Edward Eugene Thompson v. State of Arkansas

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

TERRY CRABTREE, JUDGE

DIVISION III

EDWARD EUGENE THOMPSON

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR 00-523

DECEMBER 6, 2000

APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CR-99-99-G]

HONORABLE JOE MICHAEL FITZHUGH, CIRCUIT JUDGE

AFFIRMED

A jury sitting in the Sebastian County Circuit Court convicted the appellant, Eddie Eugene Thompson, of residential burglary, a Class B felony, and theft of property, a Class C felony. Appellant was sentenced to a term of fifty years as an habitual offender in the Arkansas Department of Correction, fined $10,000, and ordered to pay $1,278 in restitution. On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting his conviction for theft of property. We affirm.

Appellant made motions for a directed verdict at the end of the State's case and at the close of all the evidence. In those motions, appellant argued that the State had failed to prove the statutory elements of theft of property, and that the State had failed to show sufficient evidence of the value of the stolen items to justify a felony conviction for theft of

property. A motion for a directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Smith v. State, 68 Ark. App. 106, 3 S.W.3d 712 (1999). The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Id. In determining whether a finding of guilt is supported by substantial evidence, we review the evidence, including any that may have been erroneously admitted, in the light most favorable to the verdict. Willingham v. State, 60 Ark. App. 132, 959 S.W.2d 74 (1998). Substantial evidence is that which is of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other, without resort to speculation or conjecture. Dodson v. State, 341 Ark. 41, 14 S.W.3d 489 (2000).

It is well settled that a general motion is insufficient to preserve a defendant's argument that the statutory elements of his crime were not proved. Stewart v. State, 320 Ark. 75, 894 S.W.2d 930 (1995). Below, appellant made a general motion as to all of the elements of the offense of theft of property and a specific motion as to the value of the stolen items. We need not address whether the State successfully proved all of the elements of the offense of theft of property. We are only permitted to address whether the State sufficiently proved the value of the stolen items. "Value" is defined as the market value of the property at the time and place of the offense, or if market value cannot be ascertained, the cost of replacing the property. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-101(11)(A) (Repl. 1997). According to Arkansas Code Annotated § 5-36-103(b)(2) (Repl. 1997), theft of property is a Class C felony if the value of the property is between $500 and $2,500, or if the property is a firearm valued at less than $2,500.

Jeff Jones testified that on July 15, 1999, while he was at work, someone broke a doorjamb at his home and removed a CD player, a sixteen-gauge shotgun, a twenty-two caliber rifle, a microwave, a VCR, a cell-phone case, and a nineteen-inch television. At trial, an audio-taped statement by appellant was admitted into evidence, in which he admitted to entering the home and taking personal property. Jones also testified, without objection, that his insurance company paid him $701.54, above his $500 deductible, for the stolen property. Jones stated that the value of the property exceeded the statutory minimum of $500.

In Clemmons v. State, 303 Ark. 265, 795 S.W.2d 927 (1990), the victim testified, without objection, that his insurance company paid him a certain amount for both stolen and damaged property. Our supreme court held that the hearsay evidence, which was admitted without objection, could constitute substantial evidence to support a conviction. In the case at bar, we believe that testimony of the amount of money paid by the insurance company for Jones' stolen items is sufficient to establish "value." Moreover, Jones testified that two firearms were stolen, and Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-103(b)(2)(C) only requires evidence of one firearm valued at less than $2,500 as proof of a Class C felony.

We find that the State produced sufficient evidence to establish the value of Jones' stolen items so as to justify appellant's conviction for theft of property as a Class C felony.

Affirmed.

Koonce and MEADS, JJ., agree.