Larry D. French v. Rheem Manufacturing Company

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, JUDGE

DIVISION II

LARRY D. FRENCH

APPELLANT

V.

RHEEM MANUFACTURING CO.

APPELLEE

CA00-307

October 18, 2000

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

[NO. E809965]

AFFIRMED

The appellant in this workers' compensation case began working for Rheem in 1976. In the early 1980's, he underwent surgery for work-related cubital tunnel syndrome, a condition resulting from entrapment of the ulnar nerve at the elbow. Appellant resumed working for Rheem without further incident until 1998, when he reported that he was experiencing numbness in the fingers of his right hand while performing his duties as press operator. He was diagnosed with right cubital tunnel syndrome, and corrective surgery was performed on October 15, 1998. Appellant filed a claim for benefits that was denied because the Commission found that he failed to prove that his 1998 episode of cubital tunnel syndrome arose out of his employment. From that decision, comes this appeal.

Appellant contends that there is no substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding that he failed to prove that his cubital tunnel syndrome arose out of his employment. We disagree, and we affirm.

Our standard of review is well-settled:

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings of the Workers' Compensation Commission, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission's findings and affirm if they are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The question is not whether the evidence would have supported findings contrary to the ones made by the Commission; there may be substantial evidence to support the Commission's decision even though we might have reached a different conclusion if we sat as the trier of fact or heard the case de novo. In making our review, we recognize that it is the function of the Commission to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. The Commission has the duty of weighing medical evidence and, if the evidence is conflicting, its resolution is a question of fact for the Commission. The Commission is not required to believe the testimony of the claimant or any other witness, but may accept and translate into findings of fact only those portions of the testimony it deems worthy of belief. Where, as here, the Commission has denied a claim because of a failure to show entitlement by a preponderance of the evidence, the substantial evidence standard of review requires us to affirm if the Commission's opinion displays a substantial basis for the denial of relief.

Whaley v. Hardee's, 51 Ark. App. 166, 167-68, 912 S.W.2d 14, 15 (1995). In the present case, appellant's physician, Dr. James Kelley, testified that cubital tunnel syndrome could be caused by trauma or by rapid repetitive motion. Dr. Kelley was of the opinion that appellant's 1998 cubital tunnel syndrome was not a recurrence of his earlier episode, becausesuch a recurrence was likely to happen within two years of the initial surgery if it were to happen at all. Instead, Dr. Kelley opined that appellant's 1998 cubital tunnel syndrome was a new injury brought about by rapid repetitive motion in appellant's employment.

Although the Commission acknowledged that Dr. Kelley was a highly competent orthopedic surgeon with great expertise in the area of medicine associated with appellant's condition, it nevertheless found that his opinion was entitled to no weight because it was rendered without knowledge of relevant facts necessary to formulate an opinion on causation. The Commission noted that Dr. Kelley was not aware that appellant injured his right elbow at home in 1996 when he fell off a ladder and was treated by Dr. McCraw, who reported that appellant presented with pain overlying the right ulnar nerve. At the hearing, Dr. Kelley was informed of Dr. McCraw's report and conceded that an injury to the right elbow could have caused appellant's cubital tunnel syndrome.

It is axiomatic that the weighing of medical evidence and the resolution of conflicts therein is a question of fact for the Commission, and the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are matters solely within the province of the Commission. See, e.g., Jeter v. B.R. McGinty Mechanical, 62 Ark. App. 53, 968 S.W.2d 645 (1998); Teague v. C & J Chemical Co., 55 Ark. App. 335, 935 S.W.2d 605 (1996). In deciding the weight and credibility of the opinion and medical evidence, the Commission is entitled to review the basis for a doctor's opinion. Maverick Transportation v. Buzzard, 69 Ark. App. 128, 10 S.W.3d 467 (2000); Crow v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 46 Ark. App. 295, 880 S.W.2d 320 (1994). The Commission did so in the case at bar and found that Dr. Kelley was unawareof facts necessary to formulate a valid opinion on causation. This constitutes a substantial basis for denying relief, see Whaley v. Hardee's, supra, and we hold that the Commission's opinion is supported by substantial evidence.

Affirmed.

Hart and Meads, JJ., agree.