing body. Marshall v. State, 342 Ark. 172, 27 S.W.3d 392 (2000). The admissibility  of proof in the penalty phase of a jury trial is governed by the Arkansas Rules of Evidence;  however,  pursuant  to  Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  16­97­103  (Repl.  2006)  certain  evidence  is  admissible at sentencing that would not have been admissible at the guilt phase of the trial.  Helms v. State, ­­­ Ark. App. ­­­­, ­­­ S.W.3d ­­­­ (June 22, 2005). Section 16­97­103 allows  for  victim  impact  evidence  or  statements,  relevant  character  evidence,  and  evidence  of  aggravating or mitigating circumstances to be presented during the penalty phase.  For his first point on appeal, Hall argues that in not allowing him to question the  victim about her alleged marijuana use, the court denied him his fundamental right to cross  examine  witnesses.  He  maintains  that  the  victim  was  “able  to  present  herself  as  totally  without human flaw,” and that if the jury had been aware of her alleged drug use, it might  have  assessed  Hall  a  lesser  sentence.  We  are  satisfied  that  the  trial  court  did  not  err.  According  to  Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  5­14­103  (Repl.  2006),  the  State  need  only  prove  Hall 2  engaged in sexual intercourse with a person under the age of fourteen to establish guilt. Hall  admitted he had sex with the victim while she was under the age of fourteen. Therefore, it  was of no relevance that she may have abused drugs after the rape.  Next, Hall argues that the trial court erred in allowing the victim to testify during  sentencing regarding sexual encounters she had with Hall prior to the time period alleged in  the State’s information. We believe that the victim’s testimony was properly admitted during  the  sentencing  phase  under  §  16­97­103.  Additionally,  although  the  State  charged  only  sexual assaults occurring in a two­year period in the information, the course  of  conduct  included several sexual encounters prior to those two years. It was not reversible error for  the court to allow the victim to tell her story from the beginning. The rapes that occurred  prior to the dates in the information were aggravating circumstances properly before the jury  during sentencing.  Even if we held that the trial court erred on either of the two points, Hall can present  no prejudice because he was sentenced to a lighter punishment than the maximum. Based on  his crime, he was sentenced to forty years in prison, but he could have been sentenced to life.  A defendant who has received a sentence within the statutory range short of the maximum  sentence cannot show prejudice from the sentence itself. Buckley, 349 Ark. at 64, 76 S.W.3d  at 832.  Affirmed.  HART  and ROAF, JJ., agree. 3 

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