Nelda Scroggins v. TTC Illinois, Inc.

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

JUDGE JOSEPHINE LINKER HART

DIVISION II

NELDA SCROGGINS

APPELLANT

V.

TTC ILLINOIS, INC.

APPELLEE

CA00-418··²

d

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November 8, 2000

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION [NO. E500032]

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Nelda Scroggins appeals a decision of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission that both affirmed and adopted as the decision of the full Commission the Administrative Law Judge's findings and conclusions therein. The A.L.J. denied benefits and ruled that appellant had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) she was entitled to additional temporary total disability benefits; and (2) additional medical treatment by Dr. David Huang -- specifically synsovic injections, additional bracing, and a total knee replacement -- was reasonable and necessary medical treatment. Although a number of issues are raised on appeal, we conclude that the case should be remanded to the Commission for more specific findings.

Appellant, while employed by appellee as a truck driver, suffered a compensable injury to her left knee when she slipped and fell as she was exiting her truck on December17, 1994. Although she has been treated by multiple physicians, her primary treating physician has been

Dr. Huang, who performed numerous surgeries on appellant's left knee, including patellar sheve with medical retinacula release and a patellectomy. The medical records reflected that she has undergone extensive physical therapy and various forms of medication therapy. The medical records supported appellant's hearing testimony that she had periodically worked as a truck driver while undergoing medical treatment, but she had not worked for appellee since January, 1998.

Dr. Huang's report dated August 13, 1998, stated:

I do not feel there is anything further we could do to help . . . [appellant]. She will always have residual symptoms.

Continue medications. Continue conservative treatment. Follow-up in 4 months. Impairment is based on range of motion, patellectomy with degenerative arthritis present. She will require about 3 visits per year, occasional physical therapy with modalities and medications as above.

He also issued a second report of the same date that indicated appellant's problem was permanent with assignment of permanent restrictions.

In a report dated November 23, 1998, however, Dr. Huang changed his opinion and stated that appellant "has not reached [maximum medical improvement]. . . . [she] continues to complain of pain and discomfort. . . . [and] I recommend further treatment." This report followed an injury suffered by appellant when her knee hyper-extended as she exited her bed; however, this incident was not the first time her knee had hyper-extended. In fact, she experienced this problem periodically both before and after Dr. Huang's August 13, 1998, report. Dr. Huang nevertheless recommended a total knee replacement along with bracing and synsovic injections.

An independent medical examination was conducted by Dr. James Mulhollan, who testified on March 17, 1999, by deposition that the latest appellant should have reached maximum medical improvement for her compensable left-knee injury was six months after the patellectomy operation. Dr. R. Barry Sorrells, who saw appellant on referral from Dr. Mulhollan, opined that "she pursue a vigorous rehabilitative program with exercises to strengthen the muscles about this left knee and that she be on a diet with an aggressive weight loss program." However, Dr. J.E. Keever, who performed an independent medical examination at appellee's request and from whom appellant later sought medical treatment, stated that appellant was in need of additional medical treatment and also recommended a knee replacement in his March 29, 1999, report.

A hearing was conducted on May 4, 1999, and in a decision dated June 10, 1999, the A.L.J. denied benefits. That decision was later affirmed and adopted by the full Commission, and from the Commission's decision, comes this appeal.

On review, we reverse if the Commission's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-711(b)(4)(D) (Repl. 1996). To determine whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the Commission's findings and affirm if reasonable minds could have reached the Commission's conclusion. See Frances v. Gaylord Container Corp., 341 Ark. 527, 531, 20 S.W.3d 280, 283 (2000) (citing Ester v. National Home Ctrs., Inc., 335 Ark. 356, 981 S.W.2d 91 (1998)).

Appellant argues that the Commission erred by denying her request for additionalmedical services benefits pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-508(a) (Repl. 1996) for the total knee replacement, synsovic injections, and additional bracing that Dr. Huang suggested. The Commission-adopted A.L.J. decision, however, only detailed the various medical opinions concerning the suggested total knee replacement1, but its discussion regarding Dr. Huang's remaining suggestions for medical treatment was more in the nature of a conclusion.2 In Wright v. American Transp., 18 Ark. App. 18, 21, 709 S.W.2d 107, 110 (1986), we concluded that the Commission's decision in that case did not "constitute such a finding as enables this court to make a meaningful review of the case and a determination of whether . . . the law was . . . properly applied by the Commission." In doing so, we reasoned that:

A claimant is entitled to know the factual findings upon which his claim is denied. In 100 C.J.S. 910, Workmen's Compensation § 629, it is stated: "When compensation is denied, findings sufficient to justify such denial must be made."

Wright, 18 Ark. App. at 21-22, 709 S.W.2d at 110.

In the case at bar, the A.L.J. failed to discuss all the proposed treatments prescribed by Dr. Huang and simply stated, "Claimant has failed to prove that the additional medical treatment recommended by Dr. Huang is reasonable and necessary for her compensable leftknee injury." This general statement does not constitute a finding with regard to all of the proposed medical treatments and, thus, we are unable to make a meaningful review and determine whether the law was properly applied by the Commission.3 Specifically, the Commission made no findings as to whether the proposed synsovic injections and additional bracing was reasonable and necessary.

We are simply unable to ascertain from the record the factual basis for denying this claim for these treatments, and are, consequently, unable to determine whether the Commission erred in its application of the law. A situation such as this is frustrating because "[t]his court does not review decisions of the Commission de novo on the record or make findings of fact that the Commission should have made but did not." Sonic Drive-In v. Wade, 36 Ark. App. 4, 6, 816 S.W.2d 889, 890-891 (1991). Therefore, "[w]hen the Commission fails to make specific findings upon which it relies to support its decision, reversal and remand of the case is appropriate." Wright, 18 Ark. App. at 22, 709 S.W.2d at 110 (citingThe Home Ins. Co. v. Meeker, 9 Ark. App. 201, 657 S.W.2d 215 (1983)). Furthermore, we have deemed it appropriate to decline to address issues that may remain in remanded workers' compensation cases such as this so as to avoid deciding the case piecemeal on appeal. See Sonic Drive-In, 36 Ark. App. at 6, 816 S.W.2d at 891. Accordingly, we decline to address the issues concerning the Commission's decision denying temporary total disability.

Reversed and remanded.

PITTMAN and CRABTREE, JJ., agree.

1 The Commission noted the opinions of Drs. Mulhollan and Sorrells that appellant was too overweight for a total knee replacement surgery to be successful, and Drs. Huang and Keever's opinions that although appellant should lose weight, she was still in need of a total knee replacement.

2 The decision simply failed to offer any meaningful discussion regarding the proposed synsovic injections or additional bracing from any of the physicians on whom the Commission relied for its decision.

3 In Wright, we offered the following definition of a "specific finding of fact":

"It is a simple, straightforward statement of what happened. A statement of what the [Commission] . . . finds has happened; not a statement that a witness, or witnesses, testified thus and so. It is stated in sufficient relevant detail to make it mentally graphic, i.e., it enables the reader to picture in his mind's eye what happened. And when the reader is a reviewing court the statement must contain all the specific facts relevant to the contested issue or issues so that the court may determine whether the [Commission] . . . has resolved those issues in conformity with the law."

Wright, 18 Ark. App. at 21, 709 S.W.2d at 109 (quoting Whispering Pines Home for Senior Citizens v. Nicalek, 48 Ind. Dec. 568, 333 N.E.2d 324 (1975)).