Juan Jordan v. State of Arkansas

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

JOHN E. JENNINGS, JUDGE

DIVISION I

CACR 00-313

November 1, 2000

JUAN JORDAN APPEAL FROM PULASKI COUNTY

APPELLANT CIRCUIT COURT, FOURTH DIVISION

VS.

HONORABLE JOHN LANGSTON,

CIRCUIT JUDGE

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE AFFIRMED

Juan Jordan was found guilty by the court, sitting as trier of fact, of possession of cocaine and was sentenced to three years in the Arkansas Department of Correction. The sole argument on appeal is that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. We hold that the conviction is supported by substantial evidence and affirm.

At trial, Scott Timmons, a Little Rock police officer, testified that on April 15, 1999, he stopped a 1997 Geo Prism driven by the appellant. Officer Timmons testified that he was familiar with the vehicle and that it was known to be driven by oneJabez Thompson, who had warrants for his arrest. He stopped the car to see if Mr. Thompson was an occupant of the vehicle.

After stopping the car he found that Juan Jordan was driving and that he had no proof of insurance or vehicle registration, and he prepared to impound the car. Officers Follett and Harrington arrived, and Timmons testified that they frisked Jordan for weapons and had him sit in the back of their patrol car while the ticket was being written.

Teresa Harrington testified that she and Officer Follett were in the same patrol car and came on shift together. She testified that they "pre-tripped" the vehicle, which included lifting out the back seat to check for contraband. She testified that there was no contraband in the patrol car when they "pre-tripped" it. She testified that Officer Follett conducted a "safety pat-down" of the appellant and that he was placed unhandcuffed into the back of their patrol car. Officer Harrington also testified that Mr. Jordan was the first person that had been placed in the patrol car that day.

On cross-examination she testified that Mr. Jordan was actually patted down twice. On re-cross the following transpired:

BY MR. CLOUTTE:

Q: When you did your trip search, did you perform it?

A: Yes, I did.

Q: Did you pull your seats up?

A: Yes.

Q: Do you remember for sure you pulled your seats up, that particular day?

A: Yes, Sir. I do it every day.

Q: Do it every day?

A: Uh huh.

Q: Then you are testifying that you have that habit of doing it, so you're assum ing you did it?

A: No, I do it every day.

Q: Okay. But you are not remembering this specific day, you just know you have that habit, is that correct?

A: Yes, Sir; that's correct.

Officer Harrington also testified that after they let Mr. Jordan out of the patrol car to sign the citation, she checked the back seat and at that time she found a white, plastic baggy containing several rocks of what appeared to be crack cocaine. The substance was later determined by the state crime lab to have been cocaine.

Jason Follett, also a Little Rock police officer, testified that he did a pat-down search of Mr. Jordan before he was placed in the back of their patrol car. He testified that he participated in the pre-trip search and that he saw Officer Harrington pull the seat up. He testified that the entire back seat is removed during the process.

Appellant testified and denied that the cocaine was his. He also testified:

So I signed the ticket, and turned around to hand Officer Follett his pen back, they both pushed me to the car and put handcuffs on me. She ran around to the passenger side and opened the back door and reached in and picked something up real quick, you know, like, yeah, we got him now. And I was like, I just started yelling and screaming to the neigh bors, you all see them planting these drugs on me, this that and the other.

Substantial evidence is that which is of sufficient force to compel a conclusion one way or another. Cerda v. State, 303 Ark. 241, 795 S.W.2d 358 (1990). It must be more than mere speculation or conjecture. Williams v. State, 289 Ark. 443, 711 S.W.2d 825 (1986). Neither exclusive nor physical possession is necessary to sustain a charge if the place where the offending substance is found is under the dominion and control of the accused. Crossley v. State, 304 Ark. 378, 802 S.W.2d 459 (1991). Put in other terms, the State need not prove that the accused had actual possession of a controlled substance; constructive possession is sufficient. Embry v. State, 302 Ark. 608, 792 S.W.2d 318 (1990). Constructive possession may be inferred where the contraband is found in a place immediately and exclusively accessible to the accused and subject to his control. Crossley v. State, supra.

On this evidence the circuit judge, as trier of fact, could reasonably infer that it was appellant who hid the bag of cocaineunderneath the back seat of the patrol car. The conviction is supported by substantial evidence.

Affirmed.

Crabtree and Roaf, JJ., agree.