Coy Lee Anderson v. State of Arkansas

ar00-154

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

WENDELL L. GRIFFEN, JUDGE

DIVISION I

CACR00-154

September 20, 2000

COY LEE ANDERSON AN APPEAL FROM OUACHITA

APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[CR98-244]

V. HON. CAROL CRAFTON-ANTHONY,

JUDGE

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE AFFIRMED

Coy Lee Anderson appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery. His sole argument is that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain his conviction. We disagree and affirm his conviction.

On September 23, 1998, while incarcerated on an unrelated charge, appellant was arrested for aggravated robbery in connection with an incident on September 16, 1998, at Star Cleaners in Camden, Arkansas. Appellant received a jury trial. The State submitted into evidence appellant's confession in which he admitted that he committed the robbery. The State also presented testimony by three employees who were present whenthe robbery took place, the investigating officers, two witnesses who saw a person matching the description of the perpetrator fleeing the area, and appellant's friend who testified that he picked appellant up in the area.

At the close of the State's evidence, appellant moved for a directed verdict on the ground that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove that he was the person who committed the robbery. Specifically, appellant argued that none of the witnesses to the robbery identified him as the perpetrator; that the witnesses gave three different heights for the perpetrator; and that there was insufficient evidence regarding the race and age of the perpetrator. The trial court denied the motion. At the close of all of the evidence, appellant renewed his motion for a directed verdict on the same grounds. The trial court again denied the motion. The jury found appellant guilty, and he was sentenced to serve 120 months in the Arkansas Department of Correction.

I. Standard of Review

We treat a motion for a directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. See Killian v. State, 60 Ark. App. 127, 128, 959 S.W.2d 432, 433 (1998). The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, whether direct or circumstantial. See id. When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, we will look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, considering only the evidence that supports the judgment or verdict. See Darrough v. State, 330 Ark. 808, 810, 957 S.W.2d 707, 708 (1997); Killian, supra at 128, 959 S.W.2d at 433. We will affirm if there is substantial evidenceto support a verdict. See Ryan v. State, 30 Ark. App. 196, 786 S.W.2d 835 (1990). Evidence is sufficient to support a verdict if it is forceful enough to compel a conclusion one way or another. See Hall v. State, 315 Ark. 385, 868 S.W.2d 453 (1993). Where the evidence is circumstantial, we must consider whether the evidence was sufficient to exclude all other reasonable hypotheses. See Carter v. State, 324 Ark. 395, 398, 921 S.W.2d 924, 925 (1996).

II. Appellant's Confession

Appellant confessed to committing the robbery. After he was informed of his Miranda rights, he told Officer Sherman Bell:

I went up in there and told her to put the money in the bag. She put it in there. I left the store, got in the car, and I got dropped off at the house. Jonah Willis was driving the car. He took me to a house on Visor Street. I had a BB gun. I gave Mr. Willis two-hundred and something of the money. I had a mask on when I went into the store, it was a toboggan. It had holes for the eyes. I went into Star Cleaners on North Adams Street. I had a paper sack in one hand and a BB gun in the other hand. I told the girl to put the money in the sack, and she put the money in the bag. I then went out of the store ran up the street, got in the car, and went to my house. We went to Auto Zone. He bought something with part of the money that I gave him. I went home after we left Auto Zone.

Appellant appears to argue that his confession is unreliable and that the State did not sufficiently corroborate his confession. He testified that in his statement to the police he merely repeated what Officer Bell told him regarding the incident. He testified that he was informed of his Miranda rights, and he did not

really know why I gave the statement. I don't understand the law and he was kind of talking over my head. I was kind of scared at first. I just didn't know what to say, so I just went along with what he said . . . . I justrepeated what he had told me he said on the tape, but I didn't know what really took place.

However, appellant did not argue below that his confession was coerced. It is well-settled that this court will not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Breedlove v. State, 62 Ark. App. 219, 970 S.W.2d 313 (1998). The only possible argument that may be gleaned from appellant's testimony below is that his confession was false, and is therefore, unreliable.

Appellant's argument fails for two reasons. First, the credibility of the accused's confession is a determination for the jury. See Fitzhugh v. State, 293 Ark. 315, 319, 737 S.W.2d 638, 640 (1987). Moreover, an accused's confession that is made outside of court, along with other evidence that the crime was committed by someone, is sufficient to support a conviction. See id. We hold that appellant's confession was sufficiently corroborated by the State's additional evidence.

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Appellant does not argue that the State did not present sufficient evidence to establish the elements of the crime of aggravated robbery. Instead, he argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to show he was the perpetrator. Specifically, he argues that none of the three witnesses to the robbery identified him as the perpetrator; neither of the two additional witnesses who saw the perpetrator outside of the store identified him as the perpetrator; and the State presented no physical evidence, such as a gun, ski mask, clothing, or money to link appellant to the robbery. The State counters that it presented sufficient proof that appellant was the perpetrator.

We hold that substantial evidence supports the trial court's denial of appellant's motion for a directed verdict. Jolynne Youngblood, an employee of Star Cleaners, testified that she was working in the back of the store when she saw a man walk in the store. She stated the man was approximately five-feet-six-inches tall, wore blue jeans, a dark colored t-shirt, and green ski mask. She testified that she noticed the perpetrator's complexion around his eyes was black. Youngblood further testified the man was holding a pistol, "pointed right kind of under his arm." She stated that she was very frightened and ran out the back door of the store, along a nearby drainage ditch, and attempted to get help. She estimated that the perpetrator took $530 from the cash register.

