Lonnie Beulah v. State of Arkansas

ar00-506

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JOHN F. STROUD, JR., JUDGE

DIVISION IV

LONNIE BEULAH

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR 00-506

December 13, 2000

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, 7TH DIVISION [CR99-3726]

HONORABLE JOHN B. PLEGGE,

CIRCUIT JUDGE

AFFIRMED

This is a criminal case in which the appellant, Lonnie Beulah, has filed an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's refusal to transfer the case to juvenile court. Appellant was charged, along with other persons, with the offenses of capital murder and first-degree battery. He was fifteen years old at the time of the offenses, which arose from the beating of a pregnant woman that resulted in the death of her unborn child. For his point of appeal, appellant contends that the circuit court erred in refusing to transfer the case to juvenile court because the court did not make written findings with respect to each of the statutory factors that are to be considered in deciding whether to transfer. We find no error and affirm the trial court's decision to retain jurisdiction.

Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-318(g) (Supp. 1999), provides:

(g) In making the decision to retain jurisdiction or to transfer the case, the court shall make written findings and consider all of the following factors:

(1) The seriousness of the alleged offense and whether the protection of society requires prosecution as an extended juvenile jurisdiction offender or in circuit court;

(2) Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner;

(3) Whether the offense was against a person or property, with greater weight being given to offenses against persons, especially if personal injury resulted;

(4) The culpability of the juvenile, including the level of planning and participation in the alleged offense;

(5) The previous history of the juvenile, including whether the juvenile had been adjudicated a juvenile offender and, if so, whether the offenses were against persons or property, and any other previous history of antisocial behavior or patterns of physical violence;

(6) The sophistication or maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration of the juvenile's home, environment, emotional attitude, pattern of living, or desire to be treated as an adult;

(7) Whether there are facilities or programs available to the court which are likely to rehabilitate the juvenile prior to the expiration of the court's jurisdiction;

(8) Whether the juvenile acted alone or was part of a group in the commission of the alleged offense;

(9) Written reports and other materials relating to the juvenile's mental, physical, educational, and social history; and

(10) Any other factors deemed relevant by the court.

We will not reverse a trial court's decision to retain jurisdiction unless it is clearly erroneous. Rhodes v. State, 332 Ark. 516, 967 S.W.2d 550 (1998); Jongewaard v. State, 71 Ark. App. _____, ____ S.W.3d ____ (2000).

Here, appellant presented the testimony of several persons who were familiar with him and who testified in essence that he was a good kid and that he would be a good candidate for rehabilitation. However, the homicide detective testified for the State that he investigated the events that occurred on August 26, 1999; that he was notified of a home intrusion robbery around midnight; and that shortly after he and other officers arrived on the scene, they received word that one of the victims was nine months pregnant and had lost her child. He stated that they obtained information that the pregnant woman had been returning home with her former boyfriend, Erik Bullock, who was also the father of the unborn child, and with her five-year-old son; that they entered Bullock's apartment and three black males grabbed them and took Bullock to one of the back bedrooms and the child to another bedroom, and that the pregnant woman was thrown to the floor of the living room where she was kicked and beaten. The victim's statement was that three people participated in the kicking and beating; that it went on for several minutes; and that the suspects left when the beating stopped. She reported that when she asked Bullock to call the police, he told her his phone was out of service, so she went next door and the neighbors called 911. She received medical treatment, but lost the baby.

The detective also testified that during the course of his investigation, appellant became a suspect in the beating; that appellant and his two brothers were at Bullock's residence after the incident occurred; that appellant was located; and that he gave a statement regarding his involvement in the incident. According to the detective, appellant told the officers that he and his brothers came to Little Rock in order to do a robbery that Bullockhad asked them to do; that Bullock let them into his residence, said he was going to get the woman, and that when they returned, appellant and his brothers were to do a mock robbery. The detective further testified that appellant also told them that if he was going to hit her, he was going to get paid, but that he was never actually paid. The detective testified that appellant never said in his statement that he knew they were going to beat her to kill the child, but rather that the reason was to get her out of Bullock's life; and that other suspects interviewed in the case implicated appellant as having participated in this beating.

Finally, Exhibit Number 1 was presented by the State. It showed a juvenile adjudication for appellant for a misdemeanor of obstructing governmental operations, an offense that was committed on October 28, 1998, and to which he entered a no-contest plea on April 13, 1999.

In its order denying appellant's motion to transfer to juvenile court, the circuit court determined that "due to the violent nature of this offense and the seriousness of the charge, the Court concludes that Lonnie Beulah should be tried as an adult." The court went on to state its finding that the following factors applied to appellant and required the court to retain jurisdiction:

1. The seriousness of the offense of capital murder and the protection of society require this defendant to be prosecuted in circuit court.

2. From the testimony elicited at the hearing, it is this Court's determination that the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated and willful manner.

3. This alleged offense was committed against a person, and a death resulted.

4. The culpability of the juvenile is great in this case, in that there was planning on the part of the defendant to participate in the crime and a high level of participation in the crime.

5. The defendant has been previously convicted in juvenile court of a misdemeanor offense.

6. The defendant was part of a group in the commission of the alleged offense. In addition, the defendant gave a statement to the police that he was to be paid for his participation in the alleged offense.

Appellant asks this court to "reverse and remand with instructions to the circuit court to consider all of the statutory factors in its written findings." He contends that the language of Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-318 was changed by the legislature in 1999, and, in effect, now requires that the trial court not only consider all of the statutory factors pertaining to whether a case should be retained or transferred to juvenile court but that it make written findings with respect to each factor. He cites no authority for his position, other than the statutory language itself.

We recently addressed this issue in Jongewaard v. State, 71 Ark. App. _____, _____ S.W.3d _____ (2000), where we held that "the trial court did not clearly err where the findings of fact rendered on appellant's motion to transfer did not explicitly detail the rulings on the ten factors contained in Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318 (Supp. 1999)." Here, as in Jongewaard, supra, the abstract fully supports the conclusion that the factors were considered by the trial court, and the fact that the court did not detail each of the ten factors in its order does not mean that it failed to consider every factor.

Finally, we note that included in his brief to this court is appellant's petition for writs of prohibition "forbidding the circuit court to try Beulah for capital murder for the killing of a fetus, and to seek the death penalty for such an offense." Rule 1-2(a)3 of the Rules of the Supreme Court provides that petitions for prohibition directed to circuit courts shall be filed in the supreme court. Appellant's petition was earlier submitted to the supreme court and denied by it in an order dated July 7, 2000. Accordingly, the petition is not properly before this court and therefore we do not address it.

Affirmed.

Jennings and Bird, JJ., agree.