Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Vicki Brown

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION ANDREE LAYTON ROAF, Judge

DIVISION II

TYSON FOODS , INC.

APPELLANT

v.

VICKI BROWN

APPELLEE

CA00-448

NOVEMBER15, 2000

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION E813574

AFFIRMED

Tyson Foods, Inc., appeals a decision of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission finding compensable a knee injury suffered by appellee Vicki Brown. On appeal, it argues that the Commission's decision was incorrect as a matter of law and not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

At her hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), Brown testified that onNovember 21, 1997, as she was turning to ask her line leader a question, her right foot got caught in a cord causing her to fall on both knees. She claimed that her left knee hurt so badly that she could not tell if her right knee was also painful. She was carried to the plant's nurse's station and later that day was sent to the company doctor, Dr. Harris. According to Brown, Dr. Harris diagnosed her with a bruised left knee, and she returned to work the next day.

However, as a result of her fall, she also experienced right-knee pain and weakness, where her knee would "give away." Brown stated that on January 19, 1998, she was walking in her house, and her right knee just gave out. She presented to the Wadley Regional Medical Center Outpatient Clinic later that day, and conservative treatment was prescribed. However, Brown returned to the clinic on February 18, 1998, and February 20, 1998, each time complaining of pain and "give away symptoms." She was referred to Dr. James Keever, who prescribed a knee brace. According to Brown, when she reported to Tyson nurse Margie Richardson that she was being treated for her right-knee complaints, Richardson inquired as to why she did not use the company doctor. Brown stated that she told Richardson that she used her own doctor because she did not know what was "exactly" wrong with her knee, however, she was "sure" that her right-knee problems related back to November 21, 1997, fall. Ultimately, Dr. Keever performed arthroscopic surgery on her right knee.

Brown was shown a copy of the Workers' Compensation Commission form, the AR-N, that she signed on November 21, 1997, and she acknowledged that it stated that she had injured her left knee. However, she stated that she did not have any problems with her knees prior to the November 21, 1997, fall, and she did not have any other accidents subsequent tothat date. Included in the medical exhibits was a physician's workers' compensation questionnaire that was completed by Dr. Keever in which he opined, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that Brown's right-knee injury was work related.

The ALJ found that Brown had proven that her injury was compensable and awarded benefits. The full Commission affirmed by a divided vote.

On appeal, Tyson Foods argues that the Commission's opinion is not supported by the law or by substantial evidence. It contends that the AR-N that Brown completed on November 21, 1997, only recorded a left-knee injury, and her medical treatment that day only focused on her left-knee complaint. Furthermore, Tyson Foods asserts that the onset of Brown's right-knee injury was on January 19, 1998, based on treatment notes from the Wadley Clinic. It argues that Brown's fall at her home was the cause of her right-knee injury. Tyson Foods urges this court to rely on its holding in Barnett v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 62 Ark. App. 265, 970 S.W.2d 319 (1998), to find that Brown's delay in reporting her injury should have been fatal to her claim. Tyson Foods also asserts that Brown's statements regarding her injury were "so inconsistent that they serve to negate each other," and therefore they cannot constitute substantial evidence.

Tyson Foods also argues that the Commission's opinion is not a "true majority opinion," and the concurrence by Commissioner Coffman was not based in fact, but in "speculative benefit of doubt" that accrued to Brown's advantage. It lists the factors cited by Commissioner Coffman in his opinion and asserts that the preponderance of the evidence does not support his conclusion, in large part because the factors that weighed in Brown's favor were "substantially comprised of [Brown's] self-serving testimony." Furthermore, itcontends that the final factor, which it recites as "it is hard to imagine tripping and falling on only one knee without sustaining trauma to the other knee," was not a fact at all, but merely a "statement of personal conjecture." Tyson asserts that speculation cannot take the place of credible evidence. These arguments are without merit.

On appellate review of workers' compensation cases, the appellate court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings of the Workers' Compensation Commission and will affirm the Commission's ruling if there is any substantial evidence to support the findings made. Beaver v. Benton County Child Support Unit, 66 Ark. App. 153, 991 S.W.2d 618 (1999). Substantial evidence is that relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Patterson v. Frito Lay, Inc., 66 Ark. App. 159, 992 S.W.2d 130 (1999). If reasonable minds could reach the Commission's conclusion, its decision must be affirmed. Min-Ark Pallet Co. v. Lindsey, 58 Ark. App. 309, 950 S.W.2d 468 (1997).

It is true that there is evidence in the record that could weigh against a finding of compensability, and that, in large part, the Commission relied on Brown's testimony to establish compensability. However, under the standard of review that we must employ in reviewing workers' compensation cases, these points cannot support a reversal. It is so well settled as to be axiomatic that it is the exclusive function of the Workers' Compensation Commission to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, Williams v. Prostaff Temporaries, 64 Ark. App. 128, 979 S.W.2d 911 (1998), and once the Commission has made its decision on issues of credibility, we are bound by that decision. Express Human Resources III v. Terry, 61 Ark. App. 258, 968 S.W.2d 630 (1998). Here the Commission simply found Brown's explanation regarding her delay in reporting her right-knee malady credible. This determination cannot be reversed on appeal. Moreover, we do not find the inconsistency that Tyson Foods claims exists in Brown's testimony. She consistently attributed her right-knee problems to her November 21, 1997, fall. Furthermore, contrary to Tyson Foods's assertion, Brown did not blame her right-knee injury on her January 19, 1998, fall at home, but rather, Brown merely claimed that the January 19, 1998, incident was the latest occurrence of her right knee giving out, something that only began after her November 21, 1997, fall at work. As to Tyson Foods's resort to Barnett v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co, supra, it is unavailing. In Barnett, this court affirmed a denial of benefits to a claimant who had not only delayed in reporting his injury but also failed to provide credible testimony that explained this delay. Finally, regarding Tyson Foods's invitation to re-weigh the "factors" that Commissioner Coffman cited in his concurrence, under the standard of review, this court is precluded from weighing evidence. Williams v. Prostaff Temporaries, supra. Accordingly, this argument must be found to be without merit.

Affirmed.

Pittman and Griffen, JJ., agree.