Martha Taylor, another employee, testified that as she was walking from the back of the store toward the front, she saw the robber. She stated he was about five-feet-seven-inches tall, and was wearing blue jeans, a black T-shirt, blue jeans, and a green ski mask. She stated that he carried a gun, and she heard him say "give me all of your money." She then fled through the back of the store with Youngblood, and they attempted to get help.

Emily Parnell, the third employee who witnessed the robbery, testified that she was walking toward the front of the store, and was the closest person to the front door. She stated that the perpetrator came running in the store and was putting on a light green ski mask as he was running. Parnell testified that as he approached the counter, he pointed a gun with a "skinny barrel" at her head, and ordered her to give him all of the money. She testified that he was approximately five-feet-five or five-feet-six-inches tall, and thathe wore a black shirt and blue jeans. She stated that she gave him all of the bills in the cash register in a small brown paper sack. She testified that after she gave him the money, he ran out of the store, heading north. At this point, Parnell telephoned the police.

Ronald Harrison testified that he saw two women cross a drainage ditch near the cleaners, and he saw an individual exit the front door of Star Cleaners and run north on Adams Street. He saw the same individual turn west on Hildreth Street. He stated the individual looked back at him, and he noticed the individual was wearing a ski mask. Harrison stated that he "thought something might have happened at Star Cleaners." He went back to the cleaners and found Parnell crying, and stating that she had just been robbed. Harrison stayed with her until the police arrived, and gave the police a description of what he had witnessed.

Clarence McKinney testified that as he was traveling west on Hildreth Street, he noticed a young black male running from behind one of the nearby residences. He stated the male was running with his right hand underneath his left armpit, that he was five-feet-six or five-feet-seven inches tall, and weighed approximately 140 to 145 pounds. He further stated that the male flagged down and got into a slow-moving Monte Carlo with a small, spare "donut" tire on the right passenger side.

Captain Gary Vaughn of the Camden Police Department testified that, based on the information provided by the employees and Harrison and McKinney, the police began searching the neighborhood. Approximately fifty minutes after the search began, hespotted a Monte Carlo matching the description provided by McKinney. He stopped the vehicle, which was driven by Jonah Willis. He also stated that in his report, Parnell described the perpetrator as being approximately five-feet-nine-inches tall.

Willis testified that on the day of the robbery, he was driving a grey Monte Carlo that had a "donut" tire on the front of the vehicle. He stated he was driving through the neighborhood where Star Cleaners is located, when appellant ran out from behind some bushes and attempted to flag Willis down. He did not stop at that point, but stopped a few minutes later. Willis further stated that appellant was wearing a black T-shirt and blue pants, and had a brown paper sack in his hand. Appellant appeared to be out of breath and asked Willis to take him home. Willis stated that he dropped appellant at his girlfriend's house, then proceeded to an auto parts store. On his way back from this store, Willis was stopped by Officer Vaughn. He further stated that he was informed of his Miranda rights and gave a statement to the police. He testified that he did not see a gun and appellant did not tell him where he had been or what he had been doing.

Lieutenant Sherman Bell of the Camden Police Department testified that he advised appellant of his Miranda rights, and appellant gave a statement, which was admitted into evidence. Officer Bell testified that appellant also stated he had thrown the gun into a wooded area, but the police were unable to retrieve the gun. Bell also testified that he searched Willis's vehicle, but found no ski mask or paper sack.

Appellant testified that he was not in Star Cleaners on the day the store was robbed. He denied that he had a gun, wore a mask, or took any money from thepremises.

We hold the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for a directed verdict. The evidence against appellant was mostly circumstantial. The law regarding sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction has been stated as follows:

The question [as to] whether circumstantial evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused is usually one for the jury. (Citations omitted) The jury is permitted to draw any reasonable inference from circumstantial evidence to the same extent it can from direct evidence. It is only when circumstantial evidence leaves the jury solely to speculation and conjecture that it is insufficient as a matter of law . . . . (Citation omitted)

Harshaw v. State, 275 Ark. 481, 482, 631 S.W.2d 300, 302 (1982). The Harshaw court further stated, "Where common sense will allow no other reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the evidence but that the accused was involved in the robbery[,] the denial of a motion for a directed verdict cannot be regarded as error." Id. at 484, 631 S.W.2d at 302.

Appellant correctly notes that the State produced no physical evidence to link him to the robbery, that no witness positively identified him as the robber, and that the State introduced no evidence as to his height and weight. However, appellant's confession, in conjunction with 1) the witnesses' descriptions of the perpetrator; 2) the testimony as to the sequence of the perpetrator's actions; and 3) Willis's description of appellant's location, clothing, and possession of a brown paper bag, all in such close geographic and temporal proximity to the crime, are sufficient to exclude other reasonable hypotheses. It is true that the witnesses's description of the perpetrator's height varied slightly; thatonly two witnesses testified as to the race of the perpetrator; and that Willis's testimony conflicted slightly with appellant's statement. However, it is well-settled that determining the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight with which to give their testimony is a function of the trier-of-fact, which in this case was the jury. See Williams v. State, 338 Ark. 178, 992 S.W.2d 89 (1999). The evidence submitted in this case was sufficient to allow the jury to infer, without resort to speculation and conjecture, that appellant was the person who committed the robbery. Common sense allows no other reasonable explanation.

Affirmed.

Hart and Jennings, JJ., agree.