Tario Watkins v. State of Arkansas
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DIVISION III
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
S AM B IRD, Judge
CACR05-70
MAY 10, 2006
TARIO WATKINS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE UNION COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CR2003-183-1]
HON. HAMILTON H. SINGLETON,
JUDGE
V.
STATE OF ARKANSAS
AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED
APPELLEE
This is the second time that this no-merit appeal is before us. The pertinent facts are
as follows. Appellant Tario Watkins was convicted of possession of a controlled substance
on June 23, 2003, and was placed on five years’ probation. On December 10, 2003, the State
filed a petition to revoke Watkins’s probation based on his alleged possession of cocaine.
Following a revocation hearing, the trial court granted the State’s petition to revoke
Watkins’s probation and sentenced Watkins to ten years in prison. Watkins’s counsel
subsequently filed a motion to withdraw on the grounds that the appeal of the trial court’s
decision to revoke Watkins’s probation was without merit. The motion was accompanied by
a brief that purportedly discussed all matters in the record that might arguably support an
appeal, and a statement as to why counsel considered the points raised as incapable of
supporting a meritorious appeal.
In a previous unpublished opinion, Watkins v. State, CACR 05-70 (Jan. 11, 2006), we
ordered rebriefing because Watkins’s counsel submitted a brief that did not contain any
discussion of the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress. Watkins’s counsel has now filed
a substituted brief in which he has satisfactorily explained that he did not discuss the denial
of appellant’s motion to suppress in his original brief because it was not a motion that was
filed in the revocation case; rather, it was a motion filed in an underlying cocaine possession
case then pending against the appellant that, for purposes of judicial economy, was heard
simultaneously with the revocation petition. As counsel notes, the court’s denial of the
motion to suppress in the underlying cocaine possession case was immaterial to the court’s
decision in the probation revocation case that is the subject of this appeal. Therefore, we are
satisfied that counsel’s substituted brief, filed pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S.738
(1967), and Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-3(j)(1), and alleging that an appeal would be
wholly frivolous, refers to everything in the record that might arguably support an appeal,
and explains why each adverse ruling in this case is not a meritorious ground for reversal.
Watkins has filed pro se points of appeal and the State has filed a brief in response. We
affirm the trial court’s decision to revoke Watkins’s probation and now grant counsel’s
motion to withdraw.
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CACR05-70
In Ofochebe v. State, 40 Ark. App. 92, 93, 844 S.W.2d 373, 374 (1992), this court
stated as follows:
The procedure for the filing of a no-merit brief is governed by Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967) and Rule 11(h) [now Rule 4-3(j)] of the Rules of the Supreme
Court. The test is not whether counsel thinks the trial court committed no reversible
error, but rather whether the points to be raised on appeal would be “wholly
frivolous.” Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. Under Anders, the appellate court is also required
to make a determination “after a full examination of all the proceedings,” whether the
case is wholly frivolous. Similarly, Rule 11(h) [now Rule 4-3(j)] permits the filing of
a no-merit brief only when “the appeal is wholly without merit.”
After examining the adverse rulings addressed by counsel and Watkins’s pro se arguments,
we hold that an appeal from any of the adverse rulings or the points raised byWatkins would
be wholly frivolous.
I. Adverse Rulings
Watkins’s counsel asserts that the only adverse ruling in this case was the trial court’s
decision to grant the State’s revocation petition. To revoke probation or a suspended
sentence, the burden is on the State to prove the violation of a condition of probation or
suspended sentence by a preponderance of the evidence. Bradley v. State, 347 Ark. 518, 65
S.W.3d 874 (2002). On appellate review, the trial court’s findings will be upheld unless they
are clearly against a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Because determination of a
preponderance of the evidence turns on questions of credibility and weight to be given
testimony, we defer to the trial judge’s superior position in that regard. Id.
In this case, Watkins was prohibited from possessing “any controlled substance” as
a condition of his probation. During the hearing on the petition to revoke, Officer Randall
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CACR05-70
Gilbert of the El Dorado Police Department testified that he found Watkins to be in
possession of approximately twenty-four grams of crack cocaine on August 5, 2003.
Although Watkins denied that Officer Gilbert “retrieved” any drugs from him on that date,
the trial judge was free to determine the credibility of the witnesses. We therefore hold that
an appeal of the trial court’s decision to grant the State’s petition to revoke would be wholly
frivolous.
II. Watkins’s Pro Se Points
Watkins’s pro se points can be classified into three categories as follows: (1)
ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) sufficiency of the evidence; and (3) suppression of the
evidence. As we have already addressed the sufficiency of the evidence above, we will
address only two of these three points.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Watkins first claims that his attorney “did not work in [Watkins’s] best interest” and
that he (Watkins) was convicted based upon his attorney’s “lack of knowledge of the law.”
Watkins further asserts that his attorney was “reluctant” to file a motion to suppress and did
so only after Watkins begged “for months.” Watkins’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
argument was not raised below, and we will generally not consider errors raised for the first
time on appeal. Cook v. State, 76 Ark. App. 447, 68 S.W.3d 308 (2002). Thus, we will not
address the merits of this argument.
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CACR05-70
Suppression of the Evidence
Watkins also contends that the search and seizure conducted by Officer Gilbert in this
case was illegal, and, thus, the evidence seized by Gilbert should not have been admitted.
Watkins apparently claims that the trial court should therefore have granted his motion to
suppress. As previously noted in this opinion, Watkins’s motion to suppress was part of a
separate case. Thus, the issue cannot be reached on appeal of this case.
For the reasons discussed herein, counsel’s motion to be relieved is now granted and
the trial court’s decision to revoke Watkins’s probation is affirmed.
Affirmed; motion granted.
G LOVER and C RABTREE, JJ., agree.
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CACR05-70
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